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Preface 
The Nepal office of the World Bank has contracted the Centre for International Development and 
Training at the University of Wolverhampton, United Kingdom, and the Nepal Institute for Social and 
Environmental Research, to carry out a technical assistance (TA) project that enhances the 
understanding of disaster risk management (DRM) and social protection (SP) programs and delivery 
systems to assess how SP programs could improve risk management and preparedness and better 
respond to shocks. The work aims to contribute to the continued evolution of SP and improved 
shock response in Nepal through the production of recommendations for improving policies, 
systems, institutions, and programs in SP to tackle key development in Nepal.  
The overall objective of the work is the production of a range of reviews and recommendations on 
possible policy, programmatic, and institutional measures to make SP programs in Nepal—in 
particular Social Security Allowances (SSAs), and public works programs (PWPs) at the outset of the 
project the Karnali Employment Programs (KEP) and Rural Community Infrastructure Works (RCIW) 
and later the new Prime Minister’s Employment Program)—more adaptive.  
Underpinning this overall objective will be a set of analytical activities—a risk profile; reviews of 
policies, systems, institutions, and programs working on SP and shock response; case studies of 
earthquake, landslide, fire, and flood; the identification of international good practice; and 
consideration of cross-cutting issues including institutional structures and the engagement of non-
state actors. This report draws together the profiling and review activities and offers 
recommendations for actions to support adaptive social protection (ASP) in the future.  
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Executive Summary 
A key challenge in Nepal is the intersection of predictable chronic or seasonal poverty and 
vulnerability, with rapid-onset and acute shocks. Nepal in the last few decades has epitomized the 
‘perfect storm’ in which a number of different factors—disasters, conflict, political uncertainty, and 
challenges to economic growth—coincide with deleterious effects on people’s well-being and 
development progress. While social protection (SP) is playing an increasing role in tackling chronic 
and seasonal poverty and wider vulnerability and exclusion, recent disasters in Nepal, particularly in 
2015, highlight how making SP more flexible and adaptive could allow a more effective and efficient 
development and humanitarian response. 
The World Bank in Nepal contracted the Centre for International Development and Training at the 
University of Wolverhampton, United Kingdom, and the Nepal Institute for Social and Environmental 
Research, to carry out the technical assistance (TA) project ‘Review of policies, systems and 
programs in social protection and shock response for adaptive social protection in Nepal’. The 
overall objective of the work is to make recommendations on possible policy, programmatic, and 
institutional measures for more adaptive social protection (ASP). The analysis was delivered using a 
mixed-methods approach. An analysis of existing data (including the Household Risk and 
Vulnerability Survey [HRVS] data) was used to understand the scope and coverage of existing 
programs and their links to disasters and shocks. A desk review of literature explored legislation and 
policies, program documentation and official implementation guidelines, and evaluations and 
research. Interviews took place with key informants at the national, district, and local government 
levels as did focus group discussions (FGDs) and individual interviews, especially with recipients of SP 
programs, at the ward or village level in the districts of Bardiya, Humla, Saptari, and Sindhupalchok.  
The year 2018 (or 2074/2075 in Nepal) is both a particularly difficult moment to assess the existing 
policies, programs, and systems for shock response in Nepal and a particularly opportune one. The 
transition to a federal system means that some implementing institutions are tying up while other 
fledgling tiers of government are embarking on delivering disaster risk management (DRM) or SP for 
the first time. Some government staff are being deployed from district to local government 
assignments and embarking on new roles often with new or different responsibilities. Recently 
elected new local government leaders are conceiving disaster management strategies in their 
locales, considering how to best support the most excluded and vulnerable people in their 
constituencies, and seeking to work out the best use of the resources available to them. The new 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act (DRRM - 2074) provides the new legislative framework 
for managing disasters, but implementation is only just beginning. 
Despite the substantial difficulties, there is also a great opportunity—to assess how far the emerging 
new systems for SP might link to the emerging policies, systems, and institutional and financing 
arrangements for DRM at a moment when it is still possible to influence the arrangements. Thus, 
this is an apt moment to look at new ways of enabling Nepal to tackle the greatest of its challenges 
(poverty, vulnerability, and climate change). The transition to a federal political system and the 
decentralization of mandates to the local government level, precisely at a time when the urgency of 
tackling disasters and climate change has never been greater, presents a rare opportunity to 
influence, and perhaps shift, the policy discourse. 
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Findings 
Nepal ranks high on the list of disaster-prone countries, with further shocks associated with health, 
political instability, and economic shocks. Particular household and individual features (such as being 
a female-headed household or having a person over age 70 in the household) do seem to affect 
exposure to some shocks, but these are political, economic, and health-related shocks and not 
natural disasters. 
In the SP sector, Nepal has made substantial progress in the past few decades to establish a suite of 
SP programs; however, the SP system remains rather fragmented and there is limited coverage of 
the poorest in Nepal, which has implications for the extent to which SP can be made more flexible, 
adaptive, and able to contribute to DRM. Progress with strengthening management information 
systems (MIS) and payments systems is ongoing and will be critical to make SP more adaptive. For 
example, given that the Social Security Allowances (SSAs) are paid three times a year, there is 
potential to improve timings of payments—particularly in the Terai districts—to better align with 
flood risks and the risk of cold waves. Using SP to deliver shock response has been demonstrated as 
feasible following the 2015 earthquake. However, other areas of ASP have received less attention. 
Rather less progress has been made to maximize the roles of SP in disaster mitigation, preparedness, 
and recovery, but there is substantial potential for SP to contribute more to disaster mitigation by 
increasing household resilience. 
The transition to a federal political system and decentralized mandates and responsibilities for SP at 
the local level present challenges for the delivery of SP, and there are gaps in ensuring accountability 
and oversight. Similarly, in the DRM sector, it will take time before the arrangements provided for in 
DRRM - 2074 are implemented, especially at the local level. The act lays out the roles and 
responsibilities of the three tiers of government, plus districts, particularly the establishment of 
committees. It also highlights the importance of covering the full DRM cycle—disaster mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery. In practice, perhaps because of the extent of damage to 
buildings during the 2015 earthquake and the 2017 floods, policy attention and program resources 
are skewed toward the rehabilitation of buildings, including targeting resources aimed at ensuring 
people’s basic consumption using criteria associated with shelter rather than the availability of food. 
Drought shocks in particular require a different focus in response. Challenges with targeting appear 
to be creating divisions and disputes, and a lack of collective action, in some communities. 
Improvements in the communication of targeting processes and decisions would go some way to 
address this. 
The lessons from international experiences with ASP stress the importance of coherent and 
coordinated rather than fragmented SP systems, the need for high coverage of poverty-targeted 
programs if SP is to prove useful for disaster response, and the importance of pre-positioning of 
resources at different levels to deal with contingency. The lessons about disaster mitigation, 
preparedness, and recovery are fewer but stress the importance of having at least one sound 
poverty-targeted program and ensuring that the mix of programs and instruments are suitable both 
for crisis response as well as for combating chronic poverty and inequality.  
Pulling together the findings from the reviews of SP and DRM systems in Nepal, lessons from 
international experience allow an assessment of what sort of arrangements for ASP might work best 
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for Nepal. Most important of all, building household resilience to reduce the impact of shocks is 
critical—and programs need to be adequate, especially in terms of the size of transfers, if they are to 
help achieve greater resilience and mitigate shocks. Addressing the limited focus on chronic and 
transient poverty within Nepal’s existing SP system would represent a critical step forward in 
achieving resilience. 
Because they remain predominantly targeted based on demographic categories, the extent to which 
expanding the coverage of existing SP programs can support disaster response is limited. However, 
Nepal’s recent experiences of disasters might provide an entry point for a serious dialogue about the 
prospects for poverty-targeted transfers in Nepal. Rethinking some SP programs will allow them to 
be more adaptive and support household resilience building, as will expanding the vision of 
programs such as public works to integrate them directly with climate change adaptation practices, 
DRM, and rural/agricultural development.  
Increasing regular payments or making extraordinary payments following a disaster will only be 
useful where the shock is experienced by most people in a given district or municipality, and when 
delivered alongside and coordinated with other humanitarian responses. Estimates based on the 
HRVS data show that households that are either in receipt of the SSAs or have household members 
who are eligible for them are no more likely to be exposed to natural disasters—specifically 
earthquake, flood, fire, drought, and landslide—than those who are not eligible. As a result, if a 
disaster response is targeted using existing (or expanded) SSA or public works programs (PWPs) 
eligibility, there are significant inclusion and exclusion errors: the majority of households that 
receive SP are not shock affected (inclusion error) and most households that are shock affected do 
not receive SP. The greatest coverage is found for shocks that are very widespread across the 
population—for example, Figure 21 shows that, in earthquake-affected districts, extraordinary 
payments to SSA beneficiaries would reach 56.2 percent of all earthquake-affected households. 
There are other reasons to consider delivering shock response through the existing SP—notably the 
challenges faced by many SP recipients (who are often socially excluded) in accessing disaster relief 
in the current targeting and damage assessment system.  
Implications and Recommendations 
Overall, the key implication for ASP in Nepal is that ‘one size’ will not fit all. There is no single SP 
program that offers a ‘best bet’ for ASP. Different programs have different useful features, for 
example, some are useful because they are targeted to the households that are most likely to 
experience shocks, while others are not targeted in such a way but reach many shock-affected 
households simply on account of their greater coverage. The distinctions between covariant and 
idiosyncratic shocks, the fact that some disasters are slower onset than others, the fact that Nepal’s 
existing SP programs have very differentiated coverage in different parts of the country and are 
targeted very differently, and the ways in which different shocks (earthquake versus fire and 
drought versus flood) are experienced mean that it will be necessary to consider options for a range 
of different situations. 
Recommendations for ASP policies, institutions, and systems 
Continue existing efforts to strengthen SP systems—particularly information and payment 
systems. There are strong arguments for continued investments in making the SP system itself work 
v 
 
better in Nepal—especially strengthening beneficiary registries. Continuing the shift from annual to 
rolling enrolment for the SSAs is a core foundation of flexibility. Ensuring that payments are made 
reliably and predictably and shifting payment times so that transfers arrive just before seasonal 
shocks are likely to be hit would be a useful way of building on existing systems strengthening 
efforts. A key part of strengthening SP systems will be the clear articulation in SP guidelines of how 
the system will first promote household resilience building and then, second, be flexible and able to 
support an emergency response. 
Clarify and make provision in guidelines and regulations for SP representation in DRM decision 
making and vice versa. International experience demonstrates the importance of a formal 
regulatory framework to allow institutional coordination between SP and DRM agencies. In the 
immediate term, it is recommended that the working group developing the Disaster Management 
Authority (DMA) regulations incorporate a specific SP role into the DMA and that those responsible 
for revising SSA guidelines include mechanisms for incorporating both the goals of resilience building 
(for disaster mitigation) and flexibility (for response and recovery).  
Continue the switch to electronic payments and mobile banking to ensure that funds reach 
beneficiaries as rapidly as possible. This has the concomitant implication that more banking would 
need to be available locally—including using new technologies supporting mobile banking and e-
payment systems—to allow a more rapid payment of emergency support through local systems.  
Increase attention and resources for mitigation and preparedness. The focus on recovery, and 
particularly the reconstruction process for buildings and homes, leaves little attention paid to 
mitigation and preparedness. It is important to ensure that more focus and clarity is created at the 
central level—notably in the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Executive 
Committee and Authority (the latter is more widely called the DMA)—on disaster mitigation and 
preparedness. This could be achieved through more explicit differentiation of actions related to 
mitigation and preparedness, and the associated resource allocation mechanisms for them and will 
need to filter down to the local level to allow a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities, and 
funding streams, in these areas. 
Pre-positioning resources for shock response. Specific examples are (a) holding contingency 
budgets or pre-positioning financial resources not just at the central level but at all tiers of 
government and (b) based on an analysis of the role of the Nepal Food Corporation, ensuring food 
stocks are in place in remote areas where shocks are anticipated so they can be sold or distributed. 
Maintaining food stocks in remote rural areas is also critical to ensuring that other cash transfer 
programs are effective. Cash transfers do not work if there is no food available in local markets at 
reasonable prices.  
Recommendations for ASP program design and implementation 
Consider expanding SP payments temporarily post disaster. There are a number of ways to further 
explore expanding SP payments. Expanding payments to existing beneficiaries would provide a 
mechanism for reaching households that otherwise struggle to access support following disasters. 
Cash and in-kind benefits provided following the 2015 earthquake appear to have resulted in shock-
affected beneficiaries being significantly less food insecure than households affected by the 
earthquake but not in receipt of SP. When receiving SSAs during shocks, beneficiaries found that 
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they were part of the solution to a household’s troubles, rather than being seen as a burden on the 
household. For programs basing targeting on poverty and food insecurity (for example, PWPs), there 
is also scope to temporarily increase the PWP wage rate.  
Recognize that increasing transfer levels will have both pros and cons. As much as the targeting of 
the SSAs appears to be widely accepted, there is a risk that targeting a shock response through the 
SSAs could create serious resentment and, potentially, worsen exclusion. Tackling this will require far 
better communication than has been the case thus far. The trade-offs between acceptable targeting 
and speed of response are particularly acute in a post-conflict setting such as Nepal where 
grievances (in this case about access to emergency support) can endure for a long time and 
potentially undermine political stability. 
Expand SP as one of a complementary set of mechanisms for emergency response, not as a 
substitute for other humanitarian responses. SP should not be an alternative to a wider shock 
response but could work well alongside other complementary humanitarian response. Routing part 
of an emergency response through existing SP would reduce the caseload of needs assessment and 
targeting that would be required at the local level during the response. Only households not in 
receipt of SP would require assessment with the potential to significantly speed up the assessment 
process. 
Begin a dialogue on potential policy and program options for poverty-targeted SP. In Nepal, there 
are few SP programs providing transfers that explicitly target poverty. While PWPs target using 
poverty proxies such as Human Development Index (HDI) indicators and food insecurity, the 
remainder of programs target based on social and demographic categories such as gender, age, and 
ethnicity. Yet, poverty-targeted SP programs are key to ASP. Given substantial progress toward 
establishing SP in Nepal over the last decade, and the pressing need to tackle vulnerability and 
impoverishment amid increasing threats from natural disasters, this is an appropriate moment to 
begin a dialogue on how a poverty-targeted SP program might work for Nepal.  
Consider integrating PWPs more with existing climate change adaptation, DRM, and 
agriculture/rural development programs. There is substantial opportunity to link public works 
initiatives to wider actions seeking to adapt and protect livelihoods, especially agricultural 
livelihoods in the context of threats from climate change and to broader infrastructure investments. 
Rethink the assessment criteria for targeting response and recovery. The review found that 
damage to housing was the primary criteria driving the targeting of response and recovery with far 
less attention paid to consumption needs. Given that this focus was leading to some unintended 
outcomes at the local level—particularly households with no mechanism to meet their basic needs 
or maintain their livelihoods receiving no support because their homes were not fully destroyed—a 
refocus of the assessment criteria away from physical housing and toward consumption is suggested 
with inputs from across all clusters.  
Conclusion 
The recommendations presented here are intended to support a dialogue about options for making 
SP more adaptive in Nepal and discussion about the roles that various stakeholders—government, 
donors, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—might play in that process. The actions woven 
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into these recommendations—increasing payments, expanding coverage, establishing new 
programs, and so on—have different levels of ambition, with varied potential outcomes. The more 
ambitious the action, the greater the potential for supporting all four pillars of the approach of the 
Government of Nepal (GoN) to DRM.  
Table 1. Mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery outcomes from recommended actions 
Recommended Actions Outcomes 
 Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery 
Policy, institutional, and systemic 
Strengthen SP systems—particularly systems 
for identification, payment, targeting, and 
management processes. 
X x X X 
Make provision in guidelines for SP 
representation in DRM decision making and 
vice versa. 
x x x x 
Put in place a contingency and financing 
strategy for the financing of responses to 
shocks.  
  X  
Clarify the procedures for expanding SP—
especially early warning criteria for triggering 
expanded payments or other predetermined 
responses to shocks.  
 X X  
Expand electronic and mobile banking 
services for SP payments. 
x x X x 
Put in place a national social registry for the 
identification of potential beneficiaries when 
shocks occur. 
 x X  
Programmatic 
Attach DRM messages to SP payments. x x x X 
Ensure pre-positioning of food stocks using 
Nepal’s Public Food Distribution System 
(PFDS) and manage food depot prices flexibly.  
x x X x 
Expand temporarily SSA benefit levels.  x  X x 
Expand (temporarily) coverage of cash 
transfers to shock-affected households. 
x  X x 
Expand public works payments and coverage. x  X x 
Establish a national poverty-targeted SP 
program to address chronic poverty and 
increase the resilience of the poor to shocks.  
X x x x 
Use public works as part of integrated climate 
change/rural development/disaster 
management response. 
X x X X 
 
The four key messages from the review are as follows:  
First, the variation in shocks—from those that come with little or no warning to those that are 
seasonal and those that have a slow onset; from those that affect very few people in specific 
locations to those that are generalized across the population; from those that cause death and injury 
to those that damage housing and to those that undermine livelihoods—means that there is no 
single best option for using SP to tackle the major shocks that Nepal faces. Multiple pathways for SP 
viii 
 
will need these differences to be borne in mind and adopt a best-fit approach across a range of 
circumstances. 
Second, the tumultuous changes in Nepal’s political and administrative systems mean programs will 
have to be flexible, not just to the specificities of individual disasters, but also to the constant 
transition and upheaval in government institutions, particularly at the local level. Assessing 
capabilities to deliver each of the options will be critical. However, the new arrangements at the 
local government level may also offer opportunities—in particular to work in a more integrated way.  
Third, while delivering disaster management operations through SP in this rapidly changing context 
is difficult, it also provides a unique window of opportunity to establish new ways of working that 
better link SP and responding to shocks not just in terms of immediate disaster responses but also in 
relation to mitigation, preparedness, and recovery.  
Last, the recommendations proposed here purposely encompass some relatively easy to achieve 
ways of better linking SP and DRM and some rather more ambitious ones. They are meant as the 
starting point for a dialogue between the government and other development and humanitarian 
agencies that might, in turn, be reflected in the guidelines that underpin SP and DRM systems, 
procedures, and programs. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction 
A key challenge in Nepal is the intersection of predictable chronic or seasonal poverty and 
vulnerability, with rapid-onset and acute shocks. Nepal in the last few decades has epitomized the 
‘perfect storm’ in which a number of different factors—disasters, conflict, political uncertainty, and 
challenges to economic growth—coincide with deleterious effects on people’s well-being and 
development progress. While social protection (SP) is playing an increasing role in tackling chronic 
and seasonal poverty and vulnerability, experiences in Nepal, particularly in 2015, highlight how 
making SP more flexible and adaptive could allow a more effective and efficient development and 
humanitarian response.  
The Nepal office of the World Bank has contracted the Centre for International Development and 
Training at the University of Wolverhampton, United Kingdom, and the Nepal Institute for Social and 
Environmental Research to carry out the technical assistance (TA) project ‘Review of policies, 
systems and programs in social protection and shock response for adaptive social protection in 
Nepal’. 
 
The overall objective of the work is to make recommendations on possible policy, programmatic, 
and institutional measures for more adaptive social protection (ASP) (Box 1).  
 Underpinning this overall objective is a set 
of analytical activities—a risk profile; 
reviews of policies, systems, institutions, 
and programs working on SP and shock 
response; case studies of earthquake, 
landslide, fire, and flood; the identification 
of international good practice; and 
consideration of cross-cutting issues 
including institutional structures and the 
engagement of non-state actors. Together 
these profiles and reviews will lead to the 
production of recommendations to support 
ASP in the future. The analysis presented 
here aims to contribute to the continued 
evolution of SP and improved shock 
response in Nepal through the production 
of recommendations for improving policies, 
systems, institutions, and programs in SP to 
tackle key development in Nepal. 
There is a burgeoning evidence base on shocks and disasters in Nepal, but evidence across the 
various types of shocks—natural, environmental, health, political, and economic—is unequal. In this 
Box 1 Characteristics of Adaptive Social Protection 
• An emphasis on transforming productive livelihoods as well 
as protecting and adapting to changing climate conditions 
rather than simply reinforcing coping mechanisms  
• Grounding in an understanding of the structural root causes 
of poverty in a particular region or sector, permitting more 
effective targeting of vulnerability to multiple shocks and 
stresses 
• Incorporation of rights-based rationale for action, stressing 
equity and justice dimensions of chronic poverty and climate 
change adaptation in addition to instrumentalist rationale 
based primarily on economic efficiency 
• An enhanced role for research from both the natural and 
social sciences to inform the design and implementation of SP 
policies and measures in the context of the burden of both 
natural disasters and changing climate-related hazards 
• A longer-term and dynamic perspective for SP programs that 
takes into account the changing nature of shocks and 
stresses. 
Source: Davies et al. (2008, 111). 
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review, we focus in particular on disasters, though noting that many so-called ‘natural’ disasters are 
the result of people’s interactions with the natural environment. Where people live, how they live, 
and, in particular, how they utilize and manage land, water, and vegetation resources influences the 
magnitude of and people’s exposure to natural hazards and allows a natural hazard to translate into 
a disaster. We focus predominantly on shocks that are covariant in nature (those that are shared 
across a specific population) rather than idiosyncratic (those affecting a single individual or 
household) (Farrington, Slater, and Holmes 2004; Holzmann and Jorgensen 2001). We also remain 
cognizant of the fact that it is not only natural hazards that affect households in Nepal and so place 
our analysis in the context of wider economic, social, and health shocks. In practice, this means 
thinking about the economic blockade and how subsequent increases in transport costs in 2015 
affected responses to earthquake and drought and what might be done about this in the future. 
Although the analysis focuses on natural disasters, an ASP system would also be critical to address 
other types of shocks—price shocks triggered by changes in international prices, shocks resulting 
from financial crises, or shocks of a more political nature for instance.  
SP encompasses a very broad range of programs. Here, the focus is on selected social safety nets—
namely cash transfers, especially the Social Security Allowances (SSAs), and public works programs 
(PWPs), such as Rural Community Infrastructure Works (RCIW) and the Karnali Employment Program 
(KEP) that closed during the finalization of this work.  
The year 2018 (or 2074/2075 in Nepal) is both a particularly difficult moment to assess the existing 
policies, programs, and systems for shock response in Nepal and a particularly opportune one. The 
transition to a federal system means that some implementing institutions are tying up while other 
fledgling parts of the government are embarking on disaster risk management (DRM) or SP for the 
first time. Some government staff are being deployed from district to local government assignments 
and embarking on new roles often with new or different responsibilities. Recently elected new local 
government leaders are conceiving disaster management strategies in their locales, considering how 
to best support the most excluded and vulnerable people in their constituencies, and seeking to 
work out the best use of the resources available to them. The 2017 Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management Act (DRRM - 2074) provides the new legislative framework for managing disasters, but 
implementation is only just beginning. 
Despite the substantial difficulties, there is also a great opportunity—to assess how far the emerging 
new systems for SP might link to the emerging policies, systems, and institutional and financing 
arrangements for DRM at a moment when it is still possible to influence the arrangements. There 
appears to be “a willingness on the part of government to address poverty, social exclusion, and the 
economic and social displacement resulting from natural disasters, using social protection transfers 
as a tool” (Koehler and Mathers 2017, 351). Although decentralization is in full swing, many 
arrangements are in limbo at this moment, and so, there is an opportunity to ensure that links 
between SP and DRM are maximized, particularly at the local government level as staff are being 
deployed and roles are being designated. Thus, this is an apt moment to look at new ways of 
allowing Nepal to tackle the greatest of its challenges (poverty, vulnerability, and climate change). 
The transition to a federal political system and the decentralization of mandates to the local 
government level, precisely at a time when the urgency of tackling disasters and climate change has 
never been greater, presents a rare opportunity to influence, and perhaps shift, the policy discourse. 
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There is, of course, a balancing act involved between aspiration and practicality. Progress with SP in 
the last decade or so has partly been possible because policy and program changes were “in each 
case administratively relatively simple to implement” even in Nepal’s “unstable and highly 
competitive political environment” (Jones 2012, 252). The challenge will be to propose options for 
strengthening links between SP and DRM that are feasible despite the upheaval associated with the 
monumental shift to the three tiers of government in Nepal.  
Methods  
The analysis presented here was based on a mixed-methods approach. Analysis of existing data 
(including the HRVS—see Walker, Khadka, and Pandey 2017) was used to understand the scope and 
coverage of existing programs and their links to disasters and shocks. A desk review of literature 
explored legislation and policies, program documentation and official implementation guidance, and 
evaluations and research. Interviews took place with key informants at the national, district, and 
local government levels as did focus group discussions (FGDs) and individual interviews, especially 
with the recipients of SP, at the ward or village level.  
Four districts were selected to capture a range of geographical, socioeconomic, and political 
contexts and to allow a focus on a range of SP programs and different types of shocks. Saptari and 
Bardiya both offered opportunities to assess the SSAs and provided key insights about experiences 
of floods. Humla allowed analysis of drought and to some extent landslides, floods, and hailstorms 
and a focus on the implications of remoteness, plus additional insights about both the KEP and the 
RCIW project. Further fieldwork took place in Sindhupalchok to better understand people’s 
experiences of SP receipt in the aftermath of the 2015 earthquakes and the 2014 landslide. Case 
studies of the main natural disasters—flood, fire, earthquake, landslide, and drought are provided as 
complements to this analysis. 
Structure of the report 
The next chapter of the report provides an overview of the main natural hazards that Nepal faces 
and the context in which they translate into disasters. It then considers what factors influence 
exposure to shocks and the impacts of disasters. Following this, the ways in which people cope with 
disasters and manage risks are explored, with specific attention paid to different types of shocks and 
their impacts in different parts of the country and among different groups of people. While this 
report focuses exclusively on natural disasters, other types of shocks also affect poor and vulnerable 
households and could be addressed in part with ASP interventions.  
Chapters 3 and 4 review the policies, systems, institutions, and programs that make up Nepal’s SP 
and DRM sectors, respectively. For SP, the emergence of programs following the Peace Accord is 
explored to explain the relatively fragmented SP system that Nepal has today and to highlight the 
conditions in which programs are revised or new programs are taken up. The system in 2018—in 
particular, the ways in which processes of registration and enrolment, targeting, and resource 
allocation take place—are assessed. People’s experiences of receiving SP are then discussed, 
drawing on evidence from fieldwork at the district and local government levels in Bardiya, Humla, 
Saptari, and Sindhupalchok. In relation to DRM, assessing the current sector and systems is rather 
like trying to hit a moving target. The emergence of DRRM - 2074means that systems for DRM are 
currently being reconfigured. We assess progress toward a new system and what that means for 
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operations and resources at the time of research. As part of the review of DRM systems, institutions, 
policies, and programs, we present four case studies of responses to flood, earthquake, drought, 
and, jointly, landslide and fire. The latter case study brings together two shocks that may appear 
rather different, but both share a critical feature for this study—namely that they are largely 
idiosyncratic and most often experienced by only one family or household at a time.  
In Chapter 5, experiences from other international SP systems are brought together to assess what is 
known about what works and what needs to be in place for SP to be an effective part of the DRM 
toolbox. Chapter 6 draws together findings from the preceding reviews and analyzes what sorts of 
ASP systems might work best for Nepal and what would need to be in place for them to operate. The 
final chapter concludes with a set of recommendations that the Government of Nepal (GoN), 
together with its donor partners, might consider to make SP more adaptive and allow it to 
contribute more to alleviating the worst effects of disasters and shocks on poor and vulnerable 
people. 
 
  
5 
 
Chapter 2: Nepal Risk, Vulnerability, and 
Shocks Profile 
2.1 Introduction 
Barca and O’Brien (2018, 5) suggest that “Vulnerability and needs assessments are an essential 
component of decision making about whether or not social protection is a suitable vehicle for 
addressing a shock”. Similarly, Aryal (2012, 147) notes that “Exploring disaster vulnerability in a 
particular geographical location is an important starting point towards building resilience.” The 
profile of risk, shocks, and vulnerability presented here seeks to provide the foundation for 
subsequent analysis of Nepal’s SP and DRM systems. It builds on data analyzed from the first wave 
of the HRVS. Both our own analysis and Walker, Khadka, and Pandey (2017) draw on the DesInventar 
Disaster Information System to understand the major disasters and shocks that are relevant in 
Nepal. The aim is to use this analysis to (a) frame the problem (how to make SP more 
adaptive/responsive) and (b) ensure that any recommendations about future actions in relation to 
SP are directly aligned with the realities (scale, probability, location, exposure, and impact) of 
hazards in different parts of Nepal. 
The paper begins with a brief framing of the Nepal context in which disasters emerge and then 
outlines the key hazards facing the country. We then explore what drives exposure to hazards, their 
impacts on people, and the ways in which people seek to manage or cope with disasters. In this 
analysis, risk is conceptualized as a combination of the interaction of hazard, exposure, and 
vulnerability, implying that any increase in either hazard, vulnerability, or exposure would lead to an 
increase in the level of risk. 
Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2004, 5) noted that “Definitions of the most common terms within 
disaster studies, such as ‘hazard’, ‘vulnerability’, ‘resilience’ and ‘coping capacity’ continue to be 
debated.” In 2018, the debate has not been concluded, not least because different definitions are 
appropriate in different contexts, including when applied to ASP. In this study, we use the following 
definitions from United Nations (2016):  
Hazard. A process, phenomenon, or human activity that may cause loss of life, injury, or other health 
impacts; property damage; social and economic disruption; or environmental degradation.  
Risk. The potential loss of life, injury, or destroyed or damaged assets that could occur to a system, 
society, or a community in a specific period, determined probabilistically as a function of hazard, 
exposure, vulnerability, and capacity.  
Vulnerability. The conditions determined by physical, social, economic, and environmental factors 
or processes that increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets, or systems to the 
impacts of hazards.  
Disaster. A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due to 
hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability, and capacity, leading to one 
or more of the following: human, material, economic, and environmental losses and impacts. 
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In the case of the work on ASP, there is also the inclusion of the terminology of ‘shocks’—which is 
similar to disaster but not automatically given the same implied severity. The key thing to note is 
that disasters result from a combination of exposure to hazards and vulnerability. So, hazards do not 
always result in disasters. As Wisner et al. (2003, 47) note “Disasters are a result of the interaction of 
both [hazard and vulnerability]; there cannot be a disaster if there are hazards but vulnerability is 
(theoretically) nil, or if there is a vulnerable population but no hazard event.” Hazards such as 
earthquakes do not become disasters if they do not destroy buildings and livelihoods and result in 
loss of lives. Similarly, individuals could be exposed to an epidemic but not fall ill. SP can play a role 
in reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience and is therefore one key tool in preventing hazards 
from leading to disasters. 
2.2 In context: Natural disasters in Nepal  
In the last 45 years, an average of about 900 people were killed, more than 131,000 
families were affected, and about 500 disaster incidents occurred annually in Nepal. 
The environmental and economic losses are beyond our calculation.  
(Speech by H.E. Arjun K. Karki made at the fifth session of the Global Platform for Disaster 
Risk Reduction, May 2017, Cancun, Mexico) 
Nepal is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. Its geographical location, climatic 
conditions, and high levels of poverty, which undermine its capacity to respond to shocks and 
surprises, leave it 20th on the list of disaster-prone countries. Globally, Nepal ranks 4th, 11th, and 
30th on vulnerability to climate change, earthquake, and flood hazard, respectively (Koirala 2014). 
The country experiences all recognized hazards, except tsunamis, and in recent years has 
encountered high-magnitude and high-intensity natural hazards such as floods, landslides, 
mudslides, earthquakes, fires, hailstones, windstorms, lightning strikes, cloudbursts, droughts, 
glacier lake outburst floods (GLOFs), avalanches, and epidemics, such as cholera, dysentery, dengue 
fever, and Japanese encephalitis (Aryal 2012; MoHA 2018; UNISDR 2015). Such high exposure to 
hazard risk accounts for the country’s economic vulnerability and has resulted in mortality and 
morbidity and loss of property and physical infrastructure thereby disrupting economic development 
(MoHA 2018). Nepal is also exposed to other types of risks—political or economic for instance—
resulting from its economic structure and exposure to international prices for some commodities 
and from its political history.  
A number of factors form the backdrop to Nepal’s high exposure and sensitivity to natural and 
human-induced hazards: 
Challenging geographical environment. On the basis of topography, Nepal has three regions—
mountain, hill, and Terai (Plain)—which account for 15 percent, 68 percent, and 17 percent of the 
proportion of landmass, respectively, and are exposed to different types of hazards depending on 
the terrain. The mountainous, rugged terrain comprising the sharp vertical landscapes of the 
Himalayas are associated with high risk of landslides, soil erosion, and debris flow. Variations in 
elevation produces flood risk, while marked climatic regions account for the spatial and temporal 
spread of risks, such as floods, droughts, and fires (Tombrink 2017). Given that Nepal is located on 
the boundary of the Tibetan and Indian plates means that the country is exposed to seismic activity 
and risk of earthquakes (Aryal 2007). 
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Constrained human development. Although between 2003/2004 and 2010/2011 the percentage of 
people living below the poverty line in Nepal halved, there is significant churning in poverty with 
many people clustered around the poverty line and at risk of sliding back into poverty. Poverty 
severity is greater among specific ethnic and caste groups (especially Dalits) and is more prevalent in 
rural than urban areas and in the mountains compared to Terai areas—though there are many 
people living in poverty on the Terai because the population there is far greater. Nepal had a Human 
Development Index (HDI) of 0.458 in 2011 ranking it 157th out of 187 countries, second last after 
Afghanistan in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The HDI, which 
measures the quality of life, varies significantly across Nepal. According to the Nepal Living 
Standards Survey, there is an association between caste and income, as well as the HDI. The Hill 
Chhetris have an HDI of 0.507 compared to 0.400 for the Madhesi Dalits. The per capita income of 
the Hill Brahman is estimated at 1.7 times higher than that of the Dalits in general and twice as high 
as that of the Madhesi Dalit (Central Bureau of Statistics 2010; UNFPA 2017). Variation in the HDI is a 
key predictor of vulnerability to hazards (Asian Disaster Reduction Centre 2000). 
Changing population size and distribution. Nepal’s population is at around 29 million in 2018. While 
17 percent of the population was urban in 2011, the rate of urbanization has been rapid with the 
number of municipalities increasing from 58 to 217 between 2011 and 2015 and with 42 percent of 
the national population living in municipalities. This rapid urbanization has not been supported by 
sufficient capacity to provide safe housing nor water management systems, thereby exposing a large 
share of the population to significant physical risks. Along with urbanization, the proportion of 
people living in the mountain and hill regions compared to the Terai has been declining, dropping 
from 62 percent in the mountain and hill regions combined in 1971 to 50 percent in 2011 and 
projected to reach 47 percent by 2031 (UNFPA 2017). This mobility is likely to change the patterns of 
exposure to hazards (GoN 2010; UNFPA 2017) as “people gravitate towards areas with high-
potential” (for livelihoods) (Aryal 2012, 149) and reduce exposure to drought but increase exposure 
to floods.  
Political upheaval. In the last few decades, Nepal has been undergoing a transition from a unitary to 
a federal system of government. This transition, starting with the Maoist insurgency from 1996 that 
sought to replace the royal parliamentary system with a socialist republic, was characterized by 
political instability and a protracted civil war. Conflict resulted in more than 13,000 deaths, more 
than 200,000 people displaced at the height of the conflict, and destruction of public infrastructure 
(UNDP Nepal 2009). Following a peace agreement in 2006, the establishment of a democratic 
constitution in 2007 and 2015 and elections in 2017, the government has embarked on a 
decentralization program, including the transfer of some DRM responsibilities from the central to 
local governments. It is yet to be seen how far local governments have the sufficient DRM 
implementation capacity. The World Bank estimates that the transition will cost the government 3–4 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) over the next four years (World Bank 2018). Continued 
political tensions—manifested in protests and blockades—have had direct economic and social costs 
including magnifying the impact of covariate and idiosyncratic shocks mainly on the poor and 
vulnerable.  
Precarious livelihoods. Nepal’s people are heavily reliant on agriculture with the sector (including 
forestry and fishing) contributing nearly a third of GDP but providing livelihoods for more than two-
thirds of the population (USAID 2018). This dependence on agriculture, particularly for the rural 
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poor, means that there is high exposure to climate-related hazards. Aryal (2012)—using DesInventar 
data pre-dating the 2015 earthquake—finds that there is a greater likelihood of disasters occurring 
in populated areas, particularly in areas with agricultural production. Whether or not an assessment 
of shocks in Nepal incorporates the rarer earthquake event, the structural shift in Nepal’s economy 
in the last decade, toward a greater dependence on remittances from migration, somewhat 
mitigates the threat of climate-related hazards undermining agricultural and other livelihoods. 
However, economic activities that contribute to natural hazards are a persistent feature of Nepal’s 
economy: deforestation, construction of roads, water leakage, and infrastructure failure are key 
factors that trigger floods and landslides. In addition, confined monsoon rainfall often translates to 
deleterious effects, affecting local and macroeconomic activity (Dahal 2012; Khanal, Shrestha, and 
Ghimire 2007). 
Climate change. Nepal is rated as one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to climate 
change. Evidence shows that for 1975 to 2005, the mean annual temperature increased by 0.06°C 
while the mean rainfall declined by 3.7 mm (−3.2 percent) per month per decade (MoPE 2016). 
Mean annual temperature is predicted to increase between 1.3°C to 3.8°C by the 2060s and 1.8°C to 
5.8°C by the 2090s. While average annual precipitation could reduce by the range of 10 percent to 
20 percent across the country, its distribution may become more pronounced such that seasonal 
flooding is intensified (MoPE 2016). 
Exposure to price shocks and inflation. Together, the factors above also leave Nepal heavily 
dependent on imports such as food and fuel. In 2008, the total number of people at risk of hunger 
increased by 50 percent (from 6 million to over 9 million people) over a period of six months (WFP 
[2009] cited in UNICEF [2014]). These effects are buffered by remittances receipts in Nepal from 
international migrants but are still estimated to have a strong negative impact on vulnerable 
households. Food prices in Nepal are strongly influenced by those of India (Mishra, Poudel, and 
Mishra 2016) and subject to inflationary pressure when, as was the case in 2015, there are blockades 
or disruptions to supply. These have had a substantial impact on health and well-being (Budhathoki 
and Gelband 2016; Lamichane 2015).  
Overall, the broad context through which hazards in Nepal translate into disasters is summed up 
well using the INFORM (Index for Risk Management) Risk Index (Error! Reference source not 
found.). The composite index assesses exposure, vulnerability, and coping in the face of a broad 
range of hazards. Relative to its neighbors, Nepal is rated as being at high risk (5.1 out of 10) 
although lower than some regional neighbors (India, 5.4; Bangladesh, 5.8) (INFORM 2018). Over a 
three-year period, the score for INFORM risk remained unchanged, but there are changes in the 
components of the index: hazard and exposure increased to rank Nepal at 42nd out of 191 
countries; vulnerability has decreased over the last three years (Nepal ranks 67th); and no changes 
were observed for lack of coping capacity.  
Disaggregating the index is insightful and shows how a combination of human development, 
economic, and environmental factors affect Nepal’s risk profile. For example, Nepal ranks poorly for 
underweight children below 5 years (11th position), physical exposure to earthquakes (4th), and 
domestic food price level index (6th). On food price volatility, Nepal scored as 31st globally. More 
favorable risk indicators included agriculture stress (114th globally) and relative proportion of 
population affected by drought (77th). The vulnerability score was influenced predominantly by 
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uprooted people (score of 5.2), vulnerable groups (4.6), inequality (4.3), and consequences of 
deprivation (4.1). 
Table 2: Summary Risk Profile for Nepal 
 
Source: INFORM 2018.  
2.3 Exposure to shocks in Nepal 
This section presents data on natural hazards and epidemics in Nepal. DesInventar provides historic 
data on natural hazards (excluding drought). Figure 1 shows that fire has accounted for nearly a 
quarter of all reported shocks between 1971 and 2013 in Nepal. This is closely followed by floods, 
epidemics, and landslides. Historically, epidemics have contributed to the greatest number of 
reported deaths while floods have caused the greatest damage to housing. Floods have also, 
historically, resulted in the greatest number of people indirectly affected. 
Figure 1: Historical data on selected natural disasters and epidemics in Nepal 
 
 Source: DesInventar (2018) 
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According to INFORM (2018), Nepal ranks high on 
exposure to hazards, with both natural hazards (5.3 out of 
10) and human-induced hazards (5.3). In particular, the 
level of exposure is the highest for earthquakes (9.9) and 
floods (6.5). While flood exposure is higher in the plains, 
drought exposure appears more universal and with less 
incidence (2.9). Storms and hailstorms are common in the 
hill region (INFORM 2018). Nepal has significant variations 
in the extent to which households are exposed to hazards, 
even within relatively small, bounded, and discrete 
geographical locations or socioeconomic settings.  
Understanding which different locations and 
socioeconomic groups are exposed to these hazards and 
why they are of critical strategic importance, though there 
is absence of a robust vulnerability mapping and multi-
hazard risk assessment in Nepal, undermines the 
effectiveness of DRM responses (Gautam 2017).  
Geographical exposure. Hazard exposure and the 
frequency with which hazards are experienced vary 
geographically across Nepal. Figure 2 shows the recent 
geographical distribution of earthquakes, floods and 
landslides, droughts, and riots/blockades in Nepal. 
Following Dixit (1996), the relative level of hazard exposure by location is shown in Table 3. The 
mountain and hill regions are more exposed to landslide risk, while the Terai region is the most 
exposed in terms of flood risk. In the case of floods, the area inundated and the area used for paddy 
fields varies by river basin, with Bagmati, Narayani, and Rapti suffering the highest impact under 
different flood return periods (MoAC 2009). Earthquake exposure in 2015 was focused north of the 
Kathmandu valley, but all of Nepal is equally exposed in the long term. 
Nepal’s challenging geography, as described previously, is reflected in exposure to hazards. A key 
insight from the HRVS Wave 1 analysis is that spatial distributions of well-being, livelihoods, and 
remoteness matter most for the exposure to (and impact of) different types of shocks. Regression 
analysis demonstrates that specific households within geographic areas were more likely to report 
certain shocks because of the predominance of certain livelihoods in those places. Walker, Khadka, 
and Pandey (2017) note that households most commonly engaged in agriculture—that is, those in 
the middle three quintiles—reported agriculture-related shocks such as drought, flood, and livestock 
or harvest losses more frequently. For earthquakes, they found that the poorest quintile and those 
without their own farming operations were less likely to be affected by earthquakes—perhaps 
because they had less land and housing that could be damaged. For political and economic shocks, in 
this case riots and blockades, they found a smaller impact on those that owned farms and 
disproportionate exposure of the poorest quintile. This is consistent with the nature of livelihoods 
among that quintile: households were more likely to be landless wage laborers who were net 
consumers of food depending on the local economy to make a living. 
Figure 2: Geographical distribution of 
Shocks in HRVS sample districts 
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Table 3: Types and location of natural and human-induced hazards in Nepal 
Type of Hazard Distribution 
Natural  
Earthquake  All of Nepal is a high-hazard earthquake zone  
Flood  Terai (sheet flood), middle hills 
Landslide and landslide 
dam breaks  
Hills and mountains 
Debris flow  Hills and mountain, severe in areas of elevations greater than 1,700 m that are 
covered by glacial deposits of previous ice age 
GLOF  Origin at the tongue of glaciers in Higher Himalayas and higher mountains; flows 
reach up to middle hill regions 
Avalanche  Higher Himalayas 
Fire (forest)  Hills and Terai (forest belt at the foot of southernmost hills) 
Drought  All over the country 
Storms/hailstorm  Hills 
Human-induced hazards 
Epidemics  Terai and hills, also in lower parts of mountain region 
Fire (settlements) Mostly in Terai, also in middle hill region 
Accidents Urban areas, along road network 
Industrial/technological  Urban/industrial areas 
Social disruptions Follows disaster-affected areas and politically disturbed areas 
Source: Dixit 1996 (with modifications). 
Patterns for idiosyncratic shock (such as illness or the death of a household member) were 
influenced more by geography than by individual and household characteristics. Walker, Khadka, 
and Pandey (2017) suggest that the patterns for illness and injury were similar to those of drought 
and reflected the effects of geographical remoteness, especially in the western hill districts, on 
morbidity and mortality. 
Population distribution. Geographical exposure is underpinned by population distributions and 
densities. As Aryal (2012) notes, while the greatest number of disaster events is recorded in the 
mountain/middle hills areas, by far, the greatest number of casualties (before the earthquake) were 
in the Terai areas. The absolute increase in population and mobility in favor of hazard-prone 
locations appears to have increased the total proportion of the population and assets exposed 
(ESCAP 2012). In Nepal, migration, including urbanization, to areas with better access to services and 
employment, is one of the key processes shaping population exposure to risk in Nepal.  
In particular, the downhill migration to areas of known flood hazard risk, for example, from the 
middle hills to the lower land, and subsequent construction of houses on former river beds are a 
significant concern for DRM (GoN 2011; Jaquet et al. 2016; Massey, Axinn, and Ghimire 2010). This 
movement is likely to both shift and increase the proportion of the population exposed to hazards 
(GoN 2010; UNFPA 2017). 
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Socioeconomic exposure. Gautam (2017) maps social vulnerability1 and exposure to disasters in 
Nepal and finds a quarter of all districts rate as either very high (6 districts) or high (18 districts) in 
terms of vulnerability to disasters. It is suggested that differences in regional HDI and the influence 
of who had access and control over productive resources play a significant role in determining who is 
affected by hazards.  
Figure 3: Social vulnerability to natural hazards in Nepal 
 
Source: Gautam 2017. 
Drawing on the HRVS data, Walker, Khadka, and Pandey (2017) focus their analysis on the two 
proxies for well-being— ‘welfare’ which is based on an asset index and organized into quintiles and 
food insecurity (based on two measures). Measures of assets and food insecurity work in the same 
direction, with food insecurity found disproportionately among the poorest asset quintile. Exposure 
to shocks is shared across asset quintiles rather than being concentrated among the lower quintiles. 
Poorer households are actually marginally less likely to report most types of shocks—perhaps 
because people tend to report experiencing a shock only when it affects them and a key part of 
being affected is damage to or loss of assets. By definition, poorer households have fewer assets 
that can be damaged or lost. Using either measure of food insecurity shows that shock-affected 
households are more food insecure than those not affected by shocks. This tells us that either food 
insecurity leads to greater exposure or that exposure to shocks increases food insecurity or that 
there is an iterative interaction between the two. Analysis following the second wave will provide 
greater insights.  
Gender is at the heart of social vulnerability. There is limited evidence to suggest that women are 
more exposed to shocks themselves, except where there are many more women than men because 
of labor migration from Nepal. Mann Whitney Wolcoxon rank-sum and Kruskal-Wallis tests drawing 
on the HRVS Wave 1 data find that specific individual and household characteristics make little 
difference to exposure to natural disasters and far more difference to exposure to health, political, 
                                                          
1 Social vulnerability is an index-based approach with components including percentages of households 
without telephone service; population with cellular phone service; households without at least one means of 
information services (TV, internet, or radio); women; female-headed households with no shared responsibility; 
people with at least one disability; population under age 14 and over age 60; households with no toilet; house 
with no electricity; and population density, household size, and numbers of illiterate people (Gautam 2017). 
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and economic shocks. For example, female-headed households are more likely than male-headed 
households to be exposed to the death of family members and unexpected higher prices, but less 
likely to be exposed to riots/blockades (Annex Table 1). This makes sense given that fewer women 
than men work away from the home and so are indirectly rather than directly exposed to riots and 
blockades by their knock-on effects (such as high prices).  
Age also makes a difference to exposure: surprisingly, exposure to shock is not higher for households 
with young children (under 5) except for excessive higher prices (
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Annex Table 2). We find households with an older head are more exposed to both fuel shortages and disease or 
injury of a household member—the latter being expected but the former being rather difficult to explain, 
except perhaps if we assume that older people are more dependent on petrol-powered transport 
than others who can travel more easily as pedestrians or cyclists ( 
Annex Table 3).  
From the HRVS data, the relationship between caste/ethnicity and exposure to shocks was less clear. 
In the case of 2015, Adivasi/Janjati and Dalit households were more likely (compared to 
Brahmin/Chhetri households) to report experiencing an earthquake, but this is because the more 
severely earthquake-affected areas had a higher proportion of Janjati households and not because, 
across Nepal, Janjati households are more exposed. However, they were less likely to experience 
harvest failure, most likely because they tend to have less access to or ownership of agricultural land 
and depend more heavily on other sources of income to meet their consumption needs.  
Risk exposure accentuated by climate change. Most hazards outlined in the hazard profile are 
directly influenced by climatic variables, primarily temperature and precipitation. While climate 
change impacts are economy-wide, specific sector concerns for Nepal include agriculture, 
hydroelectricity, forestry, and public health and water-induced disasters. For example, Lutz et al. 
(2016) estimate that in rivers of the Upper Ganges, the precipitation and glacier/snow melting by 
2050 will increase and likely lead to more and larger floods. Changes in climate variables are 
associated with increased frequency of disasters including flash floods to which 1.9 million people 
are highly vulnerable and a further 10 million are exposed (MoPE 2016). Changes such as those 
linked to monsoons will expose more people to poverty and magnify inequality, with significant 
implications for vulnerability to a range of covariate and idiosyncratic shocks, unless sufficient 
response and adaptive capacity is built (Dixit 2017).  
Nepal’s high vulnerability to climate change risks is influenced by the high level of dependence by 
the economy and livelihoods on climate-sensitive economic activities and insufficient institutional, 
technological, and financial resources for adaptation and mitigation (MoPE 2016). Vulnerability to 
climate change effects is also influenced by both the nature (and complexity) of the topography and 
level of human development (MoE 2010). Nepal’s National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) 
identifies five categories of vulnerability to climate change (Table 4), with variations being attributed 
to differences in the level of sensitivity of economic sectors to climate stress and prevalence of 
disparity.  
Table 4 Nepal districts ranked according to an overall climate change vulnerability index 
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2.4 Impacts of disasters 
Hazards become disasters when they have a negative impact on people and their livelihoods. The 
impact of shocks in Nepal is magnified by low coping capacity, with challenges noted in the INFORM 
index in the areas of governance, institutional, disaster risk reduction (DRR), and infrastructure 
(INFORM 2018). The high prevalence of poverty, churning around the poverty line, low per capita 
GDP, and other social deprivations imply that the incidence of a hazard translates rapidly to a 
disaster (WFP 2018). A review of disasters in Nepal shows that disasters have had a massive social, 
economic, and developmental impact. Three dissections of this impact are important and insightful 
here—by type of disaster, by social/demographic category, and by poverty status.  
2.4.1 Impacts of disasters by gender and social identity  
Gendered impacts of shocks prevail in Nepal as they do in other parts of the world, especially South 
Asia (Chew and Ramdas 2005). At a global level, Bradshaw and Fordham (2013, 3) note, that 
“Available data, though limited, indicates that women are more likely to die than men after a large-
scale disaster…It is inequities in the everyday, and not just in times of disaster, that create greater 
risk and reduce life chances for women and girls.” There is also empirical evidence from many 
countries, which shows that it is often the secondary outcomes of disasters that women are 
disproportionately exposed to. Neumayer and Plumper (2007, 551) argue that “the differential 
impact of natural disasters [is explained] not merely by recourse to different physical exposures and 
biological or physiological gender differences, but also by the different socially constructed 
vulnerabilities that derive from the social roles men and women assume, voluntarily or involuntarily, 
as well as existing patterns of gender discrimination.” Assessing differences in life expectancy, 
including in Nepal, Neumayer and Plumper (2007, 561) find that “disaster impact is contingent on 
the vulnerability of affected people, which can and often does systematically differ across economic 
class, ethnicity, gender, and other factor.” Dhungel and Ojha (2012) concur for Nepal, noting that a 
range of factors “contribute to women’s vulnerability to disaster in Nepal, including their livelihood 
activities and domestic work burden, gender discrimination that limits their opportunities to speak 
out, and social norms that restrict their access to outside agencies offering assistance.” Standing, 
Parker, and Bista (2016) note the escalation in violence against women and girls (VAWG), trafficking, 
and other gender-based threats following the 2015 earthquake while the Inter-Cluster Gender Task 
Force (ICGTF 2015) notes the disproportionate number of women killed or injured at that time. 
Knight and Sollom (2012) and Knight and Welton-Mitchell (2013, 57) find that those identifying as 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersexed (LGBTI) in Nepal risk “being perceived as lower 
priority for rescue efforts; families with same-sex partners being excluded from distribution of food 
and other basic supplies; and difficulty visiting injured partners and claiming the bodies of deceased 
loved ones.” Alongside gender, and intertwined with it, is ethnicity, with Muldoon et al. (2017) 
finding that, in the case of the 2015 earthquake, membership of specific ethnic and gender groups 
affected experiences during the earthquake—especially in terms of increased post-traumatic stress 
symptoms. 
2.4.2 Impacts and types of natural disaster 
The 2015 earthquake resulted in 9,000 deaths and about US$7 billion in damage (NPC 2015) and, 
according to the Nepal HRVS data, had the strongest effect on households with larger houses, which 
were more susceptible to physical damage, and farm owners, as opposed to those in the poorest 
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quartiles (Walker, Khadka, and Pandey 2017). In comparison, Walker, Khadka, and Pandey (2017) 
also find that the blockade in 2015, which magnified the impact of the earthquake, 
disproportionately affected the poorest quartile but also affected other better-off households 
because of their higher consumption of fuel.  
Over the 30-year period (1983–2013) water-induced disasters, primarily landslides and floods, 
resulted in losses worth US$235.8 million, along with over 8,000 deaths and 228,561 houses 
destroyed (Gaire, Delgado, and Gonzalez 2015). The risk of such disasters is accentuated by Nepal’s 
hydrology, in which 80 percent of the annual rainfall is received in less than three months (Gaire, 
Delgado, and Gonzalez 2015). Direct impacts are felt by farmers in general and communities living in 
the Terai region, which is relatively more exposed.  
Drought—abnormally low or poorly distributed precipitation leading to water shortage—presents a 
major source of vulnerability, especially for those practicing rainfed agriculture in Nepal in the hill 
and mountain areas. Panthi et al. (2015) find that rural households in mountain zones exhibit greater 
vulnerability to drought due to their limited adaptive capacity. The impacts of drought are wide 
ranging. In 2008/09, the winter drought resulted in falls in the production of wheat (13.1 percent 
down) and barley (16.4 percent down) compared to the previous year. Nepal experienced a negative 
production balance of more than 100,000 MT leaving annual food price inflation at 17 percent, two-
thirds of affected rural households experiencing food shortages, and an additional caseload for the 
World Food Programme (WFP) of 707,000 people (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, World 
Food Programme, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2009).  
Fire/hail/lightning and harvest loss both disproportionately affected households engaged in 
agriculture, with the impact being higher for better-off households and those living in remote 
locations. The HRVS (Walker, Khadka, and Pandey 2017) also reports that farming practices, which 
can vary with ethnicity, may have had an influence on hazard impact.  
Those working in agriculture with their own land are, by nature, more exposed to crop losses 
because of drought, flood, hailstorms, and so on. However, in some cases, dependence on 
agriculture has a mitigating function whereby households in remote rural areas and those with 
agricultural land have their own production to buffer themselves against some shocks. For example, 
the disruption to food supply and rising prices resulting from the blockades in 2015 had less impact 
on farming households. In contrast, poor households who are more likely to find their livelihoods in 
the labor market, either in urban or rural areas, were far more exposed to price inflation and supply 
disruptions.  
2.4.3 Impacts of natural disasters on poverty 
While there is a plethora of anecdotal evidence about the links between disasters and poverty in 
Nepal, rather less empirical evidence exists. The HRVS study (Walker, Khadka, and Pandey 2017) is 
one of few recent, country-wide studies of the relationship between shocks and wellbeing. They find 
a statistically significant difference in mean food insecurity for many of the shocks. For example, 19 
percent of households that were not shock-affected in the poorest quintile were moderately or 
severely food insecure, compared to 36 percent of shock-affected households. They note 
“significantly higher rates of food insecurity among shock-affected poorer households, for 
flood/landslide, drought, riots/blockade, livestock loss and disease/injury” (p. 46). At the same time, 
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they suggest that, in response to shocks, there is a strikingly higher propensity to reduce food intake 
among households in the lower quintiles. This points, in turn, to a deleterious impact on food 
security. These insights are useful but, as noted above, causation and therefore the extent to which 
shocks affect poverty—cannot be discerned from a single wave. Other assessments highlight strong 
relationships between the occurrence of natural disasters and poverty, but, again, the direction of 
causation is not always clear.  
Joshi, Piya, and Kaharjan (2017) use panel data to show that the occurrence of natural disasters 
increased the risk of households moving into poverty in the Baitadi district of the far-western hills in 
Nepal. They find that a “significantly higher proportion of households (29.2%) that suffered as a 
result of climate-related natural disasters (especially floods, landslides, and hailstorms) were 
chronically poor. The vast majority (91.3 %) of chronically poor households in the study areas were 
affected by climate-related natural disasters. The chronically poor households constituted only 5.9% 
of the total number of non-affected households. By contrast, a significantly higher proportion of 
non-poor households (50%) were not affected by climate-related natural disasters, with non-poor 
households constituting only 25% of the total number of affected households” (p. 213).  
Lee (2016) notes that both exposure to and impact of disasters in Nepal is strongly linked to poverty 
through ‘poverty traps’ whereby poor households were unable to relocate to safer places even when 
they knew they were living in a disaster-prone geographical area. The existing empirical literature 
also supports the notion of an intersection between poverty, ethnicity, and disasters, particularly 
because lower-caste households have fewer alternative sources of income through social networks 
that they can fall back on following a shock (Shrestha 2016; Wagle 2016). However, it is not just 
chronic or structural poverty that is influenced by disasters. Wagle (2016) examines poverty 
dynamics and their socioeconomic determinants between 1996 and 2011 in Nepal and finds that 
while chronic/structural poverty accounts for about 17 percent of the population, more than two-
thirds of people are subject to transient poverty. Thus, while disasters can contribute toward 
poverty traps, disasters appear to also be important in driving churning or transient poverty.  
2.5 Responding to natural disasters: managing and coping strategies 
How people manage or cope with the impact of disasters varies by the type of shock, by individual 
and household characteristics, and by the geographical/structural contexts (for example, the types 
of livelihoods that are feasible in a given area).  
Drawing on the HRVS data, Walker, Khadka, and Pandey (2017) note strong differences between 
coping strategies following the 2015 earthquake compared with other shocks. High levels of external 
assistance following the earthquake meant that reductions in food and non-food consumption were 
less than for other shocks. There was also more support from neighbors and friends following the 
earthquake. Children’s schooling was interrupted more frequently for earthquakes than other 
shocks—though this is more likely the result of damage to classrooms. 
Some of the findings about coping strategies may also reflect household and individual 
characteristics. Across a range of shocks, richer households were less likely to cut spending or 
borrow, and the poorest quintile was more likely to receive government or nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) assistance. Sudmeier-Mieux et al. (2012) note stark differences in preparedness 
for and coping strategies following landslides in two villages in Dolakha district, one higher caste 
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(Chhetri) than the other (Thami). In a similar way, Paudel and Ryu (2018) find that children in high-
caste households have been able to mitigate the effects of the earthquake with no impact on their 
education in the long run, but infants from low-caste households destined to be 17.6 percent less 
likely to complete middle school. For girls, the negative impacts are greater than for boys. 
The use of different coping strategies is also underpinned by existing structural constraints—
especially those related to geography and socioeconomic status. In terms of geography, for example, 
households in remote areas were less likely to draw on savings, most probably because they had less 
access to banking facilities compared to more accessible areas (Walker, Khadka, and Pandey 2017). 
Households in all parts of the Terai (that is, from far western to eastern) were more likely than those 
in the mountain regions to cut schooling, though it is not clear why. Structural constraints may be 
entrenched following disasters, making it harder for already disadvantaged households to recover 
than others. He et al. (2018, 68) find that in Gorkha district, following the 2015 earthquake, 
vulnerability of households accumulated over time: “The pre-earthquake disadvantages poorly 
prepare them for adapting to disasters and adversely militate their recovery…The immediate 
impacts of the earthquake including asset loss and damage, and livelihood interruptions deprived 
households of vital entitlements that could have been relied on for recovery…and temporary 
relocation raises challenges of people's health and permanent residence, which further exacerbates 
the vulnerability.” 
Drawing on evidence from respondents in earthquake-affected Dolakha district, Epstein et al. (2018) 
found that farming households made rapid changes to their livelihoods to survive in the year 
following the 2015 earthquakes: “The need for cash during the first year rose sharply. As farm land 
dedicated to food grains fell, some families drew on commercial crop sales and off-farm income and 
remittances, and others sought wage opportunities locally. Selling draught animals and other 
livestock was necessary for some households, in part for cash and in part in response to the 
reduction in planted area. Access to farm labour fell as priority was given to house reconstruction 
and relief efforts as government and donor aid came in; the labour that remained for agricultural 
work became expensive. With the increase of wage labour rates (by up to 50%) for post-earthquake 
reconstruction, the poorest households reported increased wage earnings.”  
It is not entirely clear to what extent shocks in Nepal lead to long-term changes in livelihoods—
either positive or negative—but Epstein et al. (2017) find potential for disasters to transform and 
change livelihoods in the long term. Drawing on the same evidence base from Dolakha, they suggest 
that the adoption of labor-saving cash crops as part of a postdisaster recovery is accelerating an 
ongoing transition toward more market-focused agricultural activities in subsistence communities in 
Nepal. In a similar vein, Sudmeier-Mieux et al. (2012) find that damage to livelihoods following 
landslides in Dolakha triggered labor migration decisions in households.  
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Chapter 3: Review of Social Protection 
Policies, Programs, and Systems in Nepal  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the SP policies, systems, and programs in Nepal to assess where the most 
appropriate opportunities are for making SP more adaptive and flexible in the face of the shocks and 
disasters identified in the previous chapter, as well as a broader set of covariate shocks to which 
they might be exposed, such as political and global economic crises. It is complemented by a similar 
review of the DRM systems in Nepal. There are many reviews of SP in Nepal (Khadka 2017; Koehler 
2014; Roelen and Chhetri 2016; Sijapati 2017; World Bank 2014); so, in this paper, we focus on 
capturing the current situation in Nepal, links to DRM, and the implications of the transition to a 
federal political system for SP policies and programs.  
SP is generally viewed as comprising noncontributory social assistance and social security that is 
contributory, usually through taxation. In this report, when we refer to SP, we are focusing 
specifically on social assistance programs unless stated otherwise—especially those in Table . The 
report draws on lessons from both the RCIW and KEP. Although the RCIW has been devolved to the 
local level and the KEP has closed, both programs were operational at the time of research and 
thereby provide important lessons for ASP in the future, especially the Prime Minister’s Employment 
Program. 
Table 5: Selected SP programs in Nepal focusing on assistance  
SP Details 
Senior Citizens 
Allowance 
Allowance for all Dalits and Karnali residents over the age of 60 and all others over 
the age of 70 (NPR 1,000 per month for the allowance and NPR 1,000 per month 
for old age medical treatment) 
Single Women’s 
Allowance 
Allowance for single women 60 years or older and widows of any age (NPR 1,000 
per month). 
Disability Allowance Disabled persons receive NPR 2,000 per month if fully disabled and NPR 600 per 
month if partially disabled 
Endangered Ethnicities 
Allowance 
Allowance for those that belong to one of 10 endangered ethnic groups (NPR 2,000 
per month). 
Child Protection Grant NPR 400 per month per child under 5 for up to 2 children per mother for all Dalit 
families and all families in selected districts 
RCIW Self-targeted PWP for food security in selected food-insecure districts; mainly 
unskilled and low skilled works in rural roads, micro projects, and livelihood 
support programs  
KEP Employment guarantee scheme aimed at providing employment in all five districts 
of Karnali plus Bajura; households without any employed member are eligible 
Basic Level Education 
Scholarships  
Basic education scholarships for girls identified as Dalit, disabled, or targeted 
(marginalized) groups 
Secondary Level 
Education Scholarships 
Scholarships for Dalits, disabled, marginalized, conflict-affected, and other targeted 
groups 
Public Food Distribution 
System (PFDS) 
Transportation subsidy on essential food (rice, lentils, and so on) by the Food 
Corporation in 30 remote districts.  
Mid-Day Meal Program 
(Food for Education) 
Mid-day meals to children in preprimary and primary schools in 19 selected 
districts  
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SP Details 
Nutritional Supplement 
for Pregnant Women 
and Under Fives  
Iron and folic acid tablets to pregnant woman; Vitamin A capsules to children ages 
6–59 months, and deworming tablets to children ages 12–59 months 
Integrated Child Health 
and Nutrition Program  
Fortified flour distribution - a nutritional supplement for all children ages 6–23 
months in 5 districts in Karnali and Solukhumbu 
National Tuberculosis, 
AIDS, and Sexually 
Transmitted Infections 
Control Program 
Food supplement for tuberculosis and AIDS patients  
Free Treatment for 
Target Groups  
Free treatment for the poor, those under age 15, those over 75 and endangered 
ethnicities for cancer, heart diseases, and dialysis  
Source: Adapted from World Bank 2014. 
The next section of the chapter places SP in its historical context and situates it in the current 
decentralization process. Subsequently, Nepal-specific programs are discussed with a focus on 
overlaps and gaps in coverage (in relation mainly to exposure to shocks) and strengths and 
weaknesses in implementation including payment systems. The impacts of SP are discussed in 
relation to the four pillars of Nepal’s DRM framework—mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery. The next section places what is known about SP programs in Nepal in the context of the 
decentralization processes and assesses findings, particularly from fieldwork in Bardiya, Humla, and 
Saptari, about the implementation of SP under a decentralized system. Three major challenges are 
identified regarding (a) oversight, (b) financial flows and fiduciary risks, and (c) capacity and 
administrative arrangements at the local government level. The conclusions identify key priorities 
for strengthening existing SP so that it can reach its potential in supporting DRM in Nepal. 
3.2 The emergence of SP  
The evolution of Nepal’s SP system has been described in detail in various places (for example, see 
GoN 2012a; Khadka 2017; Koehler 2014; Sijapati 2017). Understanding by what pathways and 
mechanisms SP might contribute to DRM requires, in turn, a solid understanding of what drives 
decisions to invest in and support SP and of DRM at different moments in time. As Jones (2012, 240) 
has noted “understanding the conditions under, and the process by which such perceived political 
advantages emerge and are acted on is of central importance for understanding the trajectory of 
social policy as part of social and economic development.” The high coverage of the RCIW in the 
years immediately following the Peace Accord, in part driven by renewed willingness by 
international agencies to fund programs, provides a case in point (Table 6). The growth of social 
transfer programs in Nepal has been rapid by low-income country (LIC) standards (see for example 
Figure 4 for the growth of SSAs). This growth was driven because SP emerged at a particularly pivotal 
moment in Nepal’s recent history: a new political settlement saw a restructuring of power relations 
in Nepal that brought in groups previously excluded on the basis of caste/ethnicity and geography. 
There are a number of key insights from this process. 
First, the emergence of the current suite of programs in Nepal has been largely a result of the nature 
of the political settlement in Nepal and the establishment of a clientelist system of politics after 
2013, which saw frequent switches in power between various political parties and coalitions (Drucza 
2016; Schjødt 2017). Decisions about SP were generally made at the central level by a small number 
of actors and reflected coalition negotiations at specific moments in time. For example, the process 
of establishing the under-five child grant took place following the resignation of the Maoist Prime 
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Minister, and notable elements—for example, making it universal for Dalit households—reflected 
compromises between coalition partners (Jones 2012, 247). The importance of elections is also 
noted: “evidently, SP initiatives in Nepal are influenced more by populism and less by concrete 
evidence or fiscal calculations” (Sijapati 2017, 32). While the nature of this evolution has resulted in 
substantial programs providing genuine support to vulnerable individuals, it has also led to a 
fragmented system. 
Figure 4: Growth in the number of SSA Beneficiaries - 1998–2016 
 
Source: Administrative data from Department of Civil Registration 
Table 6: Participant numbers for selected PWPs  2006/07 to 2016/17 
Program 
Financial Year 
06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 13/14 14/15 15/16 16/17 
RCIW 265,000 265,000 265,000 265,000 159,000 169,000 132,500 145,750 166,950 166,950 136,210  
KEP 60,539 67,999 71,005 75,304 73,848 73,413 61,058 66,615 40,844 16,206 19,170 
TOTAL 325,539 332,999 336,005 340,304 232,848 242,413 194,008 212,365 207,794 183,156 157,244 
Source: Administrative data from Ministry of Federal Affairs and General Administration  
Second, as a result of shifting coalitions among political parties, the process of program 
development has been rather disjointed with different ministries, drawing on support from different 
international development agencies, each with different objectives being established at different 
moments. Although there was a “shared interest to improve the country’s socioeconomic conditions 
after the end of the civil conflict” (Rabi et al. 2015, 8), the SP sector in Nepal is crowded with 
multiple interpretations of ‘vulnerability’ (Sijapati 2017) that underpin different programs. 
Third, as is common in post-conflict countries (UNDP/UNCDF 2014), substantial emphasis has been 
placed on the role of SP in contributing to state building—particularly by enhancing the visibility and 
output legitimacy of the state (Holmes and Upadhya 2009; KC et al. 2014; Slater and Mallett 2017; 
Upreti et al. 2012). Yet, notwithstanding the importance of the political settlement that underpinned 
investments in SP in the 2000s, Nepal’s programs are not viewed as particularly transformative in 
nature—that is, many of Nepal’s programs do not explicitly and overtly do much to tackle underlying 
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structural poverty and power relations. Rather they provide a signal of the presence of the state and 
its respect for particular groups, especially senior citizens. In this vein, Jones (2012, 245) notes that 
the “expansion of public spending using the existing state machinery has proved a more immediately 
feasible strategy for providing tangible benefits to voters than long-term structural reform in the 
economy or political system.” Similarly, Sijapati (2017, 31), referring to Upreti et al. (2012), notes the 
“political positioning of SP as a panacea” and the lack of alignment between (a) the framing of SP as 
an instrumental tool with multiple applications and objectives from public food provision through 
basic social services to overcoming social exclusion and other forms of inequalities and (b) the 
limited evidence of impact in these areas.  
Overall, “the current set of SSA programmes represents the outcome of a set of separate budgetary 
initiatives, the precise characteristics of which have depended on the political context of the time of 
adoption, but all of which have been subsequently retained and extended. The approach that has 
been followed to date has been to introduce instruments on an initially limited basis in terms of the 
numbers of beneficiaries who are eligible, and then progressively to extend this depending on the 
budgetary context and other priorities” (Jones 2012, 246). This goes some way toward explaining the 
challenges that have faced all partners in establishing a National Social Protection Framework to 
bind the system together “The Government has recognized the importance of consolidating some of 
these disparate programs, but this recognition is yet to translate into concrete policy commitments 
or actions” (World Bank 2016a, 2).  
3.3 SP - policies and legislative framework 
The policies and legislative framework for SP are discussed in some length (see for example, Khadka 
2017; Koehler 2011; Roelen and Chhetri 2016; Sijapati 2017; World Bank 2014; and others). Building 
on the interim constitution of 2007, the 2015 Constitution provides the foundation for SP in Nepal, 
particularly article 43 “Senior citizens, single women, people with disabilities, children and citizens of 
endangered ethnicity in an economically poor, incapacitated or helpless state have the right to social 
security, as provided in the law’ (Khadka 2017, 3).  
Provision for senior citizens is found in the Social Security and Protection of Senior Citizens Act while 
other cash transfers are delivered under the Social Security Program Guidelines 2075 (GoN 2018). 
The absence of an act of parliament covering the SSAs until recently,2 PWPs, and other forms of 
social assistance together has a number of implications: first, it held back the translation of the 
constitutional commitments to SP into an overarching strategic plan; second, by extension that this 
allows continued fragmentation—especially of management information systems (MIS) and 
coverage; and finally, that the tasks associated with delivering SP are not statutory, with implications 
for the funding, allocation, and prioritization of tasks at the local government level that is discussed 
in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
More recently Carraro and Lakhey (2018) have described the overarching policy framework 
following the shift to a federal political system and accompanying decentralization of roles and 
mandates. They suggest that some clarity is found in the 2017 Local Government Operation Act 
(LGOA 2074) regarding mandates and roles ascribed to different levels of government. So, while 
                                                          
2 The GoN has approved the Social Security Act 2075, which provides a legal basis for the cash transfers. 
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responsibility for some of the specific tasks associated with delivering the SSAs are clear, there 
remain gaps, notably that there is far less clarity on responsibilities for public works and that the 
overall policy framework for SP remains opaque. Whether or not this presents a problem for SP is 
debatable, but the challenges of making SP more adaptive are certainly constrained by the lack of a 
framework to allow clear interlinks with shock and DRM to become a policy reality. 
Notwithstanding the clarity provided in the LGOA, however, Carraro and Lakhey (2018) also note 
that SSA guidelines need to be further developed not only to recognize the new operational 
environment under devolution, but also to address some of the current limitations—as of February 
2018, the emerging guidelines were being finalized. 
3.4 SP programs 
3.4.1 Key program information 
The elements of SP that we are interested in this work—notably noncontributory transfers including 
through PWPs—occupy one of four pillars of social security identified by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) (Khadka 2017). The full SP portfolio cost, including social security, was estimated 
to be around 3.20 percent of GDP in 2015/2016 with a budget in 2017/2018 of 3.58 percent of GDP, 
though about two-thirds of this was on public sector pensions (World Bank estimates). Social 
assistance (predominantly cash transfer) programs amounted to just over 1 percent of GDP in 
2015/2016, with an estimated increase in 2017/2018 to 1.38 percent of projected GDP (World Bank 
estimates). 
The circumstances of SP’s emergence and evolution highlighted previously have resulted in a large 
number of largely fragmented SP programs. A selection of these is provided in Table , showing the 
target beneficiaries and benefits received. The programs span cash and in-kind transfers (with many 
of the latter underpinned by health and nutrition objectives), plus subsidies and stipends, especially 
to support education. At the outset of this project, the focus was on the two PWPs, KEP and RCIW, 
and on the SSAs comprising support for senior citizens, widows/single women, people with disability, 
endangered ethnicities, and households with children under five years that are either in Karnali 
region or are Dalit. Following fieldwork in Humla, the PFDS was also assessed because it was cited as 
a critical source of support during drought.  
The five SSA programs (senior citizens, single women, disability, children under five, and endangered 
ethnicities) are based on tackling lifecycle or idiosyncratic risks, and so, coverage is primarily on 
demographic and household criteria. There are exceptions to this, for example, that the under-five 
child grant is, in most districts, targeted at Dalit households but in the districts of Karnali is universal. 
In the case of the old age allowances, eligibility begins at 70 for most, but for Dalits and people in 
Karnali, eligibility starts at 60 years.  
For the two main PWPs (RCIW and KEP), targeting was first by district, selecting those districts with 
the lowest HDI. Households were then selected in specific village development committees (VDCs) 
(and from 2018 in rural municipalities and wards) using measurements of household food gaps and 
levels/types of employment. The geographical allocation of food stocks for the PFDS draws on data 
supplied by the District Administration Office (DAO) and NGOs/International Nongovernmental 
Organizations (INGOs) and takes into account the geographical remoteness of districts and whether 
they are risk prone. This information is subsequently used to calculate the amount of food stock 
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directed to each location. Beneficiary districts are chosen on an annual basis by the Executive Board 
comprising representatives from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), Ministry of Commerce, Trade 
and Supplies (MoCTS), Ministry of Finance (MoF), and Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock 
Development (MoALD).  
Table 7: Eligibility and targeting of main social transfer programs 
 Targeting Geographic Household Individual 
P
ro
gr
am
 
Old age allowance 60 and above for districts 
in Karnali 
 70 and above 
60 and above for Dalits 
Single women’s 
allowance 
  Widowed women of 
any age and widowers 
60 years or over 
Disability   Individuals with 
disability classified 
according to severity 
Endangered 
ethnicities 
 Specific ethnic/caste 
groups 
 
Under-five child 
grant 
All households with 
children under five in 
Karnali districts (Dolpa, 
Humla, Jajarkot, Jumla, 
Kalikot, and Mugu). In 
2017, it was expanded to 3 
additional districts—
Achham, Bajhang, and 
Rautahat. It is expected to 
be expanded to 6 new 
districts in 2018/2019. 
Dalit households (up 
to two children per 
household) 
Under five years old and 
Dalit 
RCIW Selected districts based on 
food insecurity 
  
KEP All ViDCs in Dolpa, Humla, 
Jumla, Kalikot, and Mugu 
districts  
Household with no 
employed or self-
employed member 
 
PFDS 100 depots in 36 districts Self-targeted (with 
different grades of 
rice available) 
 
 
3.4.2 Gaps and overlaps in programs 
Given the haphazard evolution of SP, the fragmented policy framework, and the numerous 
objectives that various programs have, we draw on Sijapati’s (2017) differentiation of types of 
vulnerability to assess gaps in SP programs in Nepal (Box 2). The main focus of Nepal’s programs is 
on lifecycle vulnerabilities with the biggest programs in terms of coverage (senior citizens, 
widows/single women, and the child grant) defining eligibility largely in terms of demographic 
criteria. On paper, the current suite of SP programs go some way to addressing historical and 
structural exclusion, with geographical targeting and eligibility defined by ethnicity/caste and gender 
being common across programs (see Table 7). For example, both KEP and RCIW explicitly target 
districts where food security and other HDIs are at their worst. 
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Assessments of SP in Nepal find limited impacts on historical and structural exclusion (see for 
example, Koehler 2014), with three main explanations. First, SP (at current coverage and transfer 
levels) is tackling symptoms rather than causes of historical and structural exclusion, and it will take 
complementary programming and substantial social change to achieve anything really 
transformational. Second, previous assessments have found that a lack of results or impacts on 
levels of inequality between ethnic groups or genders can also be attributed, in part, to the low 
levels of transfers made to households, although there have been substantial increases in payments 
to senior citizens in particular. Koehler (2014), for example, argues that social assistance programs 
are populist rather than offering meaningful change for households facing structural inequality; the 
low transfer amount of the social assistance programs allows them to serve as “placebos to the 
people in lieu of genuine support and structural socioeconomic transformation.” Third, as was noted 
in particular in Bardiya during fieldwork and as described more widely in Holmes et al. (2018), some 
of the most vulnerable among excluded groups struggle to access SP even if they are eligible—they 
either do not have the required documents (such as proof of citizenship, marriage, birth, or age) or 
the knowledge, mobility, and social networks to navigate the application process, or programs such 
as public works are oversubscribed and they are turned away.  
In terms of political violence/unsettled political environment, there is some programming that seeks 
to address the legacies of violent conflict (for example, cash transfers to the families of those killed, 
injured, disappeared, and displaced due to conflict, operated by the Ministry of Peace and 
Reconstruction). Further, given the origins of the conflict in grievances about historical and 
structural exclusion, existing programs that target, for example, Dalit groups and endangered 
ethnicities and specific geographical areas go some way to seek to address this type of vulnerability. 
Box 2: Types of Vulnerability in Nepal 
 
Sijapati (2017) identifies five types of vulnerabilities* often associated with households in Nepal.  
• Income poverty. Despite a drastic decline in poverty rates from 42 percent in 1995–1996 to 25 percent in 
2010–2011, evidence suggests that a substantial share of households in Nepal are near-poor. The 
prevalence of shocks in Nepal leaves many of them vulnerable to sliding back into poverty. For example, 
during the food price crisis of 2008, it is estimated that as much as 30 percent of Nepal’s population was 
experiencing hunger—an increase of 2 million over 2005.  
• Historical and structural exclusion based on caste, ethnicity, gender, and geography constitute another 
form of vulnerability. These horizontal inequalities result in spatial patterns of well-being and poverty. 
People from indigenous communities, Dalits, and minority religious groups are overrepresented among 
the chronically poor, as are women who face restrictions to access to education and livelihood 
opportunities and the near constant threat of gender-based violence.  
• Lifecycle vulnerabilities. Nepal faces the twin pressures of both a growing size of elderly people alongside 
a very young population overall. UNICEF (2010) reports that child malnutrition affects 45 percent of 
children under 5 years of age in Nepal while the Global Age Watch Index 2013 ranks Nepal 77th out of 91 
countries in terms of quality of life and well-being of older people (HelpAge International 2013).  
• Political violence and an unsettled constitutional and political environment. Although the decade-long 
civil war formally ended in 2006, violence remains prevalent in many parts of the country.  
• Environmental degradation and recurrent natural disasters are enduring (and perhaps worsening) 
features of Nepal that have not only led to socioeconomic insecurity but also increased the vulnerability 
of people, especially those from marginalized sections of the population as described previously. 
Source: Adapted from Sijapati (2017, 19–20) 
Note: * The basis for Sijapati’s typology of vulnerabilities is SP, rather than risks and disasters according to 
Chapter 2. 
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Overall, the programs that cover income poverty and natural disasters have far less coverage and 
are mainly small programs of NGOs. The limited focus on poverty, particularly in cash transfer 
programs, is borne out by World Bank (2013a) (see Figure 5) and confirmed by more recent HRVS 
data (Walker, Khadka, and Pandey 2017). Unemployment is not covered, except for provision in 
contributory social security, and announcements in the Government budget speech in July 2012 that 
KEP becoming an employment guarantee program following the Indian example have not been 
realized and it has been phased out. Public works beneficiaries continue to make up only a small 
share of those receiving cash transfers. This raises a critical question for this project about whether a 
more adaptive SP system in Nepal can be achieved through existing programs or whether a new (and 
perhaps radically different) set of programs or framework is required. 
Figure 5: Beneficiaries of selected SP/social security programs across wealth quintiles  
Source: World Bank 2013a cited in Sijapati 2017.  
Note: ‘In-kind’ transfers refer to non-cash transfers, particularly food.  
3.4.3 Strengths and weaknesses in general implementation features 
Schjødt (2017, 24) is positive about implementation: “Nepal’s SP programmes are overall performing 
relatively well on these three parameters [right amount of money, to the right people, at the right 
time], especially when considering the limited capacity of the state and the challenging geography of 
the country.” However, interviews with beneficiaries in Bardiya, Humla and Saptari regarding their 
experiences of SP suggest there are many challenges to be overcome and improvements to be 
made—particularly in areas that will influence the potential for SP to be more adaptive and play a 
greater role in supporting disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.  
Registration and enrolment  
The different SP programs explored have very different operating systems and so the challenges 
with registration and enrolment are varied. For the PFDS, people seeking to purchase subsidized rice 
and other basic goods have to show citizenship documents to prove that they are resident in the 
locality and are issued a ration card. There are no limits on registration/enrolment. Interviews with 
the National Food Corporation (NFC) stated that stocks are enough to cover the following 
proportions of populations in the respective areas: 85 percent–90 percent of people in remote 
locations (mountains), 50 percent in middle hills, and 35 percent in Kathmandu. The Terai does not 
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have selling centers as they produce their own supply and are suppliers of NFC food stocks. In 
contrast there are limits on the number of beneficiaries in the RCIW and KEP which are calculated 
nationally. These programs are regularly oversubscribed, and, at municipality/rural municipality level 
and ward level, officials have to develop further eligibility criteria beyond those in the guidelines to 
further reduce the number participating to keep payments in line with budgets. This can include 
making any individual or household in receipt of the SSAs ineligible for the RCIW/KEP. 
Carraro and Lakhey (2018, vi) highlight some of the challenges associated with registering and 
enrolling onto the SSA programs: “There are significant differences in the level of service provided 
across the visited local governments and wards. For example, in one local government, registration 
is still occurring once a year, and in another in limited periods every four months: for the child grant 
the implication is that people are forced to visit twice the ward offices, first to register the birth and 
then again to apply for the child grant. In Rautahat, while paper registration of children under five is 
taking place, there is a very significant delay in the digitalization of such records and no payments 
have yet been made in this fiscal year.”  
Substantial investments are underway in SSA registration systems and improvements to the 
processes of enrolment (for example the ‘Strengthening Systems for SP and Civil Registration 
Project’ (World Bank 2016a). As the World Bank notes (2016a, 3) “The manual and decentralized 
record keeping of beneficiary information is a major hurdle for addressing issues of duplication, 
under-coverage, and weak oversight facing the administration of the SSA program…weak 
administrative systems [have] given rise to a host of problems, both real and perceived, including 
lingering suspicions of duplication, alleged leakage of funds, and delayed benefit payments.” At the 
local government level in Bardiya, Humla, and Saptari, there was, however, limited evidence of 
progress with the shift from manual to digital SSA beneficiary lists—perhaps because the new 
systems were overlapping with the transition from district to local government administered 
registration and enrolment. The lack of evidence found at local level is confirmed by Carraro and 
Lakhey (2018, 11) who found that in Godawri (Lalitpur) and Rautahat “Local Governments have not 
yet entered the details of SSA beneficiaries.”  
New Era (2016) identified substantial under-coverage of eligible SSAs due to administrative and 
procedural delays, especially in relation to registration processes. Hagen-Zanker, Mallett, and 
Ghimire (2015) note the substantial challenges—in terms of time and cost—associated with 
accessing the child grant in practice that result from geographical and bureaucratic barriers. In 2018, 
our respondents did report improvements in the time it took to receive the first payment, but the 
challenges getting registered—especially for people with disabilities—remained protracted. The 
transition to the local government appeared to be improving access to the program: Although the 
evidence is anecdotal it does suggest that the devolution of some responsibilities to the local level 
may allow improvements to the efficacy of SSA systems. Lack of citizenship documents were cited as 
a significant barrier to accessing SP programs (and support during disaster), especially in Bardiya. 
For PWPs, registration and enrolment took place at the ward level, with local government staff 
responsible for ranking households and registering lists of beneficiaries/workers. Compared to SSAs, 
there appeared to be few challenges associated with the administrative processes of registration 
and enrolment for PWPs. For PWPs the fundamental challenges were associated with targeting and 
selecting beneficiaries. While there were nationally established criteria for enrolment in the RCIW 
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and KEP, the criteria as defined led to a far longer participant list than resources allowed, so further 
targeting criteria were introduced at the local level to rank participants and provide a mechanism 
aligning the number of beneficiaries with the resources available. 
Adequacy, funding, and payment systems  
Using panel data from Bardiya, Rolpa and Ilam, Sturge et al. (2017) found that less than one in five 
recipients of SP felt that it made a difference to their quality of life because of the low transfer level. 
Similarly, two evaluations of the child grant find that the levels of support provided are not adequate 
to have a meaningful impact on child poverty (Adhikari et al. 2014; Hagen-Zanker, Mallett, and 
Ghimire 2015). World Bank (2014), in analysis focusing largely on the SSAs and before the 
subsequent increases in benefit amounts, finds only limited impact on poverty of the existing cash 
transfer programs and puts this down to the low levels of transfers and categorical targeting. At the 
local level our limited fieldwork generated similar findings—few respondents felt that the benefits at 
their current levels (Table 8) made a substantial difference to their wellbeing. Using the most recent 
poverty line data (NPR 19,261 per capita in 2011), the old age, endangered ethnicities, and red card 
disability allowances would lift individual beneficiaries above the line. Single women’s, blue card 
disability, and under-five allowances would equate to approximately two-thirds, one-third, and one-
quarter of the individual poverty line. It is important to note that while allowances are meant for 
individuals, they are, de facto, often used to meet the needs of the whole households, especially in 
the case of the single women’s allowance. 
Table 8: Benefit levels of selected SP programs, FY2017–2018 
Program Benefit Level 
Old age allowance NPR 2,000 per month (including additional support to seek medical 
treatment) 
Single women’s allowance NPR 1,000 per month 
Disability NPR 2,000 per month (severely disabled) or NPR 600 per month (partially 
disabled) 
Endangered ethnicities NPR 2,000 per month 
Under-five child grant NPR 400 per month per child (up to a maximum of 2 children) 
 
RCIW NPR 450 per day up to 15 days 
KEP NPR 450 per day up to 35 days (equivalent to approx. NPR 1,300 per 
month if all days completed) 
PFDS 4 kg of subsidized rice per household member per month 
 
The allowances did prove adequate to produce other effects on intra-household and 
intergenerational relations. Respondents receiving SSAs did report that receiving support had 
changed their situation in their households, particularly their relationships with other members. This 
was found to be particularly important during times of disasters when households are under greater 
stress and intra-household conflict and domestic violence is amplified. At these times, the income 
from SSAs made recipients part of the solution rather than part of the problem as households sought 
to meet their basic consumption needs.  
Adequacy is also undermined by implementation problems. The VDCs assessed as part of a Public 
Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) reported that the funds received were inadequate to cover all 
eligible SSA households (New Era 2016). They found that 7 percent of SSA beneficiaries were found 
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to be underpaid, each receiving, on average, 3.6 percent less than they ought to. Delays in the 
registration and enrolment process were a driver of the underpayments. 
In Humla, wage rates for public works had increased from NPR 450 to NPR 750 per day and were 
viewed positively by beneficiaries. Despite significant cuts faced by the program in FY2017–2018, 
there was no lowering of the wage rate back to the NPR 450 rate. To avoid diluting the benefits for 
individual households by lowering wage rates, the total number of participants was reduced. In 
particular, in one ward in Simkot rural municipality, those receiving SSAs in the household were 
deemed ineligible for the KEP to maintain the adequacy of payments made in the KEP. For those 
receiving disability or old age allowances the exclusion was not as serious as for those who had been 
receiving the child grant. 
In terms of adequacy for the broader developmental objectives of the program, officials commented 
that the single wage rate made it difficult to attract beneficiaries with skills who could create assets 
that would make a meaningful difference to people’s lives in the local area. They sought to use the 
KEP in a more developmental way—for example, by attracting more skilled workers who could 
mentor apprentices. It was also noted that public works (both the RCIW and KEP), for the majority of 
their years of operation, were so focused on rural road construction that they were missing 
opportunities to build other assets that might have a stronger impact on people’s wellbeing, food 
security, and future livelihoods. (The RCIW did, around 5 years ago, expand to agriculture and 
livelihoods activities, but there was no mention of this during fieldwork). 
The adequacy of any cash transfer program in remote areas was underpinned by the operation of 
the PFDS. Markets that allow poor and vulnerable people to purchase food at a reasonable price are 
an essential feature of the underlying architecture for cash transfer programs to work effectively. In 
Nepal, there are mechanisms for increasing stocks held at food depots and for adjusting the price, 
which in turn ensures that those receiving cash transfers have somewhere to buy food when the 
private sector market does not deliver at a reasonable price. The process of adjusting stocks and 
prices was rather too slow to adjust to rapid onset shocks, although food depot stocks were released 
during the 2015 earthquakes for general distribution rather than sale but was useful for slow onset 
disasters such as drought. In the latter circumstances, there is time to adjust stocks and pricing to 
ensure the adequate supply of food in local markets using monitoring data of Nepal Food Security 
Monitoring Systems (Nepal Khadhya Surakshya Anugaman Pranali, NeKSAP) and WFP’s Vulnerability 
Assessment Monitoring (VAM).  
Fund flows 
For the SSAs, New Era (2016) reports that delays in receiving updated beneficiary lists and clearing 
previous payments resulted in a delay to the transfer from the District Development Committees 
(DDCs) to districts and on to VDCs. The delays are substantial: on average 63 days in 2014/2015 and 
32 days in 2015/16 for transfer to districts and 73 and 47 days respectively in the same years to 
VDCs. Human resource capacity constraints—especially a lack of accountants—were blamed for the 
delays. Although the new fund flow arrangements are not complicated—certainly no more so than 
before the transition (Figure 6)—interviews at district, local government, and (new) ward level and 
with beneficiaries suggested that the timeliness of payments had not improved following 
decentralization. Some of this was accounted for by the incomplete process of deploying district 
staff to municipalities and rural municipalities but it seems unlikely that the challenges identified by 
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New Era (2016) have been overcome already, only to be replaced by new challenges associated with 
decentralization. More likely, decentralization has created an additional layer of administrative 
challenges at this stage in time: the removal of the district layer may simplify the delivery system, 
but most of the pre-existing challenges identified by New Era were at a more local level and so are 
unlikely to have disappeared. 
Figure 6 SSA Payment authorization and fund flow 
 
Source: Carraro and Lakhey (2018, 30). 
For PWPs, the fund flow process, and specifically the size of funds delivered to local levels, was often 
irregular, notably for the KEP where the major donor cut funding. One respondent noted that “at 
first the budget was Rs 12 crore and we have planned the activities of 7 rural municipalities 
according to it. For Simkot the budget was Rs 2 crore 40 lakh and from that money Rs 79 lakh has 
been taken away. KEP made plans and made a contract with the beneficiaries and even started work 
according to the previous budget. In two areas, they have even completed the work…In wards 7 and 
8 of Simkot rural municipality, work has already been completed. They made plans in July and 
competed the work in March. They announced the decrease in the budget in April. Now it’s the time 
to give payments but there is no budget 
and the rural municipality is facing 
problem. And in other wards work has just 
been started. People come to ask for their 
payment in the rural municipality, but 
they don’t have budget.” In Humla, the 
withdrawal of donor funds for the KEP was 
interpreted locally as resulting from a lack 
of trust among donor agencies that the 
funding could be effectively disbursed and 
accounted for in the new federal system.  
For the PFDS, the fund flow is flexible to 
account for emergencies (Figure 7). In the 
event of shortages in the availability of 
Figure 7: Public Food Distribution System fund flow 
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rice at the food depot the NFC issues a request for further resourcing of transport costs to the GoN. 
A prime example of this is in the incidence of shock: PFDS was used by the GoN to supply and 
redirect existing stocks to areas affected by the 2015 earthquake and 2017 floods.  
Timeliness of payments  
Payments for the KEP are made in instalments but, in the last year, have been unreliable. The KEP 
began work on projects in 2017/18, only to then learn of a reduction in funding. The result in Humla 
was that planned projects have been cancelled in some wards, to make up the funding shortfall in 
other wards where work was already underway.  
For the SSAs, there was substantial confusion about the timing of payments. The findings of the PETS 
(New Era 2016) noted a lack of awareness among beneficiaries about when they were meant to 
receive SSAs: although only one in every seven beneficiaries received their payments at the right 
time, 92 percent of recipients felt they received payments on time in 2014/2015. Fast forward to 
2018 and very few beneficiaries said that the payments were made on time, but they were unclear 
when the payment should come. 
According to existing government guidelines SSA payments must be made three times a year: the 
last week of September, the last week of January, and the last week of May, and each time within a 
two-week window (Carraro and Lakhey 2018). In practice, few beneficiaries and local government 
officials knew whether payments were supposed to be made either every four months or at three 
unequally spaced intervals. Payments every four months would not be especially helpful for linking 
SP to disaster response. However, program timings for payments (as cited by some respondents) 
were conducive to disaster response: two of the three payments each year aligned with seasonal 
climate-related shocks. Payments at the start of the financial year (July) align with the monsoon and 
heightened flood and landslide risk. Payments in winter correspond with the onset of seasonal cold 
waves on the Terai. Only the payment preceding Dashain (when there are substantial calls on 
expenditures for festivals and travel to be with family) did not align with seasonal shocks. Payment 
timings are more relevant to shocks faced on the Terai (flood and cold waves) than in the mountain 
areas (drought and landslide). Plus, analysis of the HRVS data shows that, frequently, payments are 
delayed—arriving too late for the monsoon or for cold waves. Lists for beneficiaries also used to be 
opened only once a year but this is changing to be more regular, although not rolling, registration 
process. 
New Era’s (2016) PETS found poor financial record keeping, leakage of SSA funding at the VDC level, 
and 5 percent of funds spend on ghost beneficiaries. At this earlier stage, the extent to which the 
problems at VDC level that were identified in the PETS review will be overcome following the 
transition to a local government is not clear. It has been widely suggested that the existence of 
elected bodies overseeing the delivery of SP at the local level will allow greater accountability (and 
this is supported by experiences elsewhere—see for example, De Janvry, Finan, and Sadoulet 2012; 
Fenwick 2009, 2010; Laws 2016;).  
Substantial investments—of financial and human resources and systems infrastructure—are being 
made to deliver SP transfers direct to beneficiary bank accounts and to reduce the risks of financial 
mismanagement. In our limited fieldwork we found little progress in the transition to e-payments, 
and doubts, among both beneficiaries and government officials, about their appropriateness in 
32 
 
remote rural contexts. Humla, for example, was reported to have only one bank with permanent 
premises. In other districts, especially Bardiya and Saptari, beneficiaries complained that the costs of 
travelling to the nearest bank would eat into their allowance, especially old age and disability 
allowance beneficiaries who often required a companion to support their travel. This finding is 
echoed in Carraro and Lakhey (2018, 16): “in Rautahat it was reported that while bank payments 
makes much easier the life of public employees, some people need to make significant travel to 
reach the bank and suffer as a result.” 
Summary 
The implementation of SP in Nepal faces a multitude of challenges. While some of these may reflect 
the uncertainties of mandates, roles, and responsibilities in the context of the ongoing 
decentralization processes, it is our interpretation that many of the current challenges predate the 
transition to a federal structure. Instead, new challenges are layered on pre-existing challenges 
associated with human resource capacity (with reference to both the quantity of staff provided to 
deliver programs and their specific skills and capabilities), financing of SP, and administrative 
infrastructure such as the MIS and banking systems.  
Overall, the main implication here is that, whatever plans are made to make SP more adaptive and 
supportive of disaster risk mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery, the timing of payments 
will have to be significantly more reliable and accompanied by financing streams and systems for 
rapid identification of beneficiaries. 
3.5 Outcomes and impacts of SP programs  
High quality evaluations of the impacts of SP in Nepal—especially those that have control groups to 
ensure that changes are specific to the target population—are few. Furthermore, the evidence on 
how SP supports disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery is very rare indeed. 
Despite this it is possible to identify some findings about the impacts of programs that allow us to 
infer how they might be useful in responding to various shocks. In this section we explore what is 
known about the impacts of SP in relation to disaster mitigation and preparedness and disaster 
response and recovery. Some of the impacts are related to the core function of SP (that is, the 
transfer) while others are related to specific design features (such as the requirement to be involved 
in labor which creates assets). 
Evidence about the impacts of SP on disaster mitigation is rare, especially in Nepal. Sijapati notes 
that thus far “the impact of cash transfers in reducing the intensity of poverty and inequality have 
been very limited’, drawing on modelling from the World Bank (2013a, 2014). Vaidya, Regmi and 
Ghimire (2010) finds similarly disappointing results for the KEP in which only 13 out of 300 recipient 
households surveyed indicated food sufficiency throughout the year. The most recent evaluation of 
the RCIW does not measure impacts on food security or poverty in a robust way but instead depends 
on people’s satisfaction with the program. For the child grant in Nepal, Adhikari et al. (2014) find 
that although households are able to purchase more food (some manufactured, some more 
nutritious) the impact on food security in terms of overall consumption did not change. Koehler’s 
(2011) review goes as far as to suggest that the level of expenditure on SP may prove difficult to 
justify given the small reductions in poverty resulting from existing programs.  
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There is more positive evidence from qualitative research from Roelen and Chhetri (2016). They 
suggest that SP programs can have an impact on child poverty and vulnerability indicators. While not 
directly linked to disasters, we do know that those living below the poverty line, with poor levels of 
nutrition, lower education levels, and with poor access to health care are often more exposed to 
shocks. So, SP can play a role in mitigating disasters by disrupting the mechanism by which exposure 
to hazards, combined with vulnerability or poverty has disastrous consequences for people. In 
essence, Roelen and Chhetri (2016) and other analyses, for example Hagen-Zanker, Mallett, and 
Ghimire (2015), show that by tackling the underlying drivers of poverty, inequality, and vulnerability, 
SP mitigates shocks by reducing their impact on people. Although progress toward this core 
objective is limited, this is likely to be more about the weaknesses in the specific design features 
(such as low levels of benefit in many programs), beneficiary targeting choices, and implementation 
of the programs (such as late payment or under payment of benefits) than a fundamental problem 
with cash transfer programs themselves. The implication is that SP will only be able to support 
mitigation with substantial improvements to both design and implementation. 
In terms of preparedness, there is also little evidence available. Rabi et al. (2015, 13–14), propose 
cash transfers “accompanied by behavioral change messages that can contribute to reducing the 
household’s vulnerability to disaster…simple shelter guidance, household preparedness measures, 
checklists to protect water sources from contamination and key health messages relevant to the 
rainy season or further earthquakes and other natural disasters.”  
The evidence base on the role of SP in shock response and recovery is similarly weak with no robust 
impact evaluations of SP programs’ role in responding to natural disasters, especially in Nepal. 
Lessons from the provision of an emergency top-up cash transfer program (ETCTP) in 2015/2016 to 
beneficiaries of the SSAs in the most earthquake-affected districts of Nepal do provide useful 
insights into what is feasible and what the implementation challenges are and are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 6.  
3.6 Implications of decentralization 
Cararro and Lakhey (2018, 10) provide an excellent overview of the federal system and the 
opportunities that it is meant to provide 
“…the 2015 Constitution provides for a federal and decentralised governance system with 
non-hierarchical relationships between Federal, State and Local Governments…Through 
decentralisation and devolution there is a general expectation that this should help to foster 
different groups identify, empower people, improve service delivery, and reduce poverty 
and inequality.”  
At the same time there are clear risks associated with the federalism transition. In this section we 
review the consequences—both intended and unintended—that the transition to decentralization is 
having on the SP sector.  
Implications for access to SP. It is suggested that relationships at the local level will support access 
to the program. Carraro and Lakhey (2018) argue that closer links between people eligible for social 
security and the local government responsible for its implementation should help lower exclusion 
errors. Schjødt (2017) describes how people previously depended on personal relationships and 
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networks that the “decentralized system uses the informal social relations in communities to bridge 
the gap between citizens and the state.” 
In practice, at this specific moment, these benefits are not yet realized. The period of transition is 
certainly creating delays and confusion in the delivery of SP. At the time of this report, the division of 
power, roles, and responsibilities had been set but the distribution of human and financial resources 
was very much a work in progress. We found a number of staff had been deployed to local 
governments, mainly officials below section officer, but many were awaiting instructions from the 
central government, and others had been borrowed back from municipalities and rural 
municipalities to deliver essential roles in service delivery. For SP, Carraro and Lakhey (2018) note 
that only once staff are in place at the local government level can adjustments and improvements be 
made to programs that will allow ASP. 
Implications for roles and responsibilities. Once deployed, it is also not evident that everyone is 
clear on roles and responsibilities. As it stands, the roles and responsibilities are there on paper but 
less so in practice. Central-level agencies (specifically Ministry of Federal Affairs and General 
Administration [MoFAGA]) are primarily responsible for the main social assistance programs—the 
SSAs and both the KEP and RCIW until their closure. Under federalism, they have a specific mandate 
for overarching policy and program design (for example eligibility). For the SSAs, local governments 
are largely viewed by respondents as implementing arms of the central government rather than SSAs 
being devolved to local governments, but this may change over time as local government take on 
more independent programming. A number of areas of confusion remain, entangled in the opaque 
differentiation between exclusive and concurrent powers of different parts of the government. As 
Khadka (2017, 5) notes: “There can be duplication of resource allocation in some areas, and weak 
allocation of resources in others. It is also likely to create confusion over the role of each level of 
government. Shared responsibility can result in conflicting policies, lack of mutual coordination and 
reduced performance. Therefore, the responsibility of every level of government needs to be clearly 
demarcated and subject to a coordinating mechanism (and/or partnerships) to enforce 
accountability and encourage fiscal efficiency.” 
In practice this means overcoming the lack of clarity among stakeholders about operational 
responsibilities. For example, although on paper it is clear that beneficiary lists for SSAs require data 
entry at the local level and overall management at the center, it is less clear who owns (or holds 
master copies) and who maintains the lists among stakeholders. At the local level, respondents 
reported not having lists, but sending new entries to the central level to be added to the list. The 
current lack of clarity appears to lead to gaps in functions: in particular, there is no clarity on 
responsibility for checks and balances in the system. A further opaque area is responsibility for new 
registrations; while it is clear that the future plan is for this to take place at the local government 
level, perhaps even at the ward level (and there are clear advantages to that, including for 
incorporating disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery into SSA programming), 
some programs—disability and single women—were registering beneficiaries at district level offices 
in some places. 
Implications for locally appropriate SP. The extent to which local governments can develop their 
own SP policies and programs remains a moot point among key stakeholders. It is recognized that 
the SSAs are nationally defined programs. The situation for PWPs is more complex. Decisions about 
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the activities undertaken in PWPs and, to some extent, about targeting are taken at the local level. 
We found evidence in Humla of targeting criteria being adapted at the rural municipality level to 
adjust to new funding allocations.  
Khadka (2017, 6) highlights the roles that different levels of government play in SP: “central 
government has responsibility to determine the overall policies and standards and provide the 
budget to ensure delivery of all services, the subnational governments are responsible for 
implementation, particularly the determining of beneficiaries of welfare programmes.” The central 
overarching role is critical where SP meant to achieve redistribution, especially to avoid inequitable 
benefit levels and coverage in different areas (Carraro and Lakhey 2018). However, there is also 
acceptance that the substantial geographical variation in social and economic vulnerability across 
Nepal means that local knowledge can be applied in specific locations to better tackle particularities 
of vulnerability. Finding an appropriate and equitable balance between central and locally defined 
eligibility and benefits will be challenging for Nepal—particularly given the limited fiscal space in 
equalization budgets. There are risks in devolving SP responsibilities to the local level. Carraro and 
Lakhey (2018) note the risk that some local governments have lower capacity and resources to 
implement locally appropriate programs and without careful management of equalization grants, 
inequalities could be reinforced, rather than reduced. Schjødt (2017) stresses that local processes do 
not always support local citizens—particularly excluded groups. In Saptari, there were highly 
diverging views on how far the newly elected politicians and the local government secretaries were 
supporting them. 
Implications for implementation capacity. Before the transition to federalism, Khanal (2014, 6) had 
argued that “weak coordination between agencies, poor information management systems and a 
lack of institutional capacity are all critical problems.” There are substantial investments, including 
through support from international development agencies, in improving institutional capacity to 
deliver SP, but progress appears to be currently in limbo, as the new institutional arrangements 
emerge at central, provincial, and, especially, local government levels. 
Our findings suggest that while the potential for greater citizen and community-based organization 
engagement at the local level is widely recognized (see, for example, Schjødt 2017), early indications 
are that the new local government institutions will likely face the same capacity challenges as the 
VDCs and wards that preceded them. Kardan et al.’s (2017) assessment of capacity in Kenya and 
Zambia suggests that the political premium placed on SP led to “additional tasks being carried out by 
already stretched and understaffed local administrations, and often at the expense of their staff not 
carrying out other important statutory functions related to social services.” The ways forward are 
including administrative resources to be matched to expansion and geography; revising the job 
descriptions to cover realistic workloads for staff at the local level—especially those that are covered 
alongside other roles; assessing whether separate functional units are required; and whether 
elements of program delivery can and should be outsourced (and what the capacity implications of 
this would be). Much of this is a priority in Nepal. 
A more positive finding is that decentralization, particularly moving technical staff from district to 
local government level, may allow more integrated working at the local level—particularly of staff 
who contribute to the implementation of PWPs. Whereas previously, the KEP was implemented 
through a district-level office, it is likely now that staff at the rural municipality level—for example 
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engineers—will work on numerous infrastructure projects in road construction, irrigation, 
agriculture, and so on, and thus there is an opportunity to create more meaningful and effective 
assets through public works at the local level. Although the KEP has ended, this logic applies to the 
new Prime Minister’s Employment Programme (PMEP).  
3.7 Conclusions 
Just as emergence of SP depended on a specific moment in Nepal’s history (that is, emergence from 
civil conflict), this is a good moment to look at SP and the role a growing system might play in 
helping Nepal to tackle the greatest of its challenges (poverty, vulnerability, and climate change). 
The implications of the political processes and settlements that drove the emergence of SP in Nepal 
are gaps in program coverage, a wide range of institutions responsible for program delivery, and 
objectives for individual programs that are difficult to align in a single policy and implementation 
framework. The different underpinning ideologies and objectives of programs present particular 
challenges for implementation, especially for linking an already complex SP system with the 
management of shocks.  
Beyond these challenge, while the contribution of SP to disaster mitigation is currently limited there 
is huge potential, particularly given ongoing work to strengthen implementation systems. The more 
reliable SP is, the more it can be beneficial for mitigating disasters. Examples include improving the 
reliability and timeliness of beneficiary identification and of payments, and reducing delays in 
transferring money, and making payments through electronic means (subject to these being 
accessible for beneficiaries). Getting the foundations of SP program delivery right also matters for 
subsequent efforts to scale up. An example of improvement that will support shock response is the 
transition from a static targeting process (where new beneficiaries are registered and enrolled only 
annually) to a rolling process where the beneficiary registry is constantly updated. More generally, 
the list of beneficiaries would need to expand and contract with shocks and would require the 
registry to be more than only beneficiaries, so that it is easy to identify the additional caseload in 
times of crises. While there are limited examples of shock responsive SP in disaster response in 
Nepal, the experiences of the ETCTP in 2015 provide important insights about capacity requirements 
at the local level, accessibility to payment sites by beneficiaries—especially for people with 
disabilities, and the potential use of behavior change messaging for disaster mitigation, 
preparedness, and recovery. 
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Chapter 4: Review of Shock Response 
Policies, Programs, and Systems in Nepal  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the policies, systems, and institutions for shock response in Nepal. The 
objective is to identify, ultimately, how SP might be more adaptive, that is, the roles that SP might 
play in supporting the various stages in the cycle of DRM. The chapter begins with a summary of the 
key elements of DRRM - 2074, highlighting the importance of the four distinct pillars of mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery; the articulation of roles of central, provincial, and local-level 
governments; the provisions for district roles; and information about funds and finance flows. It then 
discusses what was learned during consultations and fieldwork about what happens in practice and 
analyzes the experiences of people to shock response at the local level. The paper concludes with a 
brief assessment of the implications of the current policies, systems, programs, and institutions for 
shock response for how SP might be made more adaptive.  
4.2 DRM on paper: legislation and policies for shock response and management  
In a rapidly changing context, DRRM3 - 2074 provides the legal framework for DRM in Nepal, though 
the regulations were not drafted at the time of research and hence it was not yet articulated how 
the roles and responsibilities would translate into practice. Figure 8 shows the general 
understanding articulated by various government actors, with pale arrows denoting areas where 
greater clarity is need. For example, the mechanisms for reporting and overall oversight are not yet 
widely understood at central or district and local government level, nor if and how financial flows 
between the central level and committees, districts, and local governments will work. Until the 
various committees are established and convened, it is unlikely that progress can be made in this 
regard. 
Four particular features of the DRRM Act are of particular importance for this project.  
4.2.1 Distinction between four discrete but overlapping pillars of DRM  
DRM is, in theory, focused on four pillars: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. At this 
moment, there is a clear prioritization of and progress in achieving the last two of the four pillars. 
Far more attention is paid to response and recovery in guidance documents and human and financial 
resources than to mitigation and preparedness. At the central level, although respondents described 
a generic system covering the full DRM cycle, they tended to focus the discussion on 
emergency/immediate response and a subsequent period of response/recovery. There was less 
articulation of explanation of preparedness (mainly in relation to flood prone areas) and very little 
on mitigation. At the local government level, the focus was on post-disaster activities, particularly on 
rebuilding houses. This focus is reflected in the distribution of guidance related to mitigation, 
                                                          
3 For the remainder of this paper we use ‘DRRM Act’ to refer specifically to the 2074 Act, and ‘DRM’ to refer to 
the various stages in the cycle of disaster management.  
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preparedness, response, and recovery: 23 building code manuals are being revised following the 
2015 earthquake with very little in the way of guidance for anything else.  
Figure 8 DRM roles, responsibilities and relationships in April 2018 
 
This is mostly likely the result of massive investments by the government and other donors in 
housing reconstruction following the 2015 earthquake and the challenges of rescue and early 
response during the 2017 floods. It skews the current overall policy agenda and allocation of 
resources toward early response and reconstruction.  
4.2.2 Articulation of mandates, funding, roles, and responsibilities across the three tiers of government  
The DRRM Act provides information on the organization of DRM at the central level, particularly the 
roles of key committees and authorities. The Disaster Management Authority (DMA), an executive 
agency, will be run from the MoHA with an Executive Committee chaired by the Home Minister. At 
the time of the consultations in Kathmandu in early April 2018, the DMA had not yet been convened. 
Above the DMA there will be a National Disaster Council (NDC) chaired by the Prime Minister with 
responsibility for future policy changes. For mitigation and preparedness functions, there is work to 
be done to address fragmentation of roles at the central level, especially how the large range of 
ministries and departments with roles in flood and landslide mitigation and early warning are to be 
coordinated. 
At the subnational level there is provision for a state-/provincial-level structure which is well tasked 
with coordination responsibilities. However, given that the provincial governments are the last of 
the three levels to be established (while local government elections were mainly held in mid-2017, 
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provincial elections took place in the autumn) it is taking longer for arrangements for provincial DRM 
mandates to be operationalized. State/provincial Disaster Management Committees (DMCs) were 
yet to be established or convened. No respondents were able to articulate with certainty how the 
provisions of the DRRM Act would translate into a mandate between the central and local 
governments in practice.  
There is less clarity in the DRRM Act about the local-level mechanisms, and particularly limited 
information about specific and precise roles and responsibilities of municipalities, rural 
municipalities, and wards. Some guidance may be provided through the 2017 LGOA (2074) but there 
is potential for guidance to be interpreted differently in different municipalities and rural 
municipalities. Further clarity may be provided by the National Disaster Risk Reduction Policy and 
Strategic Action Plan which was under discussion when consultations for this research were taking 
place.  
4.2.3 Provision for district roles and responsibilities  
The DRRM Act lays out broad provisions and is interpreted very differently by respondents. There 
was no agreement on future roles at the district level among respondents. While the district DMC 
structure (with the inclusion of municipality mayors and rural municipality chairpersons) was widely 
viewed as fit for purpose, there was not agreement on whether the district-level coordination 
process was filling the gap before local government-level disaster committees are formed or 
whether it would be part of the permanent institutional arrangements.  
In contrast, at the central level it was suggested that the local government will take on responsibility 
for most of the DRM pillars, with support from the coordinating DMA when it is operational. The role 
of the Chief District Officer (CDO) in disaster management was presented as temporary, while the 
new systems are established. However, it is notable that the roles of districts are provided for 
permanently in the act. So, while many functions of the former district administrations are moving 
to local governments, disaster response remains at the district level with the CDO. It is unclear how 
response will be coordinated with mitigation, preparedness, and recovery. 
4.2.4 Provision for funds and financial flows  
Figure 9 outlines the fund flow mechanisms that are stipulated in the DRRM Act and various other 
policy documents. Given the provision of these fund streams in policy there remained some 
confusion whether they operate in practice, as evidenced by the conflicting views expressed at all 
three levels of government (central, district, and local). It is expected that this will be clarified in the 
forthcoming regulations and guidelines. 
There are currently three main funding streams identified: (a) the Prime Minister’s Disaster Relief 
Fund (PMDRF), which receives contributions from the government, members of the public, and 
foreign donors and agencies; (b) the Disaster Management Fund (DMF) at MoHA, both of which are 
focused on response, and (c) the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) Fund,4 focused on 
recovery of housing damaged by the earthquake. 
                                                          
4 NRA is a time-bound (5 years) fund set up in 2015 to address post-earthquake reconstruction.  
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The fund flow of the PMDRF is guided by the PMDRF Operation Regulations 2006 and there are 
conditions outlined about where the fund can be used and where not. The fund is managed by a 
regulation committee headed by the vice chairman of the National Planning Commission and 
secretaries of eight ministries (relating to clusters in response system). An unanimous committee 
decision triggers the release of funds through MoHA to the CDO who coordinates the District 
Disaster Relief Fund. The fund is used for rescue and response in coordination with local bodies. The 
Fund Regulation Committee can also disburse to other entities. This allows disbursals to the new 
provincial and local structures but thus far the fund has always been routed through MoHA to the 
DAO. 
The DMF is a part of the MoHA budget but it can receive money from the PMDRF. The fund is rolling 
and routed through the district structures. In the absence of regulations, there is little clarity among 
stakeholders whether it can or will be routed direct to the local government level. There is also 
provision for compensation payments to disaster-affected households in the 2017 Rescue and Relief 
Standard for Disaster Affected - 6th amendment, 2074. This stipulates a minimum compensation for 
death due to disasters of NPR 4 lakh in mountainous districts, NPR 5 lakh in middle hills, and NPR 7 
lakh in Terai districts. The same guideline also calls for establishment of the Regional Disaster Relief 
Fund with a minimum of NPR 7 lakh. Neither stipulation was mentioned at the district or local level. 
At the local level, respondents cited two funding systems for types of shock response which are 
administered upon request from two levels: local government to support response for numerous 
households affected by shock (covariant shock), and community level to compensate/support 
individual households that experience shock that affects one or very few households (idiosyncratic 
shock).  
It was unclear among stakeholders what the distinction was between the PMDRF and the MoHA 
DMF. Both funds were focused on emergency response with funding for mitigation, preparedness, 
and recovery requirements moving through equalization grants to the local government and so 
responsibilities and resourcing for all but disaster responses appear to have been shifted to the local 
government. The links between preparedness at the local level and those activities running across 
the boundaries of local government constituencies are mentioned in the 2017 LGOA 2074 but will 
need some time to be understood and for the nuances around actual coordination of funds to be 
picked out. 
At the local level, Figure 9 highlights two types of grant (conditional and equalization) that 
respondents suggested may be a source of funding for DRM. It was suggested that conditional grants 
for DRM would be request based, with central-level government officials stating that requests are 
processed only annually. Funding is otherwise at the discretion of the local government through 
allocation of its equalization grant. In emergencies, while there is provision on paper for requests 
from local to district, local to provincial, and local to central, the mechanisms and practice fund 
transfer from provincial and central level were not wholly understood, nor were examples shared of 
their operation in practice. 
At the time of research (April 2018) no decisions or financial flows seem to be channeled through a 
province and, except perhaps in the case of a disaster where a more coordinated response was 
required across district boundaries, it was not clear why a province would need to be involved in the 
disbursement of funds between the central and local levels.  
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Figure 9: Fund flow mechanism as understood by respondents in April 2018 
 
4.3 DRM systems in practice  
4.3.1 District versus local 
The current status of the legal instruments and DRM policies provide arrangements in theory given 
that the institutions, organizations, and functions along with the human resources needed for 
operations are not yet in place. This is the case particularly at provincial and local government levels 
but in addition the key central organ, the DMA is also not yet operational, and changes between 
now and implementation could have further impact on the operationalization of planned local 
government DRM form and function. There is a consultation on management and institutional 
arrangements for the DMA at the central level that will be complete in July.  
So, what is happening at the local level given the policy and guidelines gap? At the local level there 
remains heavy dependence on the pre-existing district-level structures. Although many district-level 
functions were wound up by mid-April 2018, districts and local government staff are still following 
the District Disaster Preparedness Plans (DDPPs) and planning to convene District Disaster Response 
Committees (DRCs), headed by CDOs, in the event of a disaster. The composition of the DRCs has 
adapted to the new decentralized arrangements by incorporating municipality and rural municipality 
representation onto the committee. The existing response clusters at the district level have also 
been maintained. At the local government level in the districts we worked, no local government 
DMCs had yet been convened, though municipality mayors and rural municipality chairpersons were 
allocating resources from their equalization budgets as contingency earmarked for disaster 
response. This was particularly the case in the Terai districts.  
42 
 
The understanding is that at the local level the organization and coordination will be much the same 
as before the transition to a federal system. The local government DMC will in future be in 
operational charge of all stages in the DRM cycle. A ‘district’ DMC will be activated when a disaster 
occurs, with members brought in by the CDO depending on the nature of the hazard and from 
relevant geographical areas. The CDO in charge of this will divide the response into clusters and 
activate policy, army, and officials and coordinate the response with the Nepal Red Cross (NRC).  
4.3.2 Staffing and deployment 
While the 2018 Standard for Rescue and Relief of Disaster Affected (6th Amendment), 2075 makes it 
mandatory to have 25 well-trained people standby at the regional and local level for rescue and 
relief activities, the extent to which there is capacity at the district or local government level to 
provide a disaster response is affected by the current deployment process, described as patchy and 
uneven by key stakeholders at the district and local level. While there has been progress in training 
security agencies in search and rescue there is limited search and rescue equipment at the local 
level. The allocation of staff to municipalities and rural municipalities is underway but as yet 
incomplete. The rationale for selecting which staff move where is not fully understood, nor do staff 
understand the criteria by which staffing at the local level is agreed. This is true of both the 
geographical distribution of specific staff (Box 3) and the specialist mix of staff in any given location. 
Furthermore, the capacity to respond to disasters at the local level will also depend on how 
effectively staff can be mobilized by either the local government or by the DAO. For example, at the 
local level security forces cannot be effectively mobilized for response or relief independently of the 
DAO. 
Staff report having no work to do in some places, and too much, or work that they are not qualified 
to deliver in others. This may result in a change in morale—indeed there are anecdotal reports of 
staff taking accrued leave rather than taking up their posts and of frequent secondments back to 
districts after deployment. As yet, the allocation of these personnel is uneven—there are often not 
enough staff with specific skills to share across all the local governments in the district. This could 
leave gaps at the local level. There are also opportunities, recognized by officials, in the new system. 
It is argued that there is potential under the new system for those with specific skills to work across 
a number of sectors or programs. For examples social and women’s development officers could 
work across a range of social programs providing more holistic services. Engineers or agriculture 
specialists might work across multiple programs at the local government level—for example across 
public works and water/irrigation. The ideal scenario would be where this leads to greater 
integration within and between sectors at the local level, but will certainly require capacity 
strengthening, particularly for planning (including DRM plans) and specific technical capabilities.  
Box 3 Competing for engineers: earthquake versus flood 
In the case of housing reconstruction, the Department of Urban Development and Building 
Construction has 2,000 consultant engineers spread over the 14 earthquake districts to support the 
NRA in earthquake housing reconstruction. Although flooding also causes loss of shelter, there are 
far fewer engineers to support post-flood reconstruction and, at the local level, for example, in 
Saptari where many homes were destroyed in the 2017 floods, there are questions raised about the 
distribution of support for housing reconstruction.  
Source: Interviews with officials in Kathmandu and Saptari. 
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4.3.3 Budget allocation decisions 
There are also gaps in terms of guidelines for budgeting. Staff in one ministry stated that 10 percent 
of the local government budget should normally be spent on DRM, and elsewhere it was 5 percent 
of unconditional or 5 percent of the total budget. There are substantial differences in the amounts 
that have been allocated for DRM activities. Saptari, a rural municipality, earmarked NPR 1 crore 
(out of a total budget of NPR 31 crore or 10 percent of the equalization budget. In Humla, the 
allocated share was smaller. In Gulariya in Bardiya, between NPR 10 lakh and NPR 15 lakh has been 
earmarked for DRM contingency. Although less than 1 percent of the municipality budget, the plan 
was to build up a contingency fund over time of NPR 2 crore 55 lakh. The building of contingency 
budgets at the local government level seems appropriate for tackling local shocks but raises 
questions about mandates and powers under the new federal system. It is important to resolve the 
extent to which contingency funds can be built up in future from money saved from central 
allocations (for disaster relief or other purposes) or from fund collection at the local level. A decent 
size contingency fund at the local level potentially allows for fast deployment of help after a disaster. 
4.4 Experiences of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery  
4.4.1 Experiences of preparedness  
At the central level, we found a reasonably systematic and evidence-led approach to the early 
warning system (EWS) and strategy hosted by the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology. The 
rollout of an improved EWS is ongoing and there is recognition of where technology is used, and 
training needs to take place. Evidence from the district suggests that the execution of the EWS is as 
stated, in that, in Bardiya, people reported getting text messages during the flood in 2014, while it 
was less so in Saptari. There appear to be good practices of coordination between the government 
and the private sector (cell phone companies) and the government and INGOs (for example, 
Practical Action) in building systems for messaging. Otherwise, people depend on the police and 
army to warn them, or on word of mouth. Notwithstanding evidence that particular groups risk 
being left out of the early warning, there have been great improvements in how the EWS for flood 
works overall and there were no lives lost in 2017 compared with the 400 lives lost in 2008.  
On early warning for fire, there is no known formal EWS but again there is evidence of some 
preparedness activities. In Saptari and Bardiya, community leaders make announcements about 
avoiding and dealing with fire. They also work with local chapters of NGOs such as Rural 
Reconstruction Nepal (RRN) and Save the Children and local FM stations. They use pamphlets and 
public announcement systems to give messages and announcements telling the local population that 
it is the season for fire. For landslides, we could not find evidence of activity at the district level, 
though Practical Action has a joint research program with Practical Action India and the International 
Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) on testing methods for EWS for landslides. 
There are no pilots in practice yet but geology, soil, and water analysis is the backbone to the 
research, which aims at finding algorithms for likely scenarios for a landslide to occur.  
For drought, a slow onset disaster, the VAM mechanisms of WFP and NeKSAP provide a 
systematized EWS for the impacts of drought by tracking food consumption, food availability, and 
prices. Despite this being the strongest opportunity for ex ante responses to shocks, there is very 
little to show that it is used to plan a response. It does not appear to influence the allocation of 
resources for either the RCIW or KEP, for example, though it does influence food stocks held by the 
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Nepal Food Corporation. There is no use, as yet, of long term forecasting, despite the rapid growth 
of this area, especially the increasing efforts to combine weather forecasting with SP in Africa and 
elsewhere (Costella et al. 2018).  
4.4.2 Experiences of mitigation  
There is far less to say about mitigation activities. This is not to say that mitigation work has not 
taken place over many decades, but that mitigations are not visible or recognized as such in the 
communities where they take place. In the case of floods, the emphasis on preparedness does 
support mitigation, for example, assets such as food are increasingly being stored more safely and 
documents are stored safely. In the event of a flood, the effects may therefore be reduced. In 
Bardiya, Humla, and Saptari, this activity appears to be largely down to district-level single women’s 
officers or leaders. Despite mechanisms to protect food and documents, housing is still frequently 
damaged. Of course, the housing closest to or on the flood plain is the most affected, and the houses 
closest to the river banks is where the poorest people dwell. Addressing this requires actions to 
address the deeper roots underlying the causes of poverty and vulnerability and there is relatively 
little that DRM can do to address this alone. Here the role of SP becomes particularly important.  
4.4.3 Experiences of response  
The current system leaves responders at the local level with far fewer resources than they require. 
The Saptari CDO noted that requirements for blankets and firewood during cold waves far 
outstripped the resources delivered from the central level. Needs assessments at the local level and 
decisions about funding made at the central level do not appear to be well reconciled, leaving local 
officials struggling to deal with far higher levels of demand for support than they can provide. In 
both Saptari and Bardiya there were reports of households, particularly female-headed households 
and other disadvantaged groups, being routinely excluded from relief after their names are removed 
from lists because the resources are inadequate for the caseload.  
The Saptari CDO describes the three stages of disaster response thus: “The full process of collecting 
data is that in the initial 0–12 hours the task force collects data for the most damaged areas and 
gives the data to the committee. Within 24 hours, they give another data set which is says how 
many houses have been destroyed in those areas. In the third stage, between 1–15 weeks into the 
disaster, they go for door-to-door visits and categorize which houses are fully damaged, which are 
partially damaged, and which are less damaged.” In this final stage, the level of need seems to be 
predicated on the damage to housing rather than on actual consumption need. It occupies a tricky 
moment in the transition from relief to recovery and falls between the two. This was the case in 
both Saptari and Bardiya and, given the amount of time that many households were living under 
tarpaulins on raised roads away from their homes, it appears to be a flaw in the targeting process. 
Measures of damage to housing are used as indicators of the need for basic consumption support. 
Thus, households with houses that were ‘fully destroyed’ (generally meaning that they lost their 
walls and roof) received NPR 25,000 while households with houses that were ‘partially destroyed’ 
(for example, some or all walls were lost but the roof remained intact) received NPR 1,250 per 
household member per month for three months. Using destruction of housing, rather than existing 
food stocks, utensils, and cooking equipment, or even crops destroyed, does not appear to be a 
sensible indicator of immediate needs. 
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4.4.4 Experiences of recovery  
As discussed above, recovery is a key priority for the Nepal government at this time. In additional to 
the payments described above, for victims of idiosyncratic shocks, respondents at the central level 
suggested that a number of payments were made, notably NPR 1 lakh for households which lost a 
family member and smaller payments of NPR 5,000 for damage caused by a fire or landslide. While 
the payments for a fire or landslide were repeated regularly at the local level too, there was no 
mention of the larger payment to support households following the death of a family member.  
The primary example is housing reconstruction under the NRA, which awards grants for rebuilding 
housing. Up to NPR 300,000 can be accessed if the householder can prove that they are the legal 
owner of the land. The money is released in 3 tranches, as long as building standards meet those of 
the building codes. However, staff at the Department of Urban Development and Building 
Construction acknowledged that none of their 31 housing designs can be built and finalized using the 
available budget and that some co-funding by households is required. The NRA also recognizes the 
difficulties that those in rural villages and those who also belong to the vulnerable groups face in 
accessing the funding and making use of it, primarily because they rarely have certificates for the 
land on which their homes are built nor the labor to do construction work.  
For the floods, the MoA established special schemes in 2015 and 2017 to help farmers recover from 
a flood. These were demand-based programs for replacement seeds, storage gunny bags, and so on. 
If crops were destroyed, then seeds were provided for the following season. The MoA reported that 
their staff would be able to list affected households at the local level and assess their agricultural 
losses. Other support came in the form of substantial subsidies for seed with the MoA paying around 
80 percent of the cost of seeds and farmers covering around 20 percent. There are reports of high 
demand for the subsidized seeds, though, at the district level in Saptari and Bardiya, it was not 
mentioned among our very small sample of flood-affected households. The seed was a hybrid 
chosen by the MoA and seen as a conduit to encourage farmers to adopt new technologies. It is up 
for discussion whether it is an opportune and appropriate moment to introduce new technologies, 
particularly those that require more inputs, at a time when farmers may be resource and time poor.  
4.5 Communities roles and perceptions 
Using SP measures to support DRM requires policy makers to be mindful of local relationships and 
support and social structures through which people find ways of coping with crisis and seek to avoid 
disrupting them. There is evidence from the field of numerous acts of individual kindness and 
bravery in search, rescue, and rebuilding. Furthermore, communities and community-based 
organization (CBOs) are the conduit around which the preparedness and early warning happens. 
There are user groups involved, especially in mitigation—especially where PWP user groups organize 
digging out sand remaining in flooded areas that make them unusable for agriculture and others that 
are involved in preparedness through the organization of flood defenses.  
Local NGOs and local chapters of national NGOs, especially the NRC play a substantial role in 
preparedness (especially early warning) and early response. They sit on the district DMC and are 
frequently the first responders, alongside the army and police, to rapid onset shocks. Staff of the 
Red Cross are formally assigned in teams with local officials and the police to make assessments of 
impact and need in the immediate aftermath of a crisis.  
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For communities, disasters can be moments at which they come together or flashpoints for division 
and disagreement. When disasters are covariant, the experience and damage is widespread, and 
resources are limited, mechanisms to target the most in need become very sensitive issues and are a 
point of contention for members of communities, especially those who did not receive support but 
feel they were among the needy. Some SSA recipients who did not receive disaster relief believed 
they were being discriminated against for receiving government payments, especially in Humla after 
a devastating hailstorm. Others were critical of elected representatives who they felt failed to 
represent them during disasters. Relief distribution was identified as an opportunity for local 
political activity with politicians taking advantage of the disaster situations in a bid to further their 
political popularity. In Saptari in particular, high levels of dissatisfaction with the relief distribution 
came out strongly in FGDs. People were angry about the distributions and there were some tense 
discussions. The mechanisms and outcomes for targeting were poorly communicated, leaving 
victims of disaster in confusion about transparency and accurate collection of data. Respondents 
from all three districts provided accounts of expecting to be on the beneficiary lists, but when it 
came to distribution, their names were not found on the list, and thus they were not able to receive 
support. When asked if it was communicated to them as to why they were not on the list, responses 
were largely speculative, and fed local tensions.  
Respondents also reported difficulties in reporting grievances. Where respondents felt that targeting 
was unfair and discriminatory, people either did not raise a grievance because they did not believe it 
would have any effect, or they found themselves with conflicting emotions of grievance and 
gratitude toward actors in the flood response. People regarded the very people against who they 
held a grievance about disaster relief as the same people that had saved their lives in the immediate 
aftermath of the flood, and this influenced the extent they were willing to raise grievances.  
4.6 Conclusions: implications for linking SP and disasters  
Notwithstanding the challenges (and interruptions) to managing shocks that have occurred during 
the decentralization transition, there are good reasons to be positive about the potential role of SP 
in many of the areas of DRM. There is a strong appetite for exploring options among central and 
local government officials and other actors including NGOs and donor agencies, and support at the 
local level among disaster-affected households. The DRRM Act provides an opportunity to establish 
mechanisms for ensuring greater coordination between the agencies delivering DRM and SP. Before 
moving on to discussing some of the options for this in Chapter 6, some specific case studies are 
presented. Because different shocks present different sorts of challenges for linking SP and disasters, 
in the next section five case studies of shocks—the 2015 earthquake, the 2017 floods, drought in 
Karnali, and landslides and fires—are presented. Each explores the impact of the shocks, lessons 
about responses to the shock, and what this implies for prospects for ASP. 
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Case Study: 
Flooding in 
Bardiya and 
Saptari, 
2017 
In August 2017, excessively 
heavy monsoon rains left 
Nepal experiencing the largest 
floods in living memory on 
many parts of the Terai. 
By late August, 1.7 million people were affected and almost half a million people were displaced 
from their homes, more than 100 were dead, and scores missing or injured (United Nations Office of 
the Resident Coordinator, 2017). A total of 19 districts were affected with homes damaged in 
181,000 households across the Terai. Homes built by squatters were especially vulnerable to flood 
damage. Flooding also destroyed road, bridges, culverts, and many communities, including in 
Bardiya and Saptari where interviews took place. Nearly 1,500 schools were damaged or destroyed 
and 93 schools were used for temporary shelter by displaced households who were not sheltering 
beneath tarpaulins on roadsides. Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates among children screened 
reached 23.6 percent across the affected districts. Nearly 1 million farming households found their 
land inundated by flood water and almost 80,000 ha of crops were damaged. The Ministry of 
Agriculture and Livestock  Development5 reported economic and asset losses of US$8.12 million, 
US$10.18 million, and US$15.5 million, respectively. 
Besides these impacts measured by the Initial 
Rapid Assessment, our field study shows loss of 
infrastructure that supported agricultural 
production and other livelhoods, destruction of 
water and sanitation systems, sickness and loss of 
livestock, and dropout of children from education 
for labor work as some of the other impacts that 
will have bearings in the future. In the first two 
weeks of the response, 37,000 tarpaulins from 
government warehouses were provided to 
displaced families with a further 30,000 ready for 
distribution. About 18,000 households were 
                                                          
5 Then called the Ministry of Agricultural Development, Livestock, and Irrigation  
Figure 10 Flood affected districts in Nepal 
 
Figure 10: Flood affected districts in Nepal 
 
Source: United Nations Office of the Resident Coordinator, 2017. 
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provided with non-food item (NFI) kits. Households also received hygiene kits, blankets and 
mattresses, food, water purifiers, and jerry cans. Health camps were established and staffed by 
1,595 health workers providing, among other services, hygiene messaging given the risk of cholera 
and other waterborne diseases.  
Assessment of the response 
Delalay et al. (2018) find that, in addition to climate change and socioeconomic developments, 
multiple and complex factors contribute to 
growing vulnerability to floods in Nepal. They 
include the lack of flood risk preparedness (for 
example, lack of flood risk assessments and an 
acute shortage of adequate flood early warning 
systems [FEWSs]), as well as inadequate efforts in 
flood disaster response and flood disaster 
recovery. Together, these factors point to limited 
flood disaster governance. In Bardiya and Saptari, 
it was clear that improvements had been made 
following the floods in 2014 and the mechanisms 
for early warning had substantially improved by 2017. This included the identification of safe spaces, 
alternate water and sanitation systems, and stockpiling of relief materials being in place in most of 
the districts. 
An overall assessment of the 2017 response also reflects the transition stage that the government is 
going through. There was some confusion between districts and municipalities/rural municipalities 
about the roles of new local government structures. District line agencies of the government carried 
out recovery activities from their core program. In the absence of the DDC structure, former DDC 
staff were often involved on an informal basis. In terms of the identification of needs and 
beneficiaries, the District DMC completed two rounds of assessments, the Initial Rapid Assessment 
and the Multi Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment or Cluster Specific Detailed Assessments in the flood-
affected districts. In both Bardiya and Saptari, DMCs found themselves under-resourced. In Saptari, 
for example, the Emergency Operations Center had only has one 
police officer as staff, no separate rooms, and daily 
communication charges being borne by NGOs. During the 2017 
flood, this lack or resources made it difficult for the DAO to 
continuously update its data system and give accurate 
information to stakeholders and carry out its own response. 
The criteria for the identification of beneficiaries for flood response and recovery was not technically 
adequate to effectively understand people’s needs. Flood-affected households were assessed based 
on whether housing was fully destroyed (63,000 households) or partially damaged (118,000 
households). There was no assessment, however, of food stocks, or the impacts on livelihoods, 
especially sources of income.  
As a result, targeting and relief distribution was hugely controversial. In several instances, it led to 
riots, and the government had to halt relief distribution. On the one hand, evidence emerges from 
both Saptari and Bardiya, of beneficiary lists and relief distribution being manipulated to the 
‘Our important things should be kept in 
an emergency bag’ 
FGD, Saptari District, April 2018 
In Bardiya and Saptari improvements to 
preparedness appeared, in large part, to be 
supported by district-level single women’s officers 
or leaders or chairpersons of user groups. As part 
of their work they were supporting flood 
preparedness by holding meetings informing 
women about the need to have key documents 
with them in plastic bags and telling them where 
and how to store food. 
‘This is like we need a sari, 
but we have got a 
handkerchief’ 
Deputy Mayor, Gulariya, 
April 2018 
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advantage of people who had good political 
networks. On the other hand, lack of clear 
communications about targeting mechanisms 
meant that people felt excluded and cheated 
even when decisions were made according to 
established procedures. For example, the 
reconfiguration of boundaries and consolidation 
of VDCs across municipalities and wards, left 
villagers not understanding why neighboring 
villages were included in their lists and believing 
that resources had been misused and misallocated. Other boundaries were also at the forefront of 
the discussion about the floods, with many respondents at village, local government, and district 
level perceiving that residents in India just across the border had been protected by the closing of 
barrages, with the result that Nepali households suffered the brunt of the flooding. 
Implications for adaptive social protection 
The potential for using SP across different parts of the disaster cycle is shown in Annex 2, Figure 1, 
but three key messages are drawn out here. First, given that recurrent floods are anticipated to 
worsen due to climate change, with an increasing number of households vulnerable to flooding on 
Nepal’s Terai each year, there is an important role for SP in mitigation and preparedness. However, 
given the scale and cross-border nature of the water management challenge, this will only be 
effective alongside investments in large infrastructures and high-level bilateral negotiation with 
neighboring countries.  
Second, floods in Saptari and Bardiya did not affect only people who are deemed vulnerable due to 
age or identity (such as the elderly, single women or marginalized caste groups), although these 
groups experience problems accessing humanitarian responses beyond the immediate emergency 
universal transfers for all those displaced to the roadside or higher ground.  
Third, for supporting flood 
response, it is unlikely that existing 
SP coverage in flood-affected 
communities overlaps with a large 
share of flood-affected households 
on the Terai, but it could form part 
of a coordinated response 
alongside other humanitarian 
activities. Hence, the ASP pathway 
should be used as an appendage to 
the emergency response and not as 
the sole route for relief distribution 
and targeting.  
‘Among 135 victims in total, the poorest 
were left out and other people had access 
to the relief.’ 
FGD, Saptari District 
April 2018 
In both Saptari and Bardiya, there were reports of 
households, particularly female headed households 
and other disadvantaged groups, being routinely 
excluded from relief after their names are removed 
from lists because the resources are inadequate for 
the caseload. 
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Figure 12: Earthquake damage in Sindhupalchok 
(red = most severe) 
Source: Housing Recovery and Reconstruction 
Platform. 
Case Study: 
Earthquake in 
Sindhupalchok 
2015  
Nepal’s 2015 earthquakes affected 
about 8 million people, killed 
nearly 9000 people, and injured 
more than 22,000. It left almost 3 
million people in need of 
humanitarian assistance, many of 
them outside the Kathmandu valley 
cut off, as the earthquake destroyed transport infrastructure, energy supplies, and communications 
services. 
More than one-third (3,425) of lives lost were in 
Sindhupalchok (Data from MoHA, May 2017). 
More than 63,000 houses were destroyed. 
Households in the district, classified as ‘severely 
hit’, were already in a precarious situation, 
having experienced severe flooding and 
landslides in 2014. Some households were still 
living in tents in warehouse buildings in 2018. 
Delalay et al. (2018, 356) stress the 
precariousness of wellbeing and livelihoods in 
Sindhupalchok District: 18 percent of 
households lack access to an improved source of 
drinking water; 11 percent do not have 
electricity for lighting; and toilet facilities are 
absent for 36 percent of households. 
The response to the earthquake was vast, with the engagement of many actors and substantial sums 
of money and is too great to describe in any detail here. Instead we specifically focus on where SP 
was used as part of the response. SP was a key part of the earthquake response with the 
establishment of the ETCTP. The aim of the top up was to meet immediate household consumption 
needs and to help households avoid negative coping strategies and behaviors. NPR 3,000 (about 
US$30) was provided as a top up to usual regular payments for existing beneficiaries of the old age 
allowance, widows/single women’s allowance beneficiaries ages 60 or above, people with 
disabilities, households with Dalit children under five, and marginalized indigenous groups. This 
reached about 434,690 people in 19 districts. A second payment, to Dalit households with children 
under five followed later. 
Figure 11 Categories of Earthquake affected districts 
Source: GoN/MoHA 2015. 
Figure 11: Categories of earthquake-affected districts 
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Assessment of the response 
There are numerous assessments of government, international agencies’, and local NGO responses 
(see for example ALNAP 2015). These highlight the importance of working with and through national 
and local actors, tailoring coordination to local contexts, and using assessment as the foundation for 
an appropriate response. Geography and remoteness make these lessons all the more pertinent. 
Given the challenges of access, lack of transportation facilities, and blockades caused by debris, it 
was difficult to deliver material assistance in many places. Respondents, especially in the rural areas 
of Sindhupalchowk, complained of relief materials being distributed only in market areas and a large 
number of needy populations in remote areas being left out for days without food, water, and 
shelter. Respondents also noted that the response to flooding and landslides were largely subsumed 
by the earthquake response which occurred eight months later—this made it difficult to deal with 
the different needs that resulted from the different types of shocks.  
In our fieldwork in Sindhupalchok, surprisingly there was little mention of the ETCTP. However, the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) evaluation of the ETCTP found that about 93 percent of 
intended beneficiaries received the top-up transfer in the districts where it has been rolled out and 
that cash was most commonly used to meet basic daily needs such as food and medicine, plus 
clothing and other household essentials (Gurung et al. 2015). A small share of households used the 
money for shelter. There were limited impacts on livelihoods though Gurung et al. 2015 suggest that 
because cash was used to support household food security this would make them less likely to resort 
to negative coping strategies. There were many reports of trafficking increasing following the 
earthquake, but it is not clear how much the ETCTP protected SSA beneficiary households from 
these situations. 
The ETCTP faced a number of administrative and implementation challenges, including the difficult 
access for beneficiaries to payment sites, static beneficiary lists (that, at that time, were only 
updated annually), and delays approving payments. VDC staff reported struggling to meet the 
burden of this additional responsibility at a particularly difficult time. In spite of these shortcomings, 
the ETCTP was viewed as a success and represents a highly informative experience that Nepal can 
learn from, particularly for shocks that are rapid onset and shared across a wide number of people in 
specific geographical locations. 
A key element of the ETCTP was the inclusion of behavior change messaging, in particular to try and 
discourage negative coping strategies. It is not clear how effective this process is—awareness of the 
messages was low because there were delays getting pamphlets and leaflets out to VDCs. Grants 
have been widely provided to households to subsidize the costs of reconstruction and these also 
include an element of mitigation as the grants are subject to following building design and 
construction guidelines that make households more resistant in the case of earthquakes. 
For longer term rehabilitation and recovery, the GoN used a cash transfer mechanism after 
establishing the NRA in late 2015. After surveys of damage and developing of several policies and 
guidelines such as those for housing grant distribution, reconstruction regulation, and around 
working with NGOs, the Post-disaster Recovery Framework decided to route recovery and 
reconstruction support to households through cash transfers. 
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Implications for adaptive social protection 
The potential for using SP across different parts of the disaster cycle is shown in Annex 2, Figure 2. 
Two lessons from ALNAP (2015) are especially pertinent to ASP: the importance of supporting pre-
existing goods and service delivery systems; and paying special attention to marginalized, hidden, 
and vulnerable populations.  
These lessons suggest that disaster response to rapid onset shocks for which there is little warning 
can work through pre-existing service delivery systems, particularly SP. Indeed, given that SP in 
Nepal is heavily focused on various forms of vulnerability, expanding transfers to vulnerable groups 
(for example, the elderly, single women, the disabled, and Dalit households) may prove an effective 
mechanism to reach those who would otherwise be left out. The findings also highlight the 
importance of other investments, particularly pre-positioning of food stocks through the Nepal PFDS 
to ensure that when cash transfers are delivered, there is food available in markets at affordable 
prices. 
Lack of banks in rural areas and the difficulties and costs for those who are travelling to collect 
transfers present a real obstacle for flexible and rapid emergency responses. In cases where banks 
are not present, alternative ways to get transfers to beneficiaries need planning in advance. This 
might be branchless banking or use of local savings and credit groups and community cooperatives. 
Disaster recovery can also be a trigger for the expansion of bank accounts—for example, the NRA 
was successful in opening around 600,000 new bank accounts for house owners in 32 districts.  
Although the response to the 2015 earthquake highlights that the country was poorly prepared for 
disaster response, including limited planning for using cash transfers, several approaches were tried 
and there are important lessons to draw for disaster management and ASP. In particular, forward 
planning and the development of roadmaps and guidance for emergency top ups will allow a far 
more rapid response in the future. The inclusion of behavior change messaging activities in the 
ETCTP highlights that SP can play an important role in mitigation, preparedness, and recovery, that 
is, beyond disaster response alone.  
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Case 
Study: 
Drought 
in Karnali, 
2015– 
2016 
In 2015, a combination 
of limited winter 
snowfall, and poor 
monsoon rains led to a 
sharp decline in the 
summer and winter 
crops. Between November 2015 and March 2016, around 87 percent of Karnali’s population were 
estimated to be highly or moderately food insecure. 
The NeKSAP found evidence of households selling productive assets to get access to food and health 
care costs, and individuals in remote areas walking for many days to towns such as Simikot to find 
sources of affordable food. Migration out of Karnali increased substantially, especially to the areas 
around Nepalgunj and across the border into India, and notably among Dalit households.  
Our interviews in Humla, specifically in Simikot and 
nearby villages, found evidence of food shortages, 
livestock loss, livelihood insecurity, and severe 
deprivation poverty and famine. While drought 
directly affects those with agricultural land, others 
without land are also affected because there are 
fewer casual work opportunities in agriculture and 
because the reduced supply of food into local 
markets pushes up prices.  
Geographical factors including remoteness increased the vulnerability of victims to drought due to 
limited road access and higher transportation costs for food supplies. Karnali has notably fewer road 
networks than other parts of Nepal making food distribution and market access more difficult and 
costly. This was compounded by the economic blockade which pushed up costs of transportation 
further still. The average retail price of coarse rice was three times higher in Humla (NPR 120 per kg) 
compared to Darchula (NPR 39 per kg). For wheat flour the price was NPR 120 per kg in Humla 
compared to NPR 45.9 per kg in Darchula (WFP 2017). 
‘If there is no rain then we have a 
drought. The political party leaders do 
not give us any rice. 25 kg of rice is 
costing NPR 5,500. It is 3–4 years since 
the last big drought, we had to chop the 
heads off all the wheat, barley, and 
millet and give it to the cattle.’ 
Focus Group, Simikot, April 2018 
Figure 13: Agricultural drought conditions in the mid and far west 
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Because drought was faced by most, if not 
all, households in specific VDCs and wards, 
there were few mechanisms for informal 
community support. Those affected by 
drought were unable to seek support from 
neighbors who were in similar situations. 
Households in Humla reported being heavily 
dependent on purchasing government 
subsidized rice from food depots in Simikot 
and elsewhere. Others described walking for 
many days down the valley to find cheaper 
food to purchase. 
 
Assessment of the response 
The response in Karnali, including Humla, was tricky 
to assess. The primary reason is that drought is not 
viewed in the same way as other disasters such as 
floods or earthquakes—indeed the focus of many 
agencies was still on the most earthquake-affected 
districts east of Karnali. There was far less urgency 
regarding response to the drought in 2016, perhaps 
because the impacts of drought emerge slowly—
following snow or rainfall failures, it is only later at harvest time that drought begins to have an 
impact. A second reason is that defining or declaring a drought disaster is far more complex than 
cases of earthquakes, landslides, fires, or floods. There are debates over definitions. The thresholds 
at which, food security indicators trigger an emergency response are not agreed, especially because 
high levels of GAM are common in Nepal irrespective of whether a natural disaster has occurred.  
Respondents reported that WFP provided supplementary feeding in some parts of Humla although 
WFP’s Emergency Operation (EMOP) reports support only in Jumla and Mugu. More than 500 MT of 
super-fortified cereals were provided across Karnali. Stocks in food depots were increased. There 
were some examples of wards/VDCs seeking to increase public works wage rates or allocation days 
to beneficiaries, but these are largely anecdotal. 
Despite strong views that the climate is changing in Humla and that drought was becoming more 
frequent, there is was little evidence that drought mitigation and preparedness efforts were being 
stepped up commensurately. Respondents spoke of vegetables (potatoes, onions, garlic, radish, 
carrots, and cauliflower) and fruits (apples) which were not previously cultivable in Humla but were 
now thriving. Focus group participants reported that in the past there have been external 
interventions led by the Department of Agriculture and NGOs that addressed diversification of crops 
in light of changing climates but, in the shift to local government, it was not clear how this would be 
maintained. The CDO argued that more needed to be done on the education and growing of 
awareness on the nutritional value of diverse diets to counteract the stress of limited crops during 
the lean season. 
‘The price had doubled (from 400 to 
800). We had to walk down for four 
days to buy bags of millet, maize, 
soybeans, and we lived on that. We had 
to walk back with it. We walked down, 
hoping it would be cheaper, and then 
down even further.’  
Focus Group, Simikot, April 2018 
Figure 14: NeKSAP food security indicators 
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Implications for adaptive social protection 
The potential for using SP across different parts of the 
disaster cycle is shown in Annex 2, Figure 3. The slow onset 
nature of drought provides good opportunities for disaster 
mitigation and preparedness through SP. There is particular 
potential for the works carried out through programs such as 
the KEP and RCIW to contribute to mitigating drought. Rather 
than focus solely on road construction, public works could 
include the construction of check dams and small-scale 
irrigation infrastructure, maintenance of terracing and 
afforestation to reduce degradation, and improving soil 
structure and water-retention capacities. 
ASP systems can allow the introduction of mechanisms and 
interventions that look to reduce the impact of droughts on 
households. Scaling up to increase coverage of PWPs—such as the KEP and RCIW—can reach more 
drought-affected households. Given the oversubscription for public works activities in Humla, ward 
offices already have ranked community lists that allow them to quickly identify an additional 
caseload if emergency funds are routed through PWPs.  
This appears particularly important given the significant structure of economic and social changes 
underway in Humla. Respondents said that an increase of access to education and changing 
employment opportunities outside were making it difficult to sustain traditional livelihood activities. 
Although labor migration might bring remittance income in the future, many felt that it exacerbated 
the hardship experienced by households: because rearing or tending to livestock, was formerly done 
by children and young people, but was foregone due to education and migration. The impact of less 
livestock meant less dung for fertilizing the soils and less spare cash from sales of livestock/meat. 
Figure 15 Nepal Road Network, 2016 
Source: Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development Department of Local Infrastructure 
Development and Agricultural Roads (DoLIDAR) (2016) ‘Statistics of Local Road Network (SLRN) 
2016’, Kathmandu, Nepal 
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Case Study: 
Fires and 
Landslides  
During the monsoon, 
Nepal’s newspapers and 
other media are replete with 
news of landslides, while in 
February, March, and April, 
the focus switches to 
incidents of fires. However, 
most fires and landslides in 
Nepal are idiosyncratic—they tend to affect one or a small number of households and those 
affecting whole villages, or more are far less common. This has major implications for the extent and 
ways in which ASP will be useful for managing fire and landslides risks. 
The extent to which trends, events, and impacts can be rigorously analyzed is severely limited by the 
idiosyncratic nature of fire incidences. Data on fire incidents is mainly collected from news reports. 
This creates two potential biases in the data: (a) they capture reports on bigger incidents and are 
less likely to pick up on incidents that affect small areas/number of households or those in remote 
rural areas; and (b) news reports are rarely based on rigorous and verified measures of either 
incidence or impact. There is often little data demonstrating extent of damage or cost of damage. 
Larger fires are seasonal, especially on 
the Terai. For example, in Humla, it 
was reported that pastoralists set fire 
to land to encourage new growth of 
grass. So, setting fires was a key 
livelihood strategy in some areas. April 
in Humla is renowned for guchi 
mushrooms harvesting, fetching from 
NPR 8,000 to 10,000 per kilogram. 
Mushroom harvesters sometimes set 
fires to encourage the mushrooms to 
sprout better.  
Two kinds of landslides frequently 
occur in Nepal: seismic landslides which are triggered by earthquakes and monsoon landslides 
triggered by high intensity rainfalls. Aftershocks of the 2015 earthquake alone produced 25,000 
landslides (Roback et al. 2017). The monsoon causes landslides every year. However, unless it causes 
massive loss of lives and infrastructure, it does not get reported. 
Figure 16: Landslide risk in Nepal 
Figure 17: Prevalence of forest fires, 1971–2011 
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Assessment of the response 
Despite clarity on paper there is confusion in practice: 
officials are unclear if responsibility for compensation 
payments will stay with the district or shift to the local 
government and respondents reported varying 
amounts—from NPR 5,000–500,000. Compensation 
rates are generally viewed as inadequate by victims. 
The mechanisms for responding to individual fires, 
specifically payments to affected households, appear 
clear at the local level, despite disruptions due to the transition from district to local government 
administrative structures. At the district level, funds are distributed to fire and landslide victims. 
Standard guidelines for provision of compensation is provided by the 2017 Rescue and Relief 
Standard for Disaster Affected (6th amendment, 2074). This amounts to NPR 1 lakh per person for 
death, up to NPR 10,000 for destruction of houses, food, crops, and business premises. Up to NPR 
5,000 can be provided for housing and clothing if the affected households remain displaced based on 
assessment by the district DMC. A further NPR 50,000 per family can be given by the center based 
on district recommendations. Refunds for government hospital treatment and NPR 1,000 per person 
plus travel costs are given in case of injury during a disaster.  
Preparedness for fires was focused on during awareness raising. In Saptari, this was dealt with 
collectively by a range of agencies and NGOs. Local radio stations and TV channels also broadcast 
messages to raise awareness. Pamphlets are handed out. The main messages broadcasted included 
telling people not to light open fires in their homes and not to leave fires unattended. It was 
expressed that people heeded to the messages and the general consensus among respondents was 
that fires were less frequent than in previous years. In Bardiya, awareness raising sessions were 
targeted at schools. In Humla, community forestry user groups were raising awareness about fires to 
prevent fenced forest lands being set alight. For landslides, there were no reported activities for 
raising awareness. Tree planting had not taken place for some time in Humla. There was inconclusive 
evidence to demonstrate whether food items and NFIs were given to fire and landslide victims. 
People often depended on the support of neighbors following fire incidents.  
Implications for ASP 
There is little scope for SP to systematically respond to idiosyncratic shocks from fires and landslides 
(as can be seen in Annex 2, Figures 5 and 4 respectively): SP is not targeted specifically to these 
events; SP beneficiaries are no more or less likely to experience landslides and fires than non-
beneficiaries; and systems are in place to compensate individual households that are victims of 
landslides and fires. Given the relatively rarity of covariant fire and landslide shocks, any policy 
decisions regarding them might best follow any future systems established for floods or 
earthquakes. There is a significant opportunity for PWPs to support fire and landslide mitigation, 
preparedness, and recovery. While programs currently focus primarily on road construction, other 
works activities—such as the construction of water storage facilities at the village level to tackle fire, 
or afforestation programs to support the soil structure and prevent land slippage—might be 
considered to simultaneously support the incomes of poor households and reduce the incidence of 
fires and landslides.  
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Chapter 5: International Experiences with 
Adaptive Social Protection 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws on lessons from other countries to provide insights into the options that the GoN 
and its development partners might choose to adopt to more usefully utilize SP to support DRM in 
Nepal. The focus is on ‘best fit’ rather than ‘best practice’ experiences to ensure that the lessons are 
feasible in the Nepal context. We draw in particular on (a) countries with similar levels of human 
development indicators and with similar financial and administrative capacity rather than on SP 
systems that will require more resources than Nepal has at its disposal; and (b) what might be 
feasible with further resourcing—particularly from international and donor agencies—by drawing 
examples from countries where there have been strong partnerships between governments and 
donors. We also draw out lessons from countries that have federal systems of government (for 
example, Ethiopia), especially those that have recently made the transition to federalism (for 
example, Kenya)  
The existing evidence on international experiences is disproportionately focused on (a) responses to 
the 2008 economic crises, when food prices and fuel prices skyrocketed and when elements of 
global financial systems collapsed and (b) the role of SP in shock response compared to other 
elements of DRM. We seek to explicitly bring out what is known about other elements of response 
(mitigation, preparedness, and recovery), and focus as much as possible on shocks beyond food, fuel 
and financial (3-Fs) crisis. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first explores what is known about the roles of SP in 
contributing across the different pillars of DRM (mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery). 
The second examines the key features of ASP programs that have been identified in reviews and 
evaluations. Selected examples focus primarily on countries with federal systems—and the 
opportunities and challenges that this affords. In the first two sections we note the implications of 
international experiences for Nepal and then, in the third section, suggest specific priority areas and 
actions across the administrative, financial, and program design and implementation domains for 
Nepal. 
5.2 Disaster management through SP 
5.2.1 Disaster mitigation 
Disaster mitigation through SP happens in two ways. First, SP programs can reduce the underlying 
structural vulnerability that exposes households and individual to hazards. Second, specific features 
of SP programs, especially the assets created through public works, can contribute to reducing both 
the prevalence and the severity of hazards. 
Reducing the underlying vulnerability to hazards 
SP reduces poverty, vulnerability, and exclusion in numerous ways. Bastagli et al. (2016) use a 
systematic review to consider six outcomes of cash transfers—monetary poverty, education, health 
and nutrition, savings/investment/production, employment, and empowerment. All of these are 
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outcomes that can be related to people’s exposure to shocks and their capacity to buffer themselves 
against their worst effects. 
For monetary poverty, the evidence sourced for the review consistently shows an increase in total 
and food expenditure and reduction in poverty measures. There are impacts on household 
expenditure, in particular food expenditure, though the effect is not always big enough to have a 
subsequent effect on aggregate poverty levels.  
In education, there is a clear link between cash transfer receipt and increased school attendance but 
less evidence of a clear-cut pattern of impact for learning and cognitive development outcomes. For 
health and nutrition, cash transfers are found to support improvements in use of health services, 
dietary diversity, and anthropometric measures. This finding suggests that cash transfers alone may 
support the first two of these improvements, making a difference to anthropometric measures 
requires complementary interventions.  
In the case of employment—participation in and intensity of—cash transfers result in an increase, 
but one that is not statistically significant. Where reductions in employment are reported they are 
usually among the elderly, with child care responsibilities, and in casual rather than secure work. In 
other areas related to livelihoods, positive effects of cash transfers are also found for impacts on 
savings, livestock ownership or purchase, and use or purchase of agricultural inputs—suggesting that 
cash transfers can not only improve livelihoods and income-generating opportunities but also allow 
households to build up savings that can provide a critical buffer during a disaster.  
For empowerment, transfers are found to reduce physical abuse of women by men, and possibly to 
increase non-physical abuse, such as emotional abuse or controlling behaviour. Bastagli et al.’s 2016 
review supports the theory that increased income lowers stress-related abuse, and the theory that 
increased income enables the woman to bargain out of abuse. Cash transfers are also found to 
reduce risky sexual behavior and early marriage and reduce the incidence of transactional 
relationships. Evidence also suggests that they reduce fertility rates (despite the frequent assertion 
that cash transfers will lead to people having more children). 
The lesson from all the literature is that these positive effects occur when programs are well 
implemented, that is, they target beneficiaries well and deliver transfers on time, for a reasonable 
duration, and in adequate amounts. The quality of basic implementation thus matters for disaster 
mitigation but, as we will see in subsequent sections, it matters for preparedness, response, and 
recovery too.  
Reducing the prevalence and severity of hazards through SP 
Several natural disasters can be reduced through SP. The science around landslides is complex but 
overall suggests that afforestation can reduce landslide risk (Forbes and Broadhead 2011). The FAO 
notes that “Public works programmes are desirable in that they can be used to mobilize community 
participation in environmental projects, and they provide local employment, build community 
infrastructure, enhance skills, protect against shocks and increase resilience.” Thus, the roles of 
afforestation in tackling drought are also widely acknowledged (UNISDR 2016) and the secondary 
impacts on other disasters, notably floods, are also recognized.  
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There are numerous PWPs that include afforestation activities. In Uganda, the SAFE programme is 
implemented as part of the Karamoja Productive Assets Programme, which provides food and cash 
for work in Karamoja. Karamoja is one of Uganda’s poorest, marginalized, and conflict-affected areas 
and has experienced severe environmental degradation and recurrent droughts. Activities include 
cash or food transfers to food insecure pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in exchange for work on 
land and soil conversation measures, livestock watering points, and reforestation. About 14,000 
trees were estimated to be planted during the program’s lifetime. In drought-prone Mauritania, 
300,000 trees were planted as a part of a WFP project. The program sought to build resilience by 
providing food transfers in exchange for planting trees, building dams, and planting of forests for the 
supply of community firewood (Tirivayi 2017). 
Other key activities in PWPs include the construction of terracing, check dams, small-scale irrigation 
systems, and other soil and water conversation measures with impacts on prevalence of not only 
landslides but also floods and drought. There is potential for better water resource management 
through public works to also reduce the risks of fire. 
Links with other programs for disaster mitigation 
Sometimes it is possible for the two pathways above to be integrated. In these cases, SP needs to be 
linked to other programs to have strong disaster mitigating effects. Cash transfers alone may have 
relatively modest impacts but combined with other interventions can have stronger impacts. 
Evaluations in Ethiopia find that households participating in the Productive Safety Net Program 
(PSNP, more on this program below) alongside other food security programs saw a greater positive 
effect on food intake and income diversification. Households were more likely to be food secure, to 
borrow for productive purposes, use improved agricultural technologies, and operate their own non-
farm business activities. The latter is particularly important as it allows participants in Ethiopia—
where livelihoods are heavily focused on agriculture and highly susceptible to drought—to diversify 
their activities and have other income sources should drought occur (Gilligan, Hoddinott, and 
Taffesse 2009). Similarly, Andersson, Mekonnen, and Stage (2011) found that among PSNP 
participants, improved credit access (part of the suite of other food security programs) is associated 
with increased livestock holdings, suggesting that PSNP participation can lead to increased asset 
holdings that households can use, rather like savings, to buffer themselves against the impact of 
drought. 
Other important links are with microfinance and microcredit programs. For example, Vakis (2006) 
notes that microfinance schemes can also help ex ante income diversification which can mitigate 
against widespread natural disasters. Bangladesh, where numerous SP programs are provided in 
parallel with microfinance, provides a good example: both floods in 1998 had a serious deleterious 
impact on primarily peak season economic activities but microfinance programs allowed households 
to diversify their income-earning activities across seasons and so the impact of peak season disasters 
was reduced (Pitt 2000).  
5.2.2 Disaster Preparedness 
There are rather few examples of how SP can contribute to preparedness but there are some 
insights from examples of messaging and add-on elements to programs. In Bangladesh, the Chars 
Livelihoods Program includes activities such as plinth-raising to protect households on the Chars 
(riverine islands) when the monsoon brings an annual rise in the water level. Other instruments, 
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especially those that are frequently delivered in parallel to SP can also be important. Microfinance 
instruments contribute to preparedness as they can be used to establish local groups that then 
participate in civic and political organizations investing in preventive measures such as drainage, 
emergency warning systems, and food storage (Vakis 2006).  
In the scaled-up SSA delivered as part of the 2015 earthquake response in Nepal, UNICEF attached 
behavioral change communications to cash transfer payments to support disaster mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery. The international experience using SP to support 
preparedness messaging is limited but there are many parallels that can be drawn from SP that have 
used messaging to support, for example, improved health (Bradley, McFarland, and Clarke 2014; 
Hoddinott et al. 2017; Roy et al. 2017).  
5.2.3 Disaster Response  
Using SP to support shock response is the area that has received most attention in the literature, and 
most of the lessons about the implementation capacities to scale up are to be found here. A number 
of different types of programs have been scaled up during crises, especially school feeding programs, 
cash transfers, and public work programs. Scaling up can be either vertical (increasing the support 
given to existing beneficiaries) or horizontal (reaching new/temporary beneficiaries).  
Countries that have scaled up school feeding programs include Haiti, Liberia, Senegal, and Togo. In 
addition to providing food for school-going children there are further benefits—they encourage 
parents to continue sending children to school and, where take-home rations are included, also 
allow other household members to eat. Targeting errors include households without children of 
school-going age or those so poor that even the incentive of food transfers does not outweigh the 
other costs, including opportunity costs, of sending children to school. The Kenyan Government has 
used the Expanded School Feeding Programme to offset negative effects of drought on education 
(Government of Kenya 2012) and WFP found that the program reduced dropout rates during 
drought periods (WFP 2011).  
In terms of PWPs, the exemplary example is the PSNP in Ethiopia (Box 4). The PSNP reflects a serious 
attempt by the Ethiopian Government and both humanitarian and development agencies to shift 
from annual appeals for emergency assistance (usually to cope to with seasonal drought) to a more 
predictable and long-term response to chronic food insecurity. In this way it is insightful for seasonal 
disasters in Nepal, including floods and drought. For unconditional cash transfers, Kenya’s Hunger 
Safety Net Program (HSNP) provides a useful example (Box 5). 
Some programs add a specific additional component during a shock to address a specific element of 
vulnerability or exposure. The Mi Familia Progresa program in Guatamala, began in 2008 and by 
2011 reached more than 900,000 households or about 25 percent of the population. The increase in 
beneficiaries was planned but not at the pace that it occurred at. The food, fuel, and financial crisis 
of 2008 forced a faster rollout than initially planned. What is important about the Mi Familia 
Progresa program is that although it covers many of the usual features of a conditional cash transfer 
program, in the context of a food price crisis an additional focus on nutrition was added with 
activities to strengthen community-based nutrition services and provide extra micronutrient 
supplements (Grosh et al. 2011).  
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Box 4 Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) 
The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) covers around 8 million beneficiaries each year, usually providing six 
months of food, or cash, or a combination of the two. Transfers are provided in return for the delivery of labor 
intensive public works to around 80 percent of beneficiaries with the remaining labor-constrained households not 
required to work. The program has a number of different mechanisms to support scale up. Contingency funds 
account for 20 percent of the budget annually and is held at the federal, state, and woreda (district) levels allowing 
decisions to be made for both large-scale shocks and those that are geographically more limited. There is also a 
Risk Financing Mechanism (RFM) that pre-positions resources at the national level. The release of the RFM was 
triggered in 2011 to nearly 10 million people. About 6.5 million were existing participants in the PSNP and received 
top-up support. The other 3.1 million were people in PSNP districts, who in a normal year did not need additional 
assistance, but in 2011 received up to three months of support to secure their food consumption needs until the 
harvest. The PSNP RFM provides an example of how drought, or other seasonal disasters that can be forecasted, 
offer particular opportunities to scale up SP. 
Institutional arrangements. Scaling up the PSNP requires strong interagency, interministerial, and intergovernment 
coordination between those with concurrent mandates for delivering SP and humanitarian responses. Figure 18 
shows the roles of different ministries and development partners and how programming regulations are filtered 
through the various levels of government. Compared to other countries, because the PSNP is housed, along with 
other programs aimed at tackling food security, in the MoA, coordinating and managing contingency is somewhat 
easier than in other countries where SP is housed in different ministries to disaster management and humanitarian 
response. 
Figure 18: Institutional arrangements for Ethiopia’s PSNP 
 
Source: Adapted from World Bank 2013b. 
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Box 5 Kenya’s Hunger Safety Net Proramme (HSNP) 
In Kenya, scale up is possible in merely a number of weeks, owing to mobile point-of-sale (POS) devices 
through which payments can be made to pre-registered temporary beneficiaries. The HSNP was designed with 
the capacity to anticipate shocks from its outset. Its operational procedures are shock sensitive—for example 
the payment of transfers through POS devices allows people to access their payments despite very low 
population densities and few banks in the northern areas of Kenya and makes getting money to people a faster 
process. In April 2015, the HSNP was able to make payments to an additional 90,648 households as northern 
parts of the country began to suffer the worst of an extreme drought. Fitzgibbon (2016) notes that this scale 
up was faster “than any other previous humanitarian mechanisms on the continent.” The scale up in Kenya 
depended on four key design features. First, the program pre-registered both regular beneficiaries and a set of 
households that were not regular recipients but would receive transfers when food security and other 
wellbeing indicators were threatened. Second, the HSNP depends on satellite mapping to produce a 
vegetation condition index (VCI) to trigger additional payments. Since most of its beneficiaries are pastoralists 
or agro-pastoralists, vegetation cover is a key indicator of forage for livestock and so a proxy for wellbeing for 
communities. Finally, the HSNP staff made huge efforts to ensure that all those registered were supported to 
get bank accounts (78 percent of households in 2015), allowing payments to be made anywhere with a POS 
device. 
Although the type of payment system and the pre-registration of potential beneficiaries are the key elements 
of the HSNP design that allow scale-up, the institutional arrangements for the HSNP are also important. While 
other unconditional cash transfers in Kenya (cash transfer for orphans and vulnerable children, older persons, 
and people living with disabilities) are housed in the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, the HSNP is 
executed through a program implementation unit (PIU) of the National Disaster Management Authority 
(NDMA) which has responsibility for all drought response and management activities in the country. This 
allows direct coordination between the HSNP implementation and wider disaster management activities. 
There are also programs that are useful alongside social transfers. Subsidies are a common 
intervention in response to economic shocks and this was notably the case during the 2008–2009 
food and fuel price crisis. In 2008, a survey by the International Monetary Fund of country responses 
in 2008 saw 33 countries reducing taxes on fuel and 29 countries increasing subsidies (Grosh et al. 
2011). They note that this is a possible alternative to SP where administrative systems are lacking, 
because it is easier to resort to widespread market interventions. Subsidies are often regressive 
rather than progressive in their impact (“when they delivered some relief did so irrespective of 
need,” Grosh et al. 2011, 17) but not always. During 2008, Bangladesh, for example, began an open 
market sales program—a self‐targeted program to buy small amounts of rice at subsidized prices. 
There are existing targeted subsidies for food in Nepal, notably the PFDS, that warrant further 
investigation, especially if administrative capacity to deliver an ASP at the local level becomes 
difficult among the new and fledgling local institutions, or if no other contingency measures are in 
place.  
It is important to note that, while withdrawing subsidies is challenging, so too is scaling back after 
the horizontal expansion of a cash transfer program. In many countries, especially in Latin America, 
the food, fuel, and financial crisis saw very rapid expansion of numerous programs (Brazil, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Equador, Guatamala, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru) and very few have scaled back 
subsequently. For example, OPM (2017) note that for the Solidaridad program in the Dominican 
Republic an intended scale up was delivered far faster than planned from 1.2 to 2.1 million 
households in 2008 and has retained the same number of beneficiaries since then. 
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5.2.4 Disaster recovery 
Just as PWPs can mitigate disaster risks, so can the assets that they create: they also support 
rehabilitation of natural resources which, in turn, can mitigate against future hazards. FAO (2013, 1) 
notes that “the rationale for choosing a public works programme over other cash transfer (CT) 
modalities is based on the assumption that the creation and rehabilitation of vital community assets 
provides beneficiaries with better protection against future shocks which can negatively affect 
livelihoods in rural settings.” Examples include making simple repairs to roads, clearing irrigation 
channels, repairing agricultural land (for example by clearing alluvial deposits from flood events), 
and replanting trees. 
Bowen (2015) notes that, in the Philippines, guidelines for the National Community Driven 
Development Program include provision for the use of local grants for public works for rehabilitation 
activities, including repair of rural and local roads; collection and removal of debris ; backfill, 
reshaping, and landscaping of areas affected by erosion; repair of public buildings and infrastructure 
(for example, traffic signs and bus stops); repair of riverbank protection systems and earth-fill dykes 
up to 5 m height (if supervised by a qualified engineer); repair/reconstruction of small bridges (span 
up to 15 m); construction of temporary bypass roads; and repair/reconstruction of communal 
irrigation and water supply facilities.  
There is also evidence that households in receipt of regular cash transfers are better able to access 
microcredit—and at notably lower interest rates—when they are in regular receipt of SP. They can 
then use that credit to rebuild housing and replace domestic productive assets that have been lost 
to get life back on track. In the Philippines, following Typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan, the Pantawid 
Pamiliya Pilipino Program (4Ps) was scaled up not only to support disaster response but to support 
recovery (Reyes, Albert, and Reyes 2018). Reyes, Albert, and Reyes (2018) note strong impacts on 
household capacity to either fully or partially recover, while Bowen (2015) notes stress placed in the 
Philippines on SP as part of disaster recovery (Figure 19), especially through a program aiming to 
build/recover assets through cash transfers.  
 
 
 
 
 
5.3 
Key 
feat
ures 
of 
ASP 
Which program features matter most for ASP? 
Figure 19: SP programs during DRM stages, Pantawid Pamiliya Pilipino Program, Philippines 
Source: Bowen 2015. 
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From the program experiences listed above and a multitude of others (see in particular OPM 2017), 
we identify the main factors and program features and attributes that are important for making SP 
more adaptive and relevant to Nepal. 
Levels of experience in program delivery and the longevity of programs matter. It takes time, and 
capacity, to build a shock responsive system. It is no accident that the vast majority of scale ups 
during the 2008 crises were in Latin America which hosts the majority of the developing world’s 
established SP programs. In low-income countries, the example of Ethiopia’s PSNP shows that it 
takes time for implementation capacity to be built up and enable flexibility to scale up and 
incorporate more disaster and climate management efforts. Ulrichs and Slater (2017) highlight three 
distinct phases of the PSNP (2005–10, 2010–2015, and 2015–2020) that demonstrate a steady 
increase in the capacity of the PSNP to contribute to resilience building. In the first phase the 
program design included the contingency funds at each level, the second phase introduced the 
RFMs, and in the most recent phase the PSNP was cited as a key pillar of the government’s DRM 
strategy, and donors increasingly articulated the rationale for and objective of the PSNP in the 
language of climate action and adaption and climate funding was increasingly used to resource the 
PSNP.  
Reflections on that first phase in Ethiopia point to the challenges of attempting to do too much too 
soon, the fact that people can slide back into food insecurity as easily as they move out of it, and the 
importance of getting the transfer system, especially the institutional and financial mechanisms, 
working well to deliver transfers predictably, regularly, and reliably (Ulrichs and Slater 2017). For 
Nepal this means prioritizing improvements to the existing implementation processes for SP before 
seeking to branch out too far into complex arrangements and thinking about being ambitious only in 
the medium to long term. 
The presence of poverty-targeted programs is widely recognized as a key ingredient for ASP. Grosh et 
al. (2011) find that shock response is achieved far more easily if there are poverty-targeted programs 
already in place and where these cover a good share of poor people. Slater et al. (2006, 5) concur, 
reporting to the High Level Panel on Cash Transfers in Emergencies that “Social protection 
programmes that target specific groups, such as older people and orphans, will not be particularly 
useful to draw on in terms of reaching the desired caseload in a humanitarian response, where the 
crisis is felt by all, regardless of age or social category.” 
This is challenging for Nepal as many of its SP programs do not explicitly and overtly target those 
living in poverty. Rather, they provide a signal of the presence of the state and its respect for 
particular groups, especially senior citizens. Some of the programs, through their focus on vulnerable 
and excluded groups, may contribute to tackling structural exclusion and inequality, but will require 
concurrent and complementary interventions alongside them. Furthermore, much of the 
international experience and evidence is based on responses to economic shocks—where the 
disproportionate impact on poor people is clear—rather than natural disasters where the losses are 
often greater for less poor households (Walker, Khadka, and Pandey 2017). This, combined with the 
fact that SSAs in Nepal target some groups that are often among the most disadvantaged, and the 
fact that poverty is widely spread across the population in Nepal, suggests that there are good 
reasons to continue to explore the potential for and of adaptive SSAs.  
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Furthermore, there are examples of using scaled up categorically-targeted SP programs in parallel 
with an emergency response for non-beneficiaries. Smith (2015) and Bowen (2015) both reflect on 
lessons from the scale up of the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program ‘4P’—targeted at extremely 
poor families with children—in the Philippines, following Typhoon Haiyan. A reasonable share of 
disaster-affected households was reached rapidly through the 4P beneficiary list, but many other 
households were affected. By coordinating the 4P scale up with the broader response, it was 
possible to cover a greater share of those affected through parallel but coordinated routes.  
High levels of coverage are critical. There is strong agreement that low SP coverage prior to the 
occurrence of a shock limits both mitigation and response. The tables showing the likely coverage of 
those affected by shocks in our risk profile paper show that most of Nepal’s current SP programs will 
reach only a small share of those who are shock affected. This is, in part, because exposure to shocks 
is very weakly related to eligibility for programs but is mainly about the limited coverage of many of 
Nepal’s programs. There are very similar situations elsewhere (McCord, Harris and KC 2013) with 
Grosh et al. (2011) noting that social safety nets in Bangladesh reach less than 10 percent of the 
poorest quintile. As in Nepal, particularly with the KEP and RCIW, many households in other 
countries meet official eligibility criteria for selection but the resources to cover them all are absent. 
The implication for Nepal is that the contribution of SP to shock mitigation and response will be 
limited without the expansion of programs to cover a greater number of beneficiaries. 
In many low-income settings there are not currently the resources allocated to SP programs to allow 
high levels of coverage nationwide. However, given that geographical targeting is a near universal 
feature of humanitarian response (Kuriakose et al. 2012), there may be a case for prioritising the 
expansion of SP coverage to areas that are especially disaster prone. In Ethiopia, the PSNP is focused 
on districts that have been classified as food insecure which, given that the predominant covariant 
shock in Nepal is drought, provides a useful link between PSNP targeting and likely shocks. In Nepal 
this would be challenging because of the widespread geographical distribution of shocks—there are 
few districts not affected by some sort of disaster, so prioritization may be easier said than done. 
However, geographical targeting is already a feature of SP in Nepal and would not only support a 
more effective use of SP for disaster response but also mitigate disasters given the role that SP can 
play in reducing household vulnerability to shocks by enhancing human, physical, and financial 
capital assets.  
The regularity of enrolment/verification is also important. Where it is either slow or ‘static’ (that is, 
where new registrations happen only annually or where validation of the targeted group happens 
only in longer cycles) there is less chance of it supporting a shock response because the beneficiaries 
lists do not reflect those currently in need who have not been able to join programs. Castel (2010) 
notes that in Vietnam the lists of poor households were only validated each time a new poverty line 
was issued, and this usually took place only every five years, presenting an obstacle to supporting 
those whose circumstances have changed—including those whose livelihoods have been disrupted 
by disasters.  
Drawing on a study of 13 countries, Grosh et al. (2011) found that “a number of countries do not 
allow households to register year long as they are formed or feel hardship; in these countries 
registration is confined to defined periods and/or the number of recipients is capped to fit a certain 
budget envelope. These factors limit shock responsiveness.” Grosh et al. (2011) go on to note that 
for shocks that exacerbate existing poverty (such as food price shocks) the issue of static targeting is 
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less problematic but for countries where many ‘near poor’ are pulled into poverty by a shock it can 
be a serious challenge. It is not entirely clear how much of a problem this would be in Nepal. On the 
one hand, Nepal uses mainly social categorical targeting for its SP system so this has little bearing on 
poverty. On the other hand, as Walker, Khadka, and Pandey (2017) note, there are many ‘near poor’ 
in Nepal and protecting them during any shock and supporting their early recovery is a pressing 
challenge.  
A further ingredient is the adequacy of the response. Even without the presence of shocks, delivering 
SP at high enough transfer levels to make a meaningful difference to people’s basic consumption 
and opportunities to invest in livelihoods is difficult. And poorest households are most at risk; 
estimates by the World Bank show that per capita transfers received by households in the bottom 
quintile are lower than those received by the other four quintiles: “In Malawi, the poorest quintile 
receives on average 0.5 cents per day, while the richest 20 percent receives more than 17 cents. In 
Vietnam, transfers are respectively 9 cents and US$1.6, in Colombia, the poorest receive 23 cents 
per day and the richest more than 4.6 cents per day” (Hallegate et al. 2016, 150, citing the World 
Bank ASPIRE database). When shocks occur, this is even more challenging, particularly because local 
or widespread inflation in the prices of basic consumption goods that follows a shock reduces the 
purchasing power of cash transfers. Del Ninno et al. (2001) found that in Bangladesh in 1998, 
transfer amounts covered only 4 percent of monthly expenditures among poor households. 
Devereux (2012) notes that in Kenya, the cash transfer rate for the HSNP that was established in 
2007 based on the cost of a WFP food basket, within 18 months could purchase only one-third the 
amount of food. In this case the shock that drove prices up was a combination of regular seasonal 
drought and the global 3Fs crisis—showing that managing food price fluctuations is a major 
impediment to the efficacy of SP programs being uised for shock response, particularly when market 
prices are beyond the control of national governments.  
It isn’t feasible to implement SP programs for disaster response from scratch.  
In Pakistan, there were numerous delays—financial, administrative, and targeting—to the delivery of 
the cash transfer response package following the 2005 earthquake. Pelham, Clay, and Braunholz 
2011 found that targeting assessment processes were lengthy, that it was not possible to directly 
assess needs and compensation claims of every one of more than a quarter of a million households, 
and that instead village meetings were conducted using oral evidence to assess needs. In Pakistan, 
Save the Children estimates that the preparation phase for community-based targeting in general 
can take up to 14 weeks and concluded that while this may be possible if scaling up a safety net and 
targeting process that is already in place, “it is infeasible if trying to implement a safety net rapidly 
from scratch” (Pelham, Clay, and Braunholz 2011 cited in Bastagli et al. 2014). 
Targeting challenges (inclusion and exclusion errors) can be addressed, at least partially, through better 
grievance mechanisms and communication 
It is important to recognize that there are trade-offs between the extent of overlap of shock-affected 
and SP beneficiary households, and the need for a timely response. While minimizing inclusion and 
exclusion errors is a priority in SP programs, in humanitarian or emergency contexts there is a risk 
that taking time to address errors delays getting resources to households when they desperately 
need them. As Hallegate et al. (2016, 141) note “to be effective, safety nets must be rapidly scalable, 
even if speed of delivery may come at the cost of targeting.” One of the ways to help manage the 
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trade-off is to invest, ex ante, in grievance systems that address challenges rapidly (Hallegate et al. 
2016).  
Timely responses require not only established lists of existing beneficiaries, but also a social registry of a 
wider group of households and individuals among the population  
OPM (2017) find that data availability is a critical prerequisite and consider registries that collect 
information on vulnerable groups beyond existing SP beneficiaries are a powerful tool for effective 
and rapid shock responses. Similarly, Bastagli (2014, 19) finds “if administrative records are 
restricted to collecting information on existing SP beneficiaries, their use in identifying potential new 
ones in the aftermath of a shock is limited. In contrast, registries that regularly collect information 
for a broader segment of the population, including the ‘near poor’ and other vulnerable groups in 
addition to program beneficiaries, are a powerful tool for SP shock response.” 
Evidence for these assertions is found widely across varied countries. In Brazil, the Cadastro Unico 
includes households with a per capita income below half the national minimum wage. This threshold 
is higher than in most SP programs in the country and so allows rapid horizontal scale up of 
beneficiaries for the Bolsa Familia conditional cash transfer program. In the Philippines, Reyes, 
Albert, and Reyes (2018) stress the importance of generating local level data on household and 
individual characteristics, and keeping it regularly updated, to improve the potential for shock 
response. In Mauritania and Senegal, registries include a ‘buffer’ caseload whereby around half of 
names on the registry are safety net beneficiaries and the other half are not beneficiaries but are 
vulnerable to shocks. In Mauritania, the buffer is greater for regions that are more exposed to 
climate-related shocks. 
The exemplary example of this for a country with Nepal’s resources is Kenya’s HSNPs. The HSNP has 
a cohort of households that are not the regular caseload but receive transfers only when their living 
situations worsen, usually because of drought. Establishment of the list before a shock occurs is 
critical. In Kenya, all households in the four locations of the country in which the program operates 
were ranked according to poverty. This provided the basis for scaling up subsequently. It is 
important for the HSNP that, while it is viewed as a key program in Nepal’s SP framework, it is 
implemented rather differently to Kenya’s other cash transfer programs (which are targeted to poor 
households with orphans and vulnerable children, the elderly, people with disabilities, and the urban 
food subsidy cash transfer program). The HSNP is administered from the NDMA, with substantial 
technical and financial support from international donors and NGOs and works through offices at the 
county level with strong links to the new, devolved government structures. The other cash transfer 
programs, in contrast, are operating by local arms of the national government.  
Financial arrangements and payment systems need to be established before shocks occur 
Making SP systems more adaptive, as opposed to seeking to link SP and disaster response in more ad 
hoc ways, represents a financial commitment on the part of the government. Hallegate et al. (2016) 
suggest that this has implications for the sorts of financial instruments that may be required to 
deliver a more systematized approach—from reserve funds, contingent finance, reinsurance 
products, and support from international donors. 
The lessons about contingency funds are pertinent for Nepal. The international experience shows 
that pre-positioned funds and trigger criteria are critical (Ethiopia, the Philippines, and Mexico), that 
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separate funds for different types of shocks and separate funds for ex ante and ex post actions are 
required (Mexico and Kenya), and that there are benefits for holding contingencies at different levels 
of the government (Ethiopia).  
Evidence from other countries suggests that a single DMF is unlikely to work and that a range of 
funds (or at least earmarked fund components) is required. The National Drought and Disaster and 
Contingency Fund in Kenya has two components to disburse funds for an ex ante response to slow 
onset shocks (notably drought but in a Nepal equivalent case this could also support more 
predictable/seasonal shocks such as cold waves and monsoon flooding at a small scale) and for ex 
post responses for quick action (for more unpredictable and rapid onset disasters) (Tilsone 2012).  
In Mexico, there are different funds in the financial instrument for disaster response, FONDEN, that 
differentiate between financing for prevention, reconstruction, and emergencies (Espinosa 2017). 
While response and recovery activities continue to dominate expenditures (as they do in Nepal), a 
review of FONDEN (World Bank 2012) finds an increasing focus on ex ante responses (that is, 
mitigation and preparedness activities) (Figure 20). The amounts of funds available are also secured, 
for example, Federal Budget Law requiring that no less than 0.4 percent of the annual federal budget 
(net of the uncommitted funds in the FONDEN Trust at the end of each year) should be available to 
FONDEN and a number of other DMFs. In 2011 this was around US$800 million (World Bank 2012). 
 
Figure 20: Funds and resource allocation for FONDEN 
 
Source: World Bank 2012. 
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While in Mexico, funds are held at the central level, the Ethiopia PSNP holds contingency at federal, 
state, and district levels giving, in theory, greater autonomy to the local level to respond in ways 
most appropriate to their specific context (Slater et al. 2006).  
In terms of payment systems, there are other lessons from Africa about payments systems, most 
notably the branchless banking system used by the HSNP to deliver cash transfers and the speed 
that having beneficiary bank accounts brings to shock response. Furthermore, the challenges of 
setting up payments systems following an earthquake in Pakistan are noted in Pelham, Clay, and 
Braunholz 2011. 
EWSs combined with pre-positioning of resources can ensure a timely response 
Hobson and Campbell (2012) highlight the importance for slow onset shocks such as drought of 
having EWSs in place to indicate the need for a response as early as possible. At present much of the 
emphasis on early warning in Nepal is on warning people that a shock is imminent. The Hobson and 
Campbell case in Ethiopia is different and is about early warning for a slow onset shock to ensure 
that resources are prepositioned. Contingency planning is underway in Nepal but, at this particular 
time, is rather constrained by the slowly emerging guidance on roles and responsibilities for both 
DRM and for SP at the provincial and local levels. Contingencies in Nepal appear to be funded and 
held mainly at the central level, though some local governments are considering trying to build 
contingency funds. More guidance will be needed on where contingencies can be held, how they will 
be financed and by who, and whether the central government will seek to recover unspent pre-
positioned resources at the end of each year or whether they can and should be maintained at the 
local level. 
Institutional arrangements 
There are multiple institutional arrangements and coordination mechanisms for ensuring strong 
links between SP and DRM but from international experience there are lessons to learn. Two 
patterns are discernible. First, as shown in the examples from Kenya and Ethiopia above, in low-
income countries the integration of SP and DRM appears to be strongest where SP is embedded in 
ministries that also deliver natural resource management and disaster response. Indeed, in Kenya, of 
four cash transfer programs, it is only the one that is housed in the NDMA that is able to scale up 
rapidly in response to shocks. Second, elsewhere, the leadership of disaster management by 
institutions responsible for SP is paramount. The primary example here is from the Philippines. 
Bowen argues that the capacity to use SP in disaster response and recovery and rehabilitation has 
depended on the central role played by the government’s Department of Social Welfare and 
Development (DSWD). “DSWD is prominently integrated into the national disaster risk management 
(DRM) framework, taking the lead coordinating role in disaster response activities. DSWD is the lead 
agency for ‘disaster response’ within the Government of Philippines’s National Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP). The department also has responsibilities across the 
national prevention and mitigation, preparedness, recovery, and rehabilitation pillars of the 
NDRRMP” (Bowen 2015, 1).  
Capacities and roles should be clearly defined and realistic  
SP programs frequently depend on statutory and voluntary roles at the local level. Kardan et al. 
(2017) note the importance of implementation roles at the local level, especially in targeting, but 
also note that, in the case of Zambia and Kenya at least, there is often limited institutional clarity at 
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the national level and that this worsens as guidance about roles, responsibilities, and mandates are 
cascaded down to the local level. This is also the case in Nepal at this time, because of the very 
recent transition to decentralized government systems and the pending emergency of specific 
guidance. It is also noted that material and financial support, and adequate training, are often 
lacking at the local level with implications for the effectiveness and sustainability of program 
delivery. This stresses the importance of functioning systems for delivering basic systems of SP, even 
before the addition of adaptive and flexible elements of program design and delivery.  
Individual roles at the local level are also in flux. While the shift to local governments in Nepal may 
provide an opportunity for more integrated working at the local level and technical staff working 
together on a number of programs rather than in silos, it also brings challenges. In particular, it may 
require staff to expand their existing skill set and adopt a broader range of capabilities. As Karden et 
al. (2017) note, “while the level of range of qualifications is quite high amongst professional staff, 
the nature of their work has substantially changed from their traditional social welfare role, 
requiring higher levels of project management skills and leadership skills.” While it appears critical 
for staff at the local level in Nepal to deliver a broader portfolio, and to work in an integrated way on 
DRM, we should also be cautious of what Pritchett Woolcock, and Andrews (2010) have called 
‘premature loadbearing’ at the local level. By asking staff to combine roles in SP and in DRR we may 
be asking “too much of too little, too soon, too often” (p. 37).  
5.4 Conclusion 
In a review of shock response and SP following the 2008 food, fuel, and financial crisis, the countries 
that are least prepared for using SP (that is, those with the least ASP systems) were those where 
“the existing base of safety nets is characterized by fragmentation, small programs and poor systems 
development” (Grosh et al. 2011). All were fragile countries that had either recently emerged from 
violent conflict or were still in conflict and all had a proliferation of small programs, against a 
background of fragmented policy. There are lessons here for Nepal, about needing to be modest 
about what it might achieve in ASP and the need to continue to build on bringing together currently 
fragmented SP programs into an overarching framework. Nepal has already begun this work—with 
substantial investments in administrative and MIS systems at the central level, and with the 
development of a national SP framework. 
  
72 
 
Chapter 6: Analyzing What Might Work in 
Nepal 
In this section we integrate lessons from Nepal’s risk profile, SP sector and programs, DRM system, 
and international experience in ASP to explore what might work best for Nepal. We structure our 
assessment according to the four different elements of DRM that SP might play a role in: mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery, and in relation to the overarching SP system.  
6.1 What might work for making SP systems more adaptive in Nepal? 
SP systems are, in this context taken to comprise three elements: administrative, institutional, and 
financial. 
6.1.1 Aligning SP and disaster management systems 
The lessons from international experience suggest strong arguments for aligning SP and disaster 
management systems. An integrated social registry of households, including those already in receipt 
of SP would provide a valuable resource for the identification of households that might benefit from 
support for disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.  
In terms of payments, however, alignment is not entirely straightforward for Nepal because of the 
specific evolution of its SP programs in rather fragmented ways. In terms of alignment between 
disaster management/humanitarian programming and SP systems, OPM (2017) define shadow 
alignment as running a parallel humanitarian system that aligns as best as possible with a current or 
possible future SP program. The main obstacle is the fragmentation, particularly of transfer levels, 
between the existing programs. While senior citizens receive NPR 2,000 per month, the under-five 
child grant pays NRP 400 per month and single women/widows receive NPR 1,000 per month. This 
creates a rather intractable challenge of aligning emergency payments to shock-affected households 
who are not in receipt of SP, to existing payment levels. Without consistency across payments within 
the SP system, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, for humanitarian response to align with it, thought 
it might piggyback on the payment system. The implication for Nepal is that for the SP system to be 
more adaptive, the fragmentation and lack of coherence in program coverage needs to be 
addressed. 
Overall, while the opportunities for alignment are somewhat limited, there are some exceptions. 
First, there is substantial scope within Nepal’s food distribution system to pre-position food stocks in 
food depots to ensure that the delivery of cash transfer payments do not create inflationary effects 
in food prices. Second, at the local level, it is possible that local government officials with new 
responsibilities for registering and enrolling SP beneficiaries, might use their local level knowledge 
and systems to support the identification of shock-affected households and thereby support 
emergency response targeting. 
6.1.2 Strengthening institutional coordination  
International experience highlights the importance of strong integration of and coordination 
between SP agencies and ministries and those responsible for DRM. In Nepal, there is provision for 
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this through the DRRM Act and the composition of the committee governing the operations of the 
DMA. However, it might be more specific about which parts of MoFAGA, that is, those responsible 
for SP, should be represented on the high-level committees. The prospects for improved alignment 
might be furthered by ensuring that the involvement in the committee of the Department of Civil 
Registration and those parts of MoFAGA or the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security 
(MoLESS) is detailed and exploring having specific SP expertise within the DMA staffing composition.  
6.1.3 Making SP financing more adaptive 
From international experience, there is recognition of the critical importance of having pre-
positioned resources and agreed criteria for triggering expansions in SP during times of shocks and 
disasters. At present, because the largest share of SP programs are targeted not to poverty but to 
specific demographic and social categories, there are no arrangements for contingency in the SP 
system nor contingency budgets held at central ministry, central department, or local government 
levels. Furthermore, among stakeholders at the central, district, and local government, it is not well 
understood or agreed whether disaster response funds can be routed through existing SP financial 
payment systems. A core element of a more ASP system would be the establishment of contingency 
funds that are held at different levels of government and can be flexibly deployed. 
There would be additional benefits to clarifying these systems. At present, there are concerns 
among donors that government disaster funds (such as the PMDRF, and the DMF that is provided for 
in the DRRM Act are not currently able to account for expenditures in a manner that allows 
international agencies to contribute to them and then provided a clear account of where and how 
money was spent back to their home governments. This accountability challenge creates obstacles 
to close engagement and partnership between the GoN and international partners in disaster 
response and, by extension, contributes to a rather fragmented humanitarian response overall. 
Routing funding through the SP system—provides a clear paper trail of which households have 
received and where—increases accountability and transparency and reduces concerns among 
international agencies about fiduciary risks. Clarifying the options for routing funds through SP 
could, therefore, increase confidence among donor agencies and allow a more coordinated disaster 
response.  
6.2 What might work for disaster mitigation through SP in Nepal? 
Chapter 5 demonstrates that SP can play a key role in mitigating disasters in two main ways: by 
making households more resilient in the face of shocks and stresses; and by reducing the incidence 
of disasters themselves by contributing to better environmental management. There are prospects 
for enhancing the mitigating role of SP in Nepal in both these ways. Two possible mechanisms are 
envisaged—the introduction of a poverty-targeted program into Nepal’s suite of SP programs; and a 
re-envisioning and redesign of PWPs so that they are more oriented toward disaster mitigation. 
6.2.1 Poverty-targeted SP for mitigation 
Poverty-targeted SP plays a key role in mitigating disasters by making households more resilient 
when exposed to droughts, floods, earthquakes, fires, and landslides. Given that it is frequently the 
poorest and most vulnerable households that are most exposed to shocks—particularly those 
dependent on agricultural and other casual labor—a longer-term program targeting the poorest 
could potentially help reduce their exposure to shocks and help them buffer themselves against 
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disasters. Experiences in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, as outlined in Ulrichs and Slater (2017) 
suggest that in the relationship between SP and resilience note that it is that core, foundational 
element of all SPi.e.—the transfer itself—that is what helps people absorb shocks. 
Yet, Nepal’s existing suite of SP programs are not currently well targeted to the poor (the lower 
coverage PWPs being an exception to this) (Box 6) and so the opportunity to build household 
resilience is missed. Elements providing the foundation for more poverty-targeted SP include 
building a social/poverty registry and establishing lists or community rankings at the local level. 
Moving toward more poverty-targeted SP would increase the fiscal burden on the government and 
is likely to require the support of international donor agencies. 
Box 6 Coverage of different types of vulnerability in Nepal’s SP system 
Sijapati’s (2017) differentiation of types of vulnerability demonstrates substantial gaps in SP programs. The 
main focus of Nepal’s programs is on lifecycle vulnerabilities with the biggest programs in terms of 
coverage (senior citizens, widows/single women, and the child grant) defining eligibility in terms of lifecycle 
risks. On paper, the current suite of SP programs go some way to addressing historical and structural 
exclusion, albeit tackling symptoms rather than the causes of historical and structural exclusion where it 
will take complementary programming and substantial social change to achieve anything really 
transformational. Previous assessments of this element of SP have commented that a lack of results or 
impacts on levels of inequality between ethnic groups or genders can also be attributed, in part, to the low 
levels of transfers made to households, although there have been substantial increases in payments to 
senior citizens in particular. There is some programming that seeks to address the legacies of violent 
conflict (for example cash transfers to the families of those killed, injured, disappeared, and displaced due 
to conflict) operated by the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. However, overall, programs that define 
eligibility in terms of income poverty and natural disasters have far less coverage. 
Prospects for improving the poverty-targeting of existing programs, or establishing a new poverty-
targeted SP program in Nepal 
The importance of poverty-targeted SP programs for ASP is not disputed in Nepal. However, given 
that they would be substantially different from the existing suite of programs, there are questions 
about institutional and financial capacity to deliver them, and the extent to which there is 
widespread political support for them.  
In terms of capacity, although Bastagli (2014, 17) note that “Effectiveness in the aftermath of a 
shock depends to a large extent on whether mechanisms were in place and institutionalized prior to 
the crisis or set up in the crisis context.” Nepal would not be starting completely from scratch. In a 
number of municipalities and rural municipalities, efforts are underway to create lists at the local 
level that rank the most vulnerable households, and include data about existing sources of support, 
including participation in PWPs or receipt of SSAs. The Ministry of Land Management, Cooperatives 
and Poverty Alleviation continues to work toward the establishment of a poverty identification card 
system and further progress in this regard could provide an enrolment mechanism for households to 
receive regular cash transfers. This work is not without its own challenges—in particular technical 
challenges of data collection and maintenance, but the pilot initiatives in 25 districts does provide 
indication of the government’s aim to tackle poverty. 
The current urgency of responding to natural disasters has highlighted the lack of poverty-targeted 
SP in Nepal. This urgency may provide an entry point for further analysis and dialogue—especially 
between the government and donors—about how a long-term program, with the capacity to scale 
up, might work. Pilots, supported by donors, could be developed relatively quickly at provincial and 
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local government level, given the concurrent responsibilities for SP held, particularly at the local 
level. However, this will depend on political support. It is not clear whether the urgency to 
strengthen disaster management—and to tackle the poverty that underpins people’s exposure to 
shocks—will be sustained over time. In our interviews, a number of respondents noted how quickly 
we forget about large-scale disasters and how quickly they slide off the policy agenda. Enthusiasm, 
especially for disaster mitigation and preparedness, can often dissipate among politicians and policy 
makers rather quickly. Exploring whether an explicitly poverty-targeted mechanism will be politically 
acceptable depends on a stronger understanding of the shifting priorities of local-, provincial-, and 
central-level actors and a wider consultation on this by political economy experts or political 
scientists. 
Exploring the use of these emerging lists to identify cash transfer beneficiaries, either for a 
permanent program or for an emergency top up, may provide the missing element for an ASP 
system in Nepal. 
The challenge with a bottom-up approach of this kind would be twofold. First, as Carraro and Lakhey 
(2018, 8) note, although it is likely there will be different requirements for SP among distinct 
populations in certain localities, “it is also realistic to expect that this could create divergent levels of 
protection within the country…not based on actual different needs of the local population, but the 
different level of capacity of the local government or financial/economic opportunities.” The 
redistributive element of equalization grants goes some way to balancing need and resources but 
will not account for technical capacity requirements. Second, while the establishment of elected 
officials at the local level will make local decision makers more accountable to all their constituents, 
it is unlikely to dissolve the dynamics of exclusion completely, nor do away with elite capture. A final 
element of difficulty associated with localized approaches to poverty reduction would be to establish 
the right balance between the need for national or standardized methodologies for identifying the 
poor that ensure equality on the one hand and some flexibility in approaches to ensure equity across 
different provinces and municipalities. 
6.2.2 Re-envisioning PWPs for DRM 
As seen in many other countries, PWPs have the potential to contribute not only to shock responses, 
but also to disaster mitigation, preparedness, and recovery. At present there have been significant 
investments in PWPs in Nepal for more than a decade—indeed the RCIW was first established in 
1995–96. At the same time, there is widespread disappointment about the extent to which public 
works have been able to create assets that support livelihoods and economic growth in the long 
term and make meaningful and sustainable differences to the lives of participants and their 
households. Based on evaluations and reviews of PWPs in Nepal, and elsewhere (GoN 2012b; KEPTA 
2014; McCord, Harris, and KC 2012), we suggest that a combination of challenges with finances and 
administration, and the overwhelming focus on road building and only labor-intensive works, 
present a missed opportunity.  
Broadening the range of public works activities would allow public works to contribute across the 
whole spectrum of DRM—from mitigation, through preparedness and response, to recovery. 
Examples of possible works include tree planting to allow afforestation of land that is subject to 
slippage, or the construction of check dams and basic irrigation systems to both improve water 
control and ensure its availability for agriculture. For preparedness, the monitoring of river, dam, 
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and snow pack levels could become a public works activity and formalized and systematized at the 
community level (for example, households could be paid for monitoring activity). For response, 
existing beneficiaries might receive wages irrespective of whether work has taken place (see above) 
to provide them with life-saving support at critical times. During recovery workers might clear roads 
or (when appropriate and legal) remove sand deposits from agricultural land that has been flooded.  
At the central level, an appropriate approach might be to integrate PWPs more directly and explicitly 
with the NAPA for Climate Change (GoN 2010), with the Local Adaptation Plans of Action (LAPAs) 
and with emerging agricultural strategies. Incorporating public works more fully into DRM would 
require a refocus of current national-level priorities to give greater attention to mitigation and 
preparedness. Clarifying the roles of the various central-level committees in respect of the four 
phases of DRM would be an important step toward achieving this.  
At the local level there are many implications, and new ways of working would be required. In some 
cases, this will require greater capital, as opposed to labor, inputs into the work, and this will involve 
a change of mentality from only doing road building and only using labor to develop physical 
infrastructure and assets. It will also require more attention from engineers, agricultural technicians, 
and others, but there may be opportunities in the new local government setups to have technical 
staff working in a more integrated way across programs—this in turn would require revisiting job 
roles and descriptions to ensure an appropriate distribution of tasks and responsibilities and an 
assessment of capacities at the local level. However, better integration of sectors and programs at 
the local level—for example, in disaster management, agriculture, climate change, small scale 
infrastructure development, and public works—is one of the potential benefits of the new ways of 
working at the local level.  
This is a highly ambitious option and it would require strong political will—at central, provincial, and 
local government levels, and among local participants, NGOs, and international agencies. It will be 
challenging and require a reframing of public works in Nepal. It has a number of shortcomings, for 
example, efforts to address climate change are highly focused on rural areas at this time. In the 
absence of more climate change programming in urban areas, there is a risk of excluding, for 
example, those in urban areas that are susceptible to food price shocks caused by blockades, and so 
on. 
Whether or not there is appetite to tackle disasters in this way is less clear. We found enormous 
support for a more integrated approach at the local level. However, as Jones (2012) notes, what has 
driven progress with SP in the last decade or so has been alliance of political will with something that 
is relatively simple to implement institutionally. An integrated public works, DRM, climate response, 
and agricultural development program would not offer simple implementation. However, it may be 
possible that the wave of energy and enthusiasm created by the transition to the federal system and 
the interests of elected officials at provincial and local government level to do something different 
and visionary will allow a more ambitious approach. 
There are other reasons to be optimistic about a rethinking of public works—notably the 
announcement in the 2018–2019 budget of a new employment program based in the MoLESS. It is 
anticipated that a large part of the program will be focused on public works and there is strong 
potential to incorporate a planning process for the creation of infrastructure through public works 
that support disaster mitigation.  
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6.3 What might work for disaster preparedness through SP in Nepal? 
The sorts of public works activities identified above for disaster mitigation, could also apply to 
disaster preparedness. Examples include payments for monitoring of soil and forest resources or of 
river levels and avalanches that might trigger glacial lake outflows. Beyond this, there are some 
noteworthy and relatively simple opportunities to piggyback on existing administrative and 
implementation systems in SP to support disaster preparedness in Nepal. The experiences found in 
the international experience are limited in Nepal, notably because the greater share of Nepal’s SP 
programs is demographically targeted, rather than being targeted based on poverty. This means that 
options for using existing beneficiary lists, registration and enrolment systems, and payment systems 
to deliver humanitarian responses are limited. Yet, there is one specific opportunity for DRM to 
piggyback on SP communication systems.  
In the scaled-up SSA delivered as part of the 2015 earthquake response, UNICEF attached behavioral 
change communications to cash transfer payments to support disaster mitigation, preparedness, 
response, and recovery. Although the results were mixed (Box 7), as SP payments and 
communication become increasingly automated, they have the potential to provide a simple, low 
cost way to deliver information about managing shocks.  
From international experiences, examples of messages extend across a range of shocks—from 
messages about hand washing (to mitigate health shocks), to advice to keep women and girls as safe 
as possible after disasters—especially given the high risk of violence and trafficking they face during 
displacement (Standing, Parker, and Bista 2016), to messages about keeping documents (such as 
citizenship certificates) protected from water during floods.  
The findings from wider research, especially in more developed countries (Bradley, McFarland, and 
Clarke 2014) suggest that cash transfers could provide an appropriate vehicle for disaster risk 
communications, allowing communities to be prepared. Communications methods used include 
posters at sites where people receive transfers, leaflets included in SP documentation or messaging 
on payment slips, and text messages when beneficiaries are alerted that payments have been made 
into their bank accounts or are ready for collection. In principal, the vehicle applies not only to 
preparedness but also to mitigation, response, and recovery. 
Furthermore, there is a growing body of evidence in support of attaching messaging for behavioral 
change (for examples from Bangladesh see Hoddinott et al. 2017) that suggests that messaging often 
reaches beyond program recipients to non-beneficiary households. Lessons from the experience of 
the 2015 earthquake in Nepal and from other countries suggest that the messaging needs to be 
simple and timely (requiring it to be prepared in advance), that succinct messages work better, and 
that the process needs to be sustained over time. 
Box 7 Behaviour change communications during the 2015 earthquake in Nepal 
The scale up of SP following the 2015 earthquake in Nepal included behavioral change messages. These were 
targeted to specific vulnerable groups and sectors and were aimed to support specific relief and recovery 
outcomes. They included simple shelter guidance, household preparedness measures, and checklists to 
protect water sources from contamination. There was also potential to expand messaging to provide key 
health and other messages relevant to the rainy season or further earthquakes and other natural disasters in 
the future.  
Communications took two forms as booklet and leaflets. An evaluation found that only 6.5 percent of sampled 
beneficiaries of the scaled-up response received the communications booklet—mainly widows and single 
78 
 
women, non-Dalit senior citizens, and households with Dalit children, in Gorkha, Rasuwa, and Okhaldhunga. 
Leaflets did not appear to make it from the district level into communities. It was logistically challenging to 
transport leaflets and booklets to the VDC level and hard to mobilize human resources to deliver information 
campaigns in a very short timescale.  
Source: Gurung et al. 2015. 
 
6.4 What might work for disaster response through SP in Nepal? 
There are a large number of potential ways in which SP might contribute to disaster response in 
Nepal. These are discussed with reference to the typologies of Bastagli (2014) and OPM (2017, 2018) 
(Table 9). 
Table 9: Typologies of mechanisms by which SP can support shock response 
Bastagli (2014) OPM (2017, 2018) 
Increase payments/make 
extraordinary payments 
Vertical expansion - topping up support to (existing) beneficiaries 
Expand coverage to reach 
additional beneficiaries 
Horizontal expansion - temporarily extending support to new 
households 
 Piggybacking - borrowing elements of an existing program or system 
while delivering a separate emergency response 
 Alignment - humanitarian response mimicking elements of an existing 
program (payment levels, payment frequency) but without integrating it 
Relax/change requirements to 
make more households eligible 
Refocusing* - retargeting an intervention without expanding; and design 
tweaks 
New programs  
Note: * This element was part of OPM’s analysis in 2017 but in 2018 reassessed as part of a resourcing 
strategy in a constrained environment rather than as a mechanism for achieving shock response.  
6.4.1 Increase payments / make extra-ordinary payments 
International experience suggests that one option for shock response is to increase the size of 
existing transfers for a limited period or to make extraordinary payments to existing beneficiaries. 
There are good reasons to explore how effective and achievable this mechanism would be in Nepal. 
First, experiences with the ETCTP in 2015 provide a good sense of what is feasible in the Nepal 
context (Gurung et al. 2015) and what the GoN and its development partners might work toward. 
Second, for a different type of SP program altogether, analysis of the HRVS data suggests that PWPs 
have potential for supporting shock responses. Walker, Khadka, and Pandey (2017) find that 
“earthquake-affected households that participated in temporary public works programs were no 
more food insecure than unaffected households, while those that experienced the shock and did not 
participate in public works were significantly more food insecure” (p.52).  
We assess increasing SP transfers payments in two ways—first, by looking at whether support would 
reach the right people (that is, assessing how far exposure to shocks is related to receipt of SP, and 
what the inclusion and exclusion errors would be); and, second, by considering the readiness of SP 
systems and the acceptability of such an approach to key stakeholders.  
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Would scaling up existing SP payments reach the right people? 
It is not only households that receive SP who are exposed to shocks, especially given that most SP in 
Nepal is not targeted on the basis of poverty or food insecurity. The relationships between receipt of 
SP and exposure to shocks are not especially strong; the HRVS data shows that 65 percent of 
households in receipt of SP were exposed to at least one shock in the 24 months before their 
interview. This is lower than the average for all households across Nepal. When we disaggregate by 
program, in the very few cases where the relationship is statistically significant, beneficiaries of SP 
programs are less likely to report being exposed to shocks compared to non-beneficiaries. 
Disaggregating this overarching finding further by differentiating between different shocks also 
provides limited results (Table 10). The key message is that the HRVS data does not immediately 
suggest a strong rationale for scaling up SP for shock response. 
Table 10: Households affected by shocks: differences between SP beneficiary and non-beneficiary households  
 Shock 
Any shock Earthquake2  Landslide  Flood Drought  Fire 
Total number of 
households affected by 
shock 
3289  
(47311) 
809 151 190 1134 23 
Number and % of 
affected households 
receiving SP3 
1259  
(38.3%) 
 (26.6%1) 
541 
(66.9%) 
54 
(35.8%) 
53 
(27.9%) 
372 
(32.8%) 
6 
(26.1%) 
Affected households not 
receiving SP 
2030  
(61.7%) 
(73.41) 
268  
(33.1%) 
97 
(64.2%) 
137 
(72.1%) 
762 
(67.2%) 
17 
(73.9%) 
Mann-Whitney test (P-
value 
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.34 0.20 0.62 0.53 
Note: ‘Any shock’ in this table includes the only shocks listed in this table—earthquake, landslide, flood, 
drought, and fire.  
1 The numbers in italics show results for a combination of natural disasters and some specifically selected 
health, economic, and political shocks as per Annex Table 1. This reduces the percentage of shock affected 
households receiving SP falling to about 27 percent. Walker, Khadka, and Pandey (2017) refer to the full list of 
shocks in the HRVS survey instrument. 
2 Earthquake is based on earthquake-affected districts in the sample (7 districts out of the 50 in the HRVS: 
Gorkha, Dhading, Nuwakot, Kavrepalanchok, Sindhupalchok, Dolakha, and Makwanpur).  
3 SP programs included: old age allowance, single women/widow’s allowance, disability allowance, under 5’s 
child allowance, RCIW, KEP, and scholarships.  
 
These estimates suggest large gaps in coverage and substantial exclusion and inclusion errors if 
shock-responsive SP is targeted using the same lists as regular SP programs. However, the estimates 
are based on 50 districts in the HRVS and so, for more robust estimates we explore in more detail on 
a district-by-district, shock-by-shock, and program-by-program basis whether delivering shock 
response through SP, as well as supporting disaster-affected people, might tackle the structural 
vulnerabilities that underpin poverty in an effective way. 
Table 11 uses the HRVS data to estimate how many households that are affected by particular 
shocks would be included and how many shock-affected households would be excluded if shock 
response was routed through existing SP programs (exclusion error). It also shows how many current 
SP beneficiaries are not affected by particular shocks (and would represent inclusion errors if they 
received SP top ups intended as a shock response).  
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These estimates suggest large gaps in coverage and substantial exclusion and inclusion errors if 
shock-responsive SP is targeted using the same lists as regular SP programs. However, the estimates 
are based on 50 districts in the HRVS and so, for more robust estimates we explore in more detail on 
a district-by-district, shock-by-shock, and program-by-program basis whether delivering shock 
response through SP, as well as supporting disaster-affected people, might tackle the structural 
vulnerabilities that underpin poverty in an effective way. 
Table 11: Coverage of shock response using selected SP programs 
 
 Landslide 
(%) 
Flood 
(%) 
Drought 
(%) 
Fire 
 (%) 
O
ld
 a
ge
 a
llo
w
an
ce
 
Shock-affected households receiving old age 
allowance (and therefore included) 
 12.6 11.1 13.4 8.7 
Shock-affected households not receiving old age 
allowance (and therefore excluded) 
 87.4 88.9  86.6 91.3 
Share of old age allowance beneficiaries that are 
not shock affected but still included 
97.3 97.0 78.4 99.7 
Si
n
gl
e 
w
o
m
en
/w
id
o
w
s 
al
lo
w
an
ce
 
Shock-affected households receiving single 
women’s allowance (and therefore included) 
7.9 10.5 10.9 4.3 
Shock-affected households not receiving single 
women’s allowance (and therefore excluded) 
 92.1  89.5 89.1 95.7 
Share of single women’s beneficiaries that are not 
shock affected but still included 
97.7 96.2 76.6 99.8 
D
is
ab
ili
ty
 
al
lo
w
an
ce
 
Shock-affected households receiving disability 
allowance (and therefore included) 
6.0 5.8 2.5 8.7 
Shock-affected households not receiving disability 
allowance (and therefore excluded) 
 94  94.2 97.5  91.3 
Share of disability beneficiaries that are not shock 
affected but still included 
94.1 92.8 81.7 98.7 
U
n
d
er
 f
iv
e 
ch
ild
 
gr
an
t 
Shock-affected households receiving under 5 grant 
(and therefore included) 
 5.3 1.1 2.2 0 
Shock-affected households not receiving under 5 
grant (and therefore excluded) 
 94.7  98.9 97.8  100 
Share of under 5 beneficiaries that are not shock 
affected but still included 
97.1 98.0 74.7 100 
A
ll 
SS
A
s 
Shock-affected households receiving any SSA (and 
therefore included) 
27.8 24.7 27.7 17.4 
Shock-affected households not receiving any SSA 
(and therefore excluded) 
72.2 75.3 72.3 82.6 
Share of SSA beneficiaries that are not shock 
affected but still included 
97.5 97.2 81.6 99.8 
R
C
IW
 
Shock-affected households receiving RCIW (and 
therefore included) 
 6.6 0 3.8 4.3 
Shock-affected households not receiving RCIW 
(and therefore excluded) 
 93.4 100 96.2 95.7 
Share of RCIW beneficiaries that are not shock 
affected but still included 
93 100 69.7 99.3 
K
EP
 
Shock-affected households receiving KEP (and 
therefore included) 
 2 1.6 0.8 4.3 
Shock-affected households not receiving KEP (and 
therefore excluded) 
 98 98.4 99.2 95.7 
Share of KEP beneficiaries that are not shock 
affected but still included 
91.9 91.9 75.7 97.3 
P
FD
S Shock-affected households with access to PFDS 
(and therefore included) 
 4.6 1.6 2.3  0 
Shock-affected households without access to PFDS  95.4  98.4 97.7 100 
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(and therefore excluded) 
Share of households with access to PFDS that are 
not shock affected but still included 
95.8 98.2 84.3 100 
 
Focusing solely on earthquake-affected districts sampled in the HRVS and assessing the coverage 
rate and inclusion and exclusion errors of providing an additional payment through the SSAs 
produces a more positive picture (Figure 21). The HRVS survey covers 7 of the most severely affected 
districts (Gorkha, Dhading, Nuwakot, Kavrepalanchok, Sindhupalchok, Dolakha, and Makwanpur) and 
finds 809 respondents there reporting experiencing the earthquake. Of these, 56.2 percent are 
covered by the SSA and would be reached by an additional payment, but 43.8 percent of households 
who reported being earthquake-affected would not be covered by an additional SSA payment. 
For flood events, we assess coverage and inclusion and exclusion errors for a top up to the SSAs in 
the HRVS district with the highest share of respondents reporting that they experienced flooding. 
The number of respondents is small but provides a more useful analysis than a nationwide one. Of 
the 30 households in Banke in HRVS Wave 1 that reported experiencing flooding, one-third are 
covered by the SSA and would be reached by an additional payment but two-thirds of households 
who reported being flood affected would not be covered by an additional SSA payment. In Banke, 47 
households in the sample receive one or more regular SSA payment but 78.7 percent did not report 
being affected by the earthquake (Figure 22). In this case, the inclusion error cost would be high, 
though it is important to note that the reporting period (2015–2016) did not cover a large, covariant 
flood in Nepal.  
For future drought events, we assess coverage and inclusion and exclusion errors for a top up to the 
SSAs and RCIW in the HRVS district with the highest share of respondents reporting that they 
experienced drought. Of the 48 households in Kalilot in HRVS Wave 1 that reported experiencing 
drought, more than half are covered by the SSA and would be reached by an additional payment, 
but just under half of the drought-affected households would not be covered by an additional SSA 
payment. This greater coverage is probably the result of the under 5 child grant being universal in 
Karnali. Of those receiving SSAs, 16.7 percent were not affected by drought (Figure 23). Just 14.6 
percent of drought-affected households are covered by the RCIW and 30 percent of households in 
the RCIW are not affected by drought. Overall, in Kalikot, the RCIW appears too small to make a 
significant contribution to drought response at current coverage levels. In a later section, we will 
explore whether expanding the coverage of programs could work for Nepal’s SP programs to be 
more adaptive. 
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Figure 21: Coverage and exclusion and inclusion errors using SSAs for earthquake response in most severely 
affected districts 
 
Figure 22: Coverage and inclusion and exclusion errors for district-level flood response 
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Figure 23: Coverage, exclusion, and inclusion for district-level drought response 
 
 
There is potential for scaling up programs, but it depends heavily on both the shock affecting a very 
large share of the population and high coverage of SP programs among those affected by shocks. 
Overall though, the estimates based on the HRVS data suggest that SP can support disaster 
responses alongside other humanitarian interventions but not as a substitute for them. 
Could scaling up payments happen in practice? 
The experiences of the ETCTP show that, in terms of institutional capacity, it is possible to deliver 
extraordinary payments to beneficiaries of SP. There is interest in government departments in 
establishing roadmaps for decision making and criteria for the situations when an extraordinary 
payment might be triggered.  
Providing disaster response through SP would require some substantial improvements to delivery 
systems. The delays that are seen at present would have to be eliminated and the timings of 
payments realigned with major shocks. In terms of payments, in many areas, the switching to 
payments through bank accounts is creating problems for people accessing their payments, 
especially senior citizens, people with disability, and single women. More and rapid progress in 
getting mobile banking to rural municipalities and wards would be required.  
In terms of support for scaling up payments, a number of concerns are found at the central, district, 
local, and community levels. Respondents in interviews at the central level raised concerns about 
scaling payments down again. For example, one respondent in the MoF suggested that “as per 
historical experience, once [SP] is increased, you can never take it away, so we cannot ever increase 
during a disaster.” At the community level, respondents expressed concerns about both shock-
affected people being left out, because they are not SP beneficiaries, and about SP beneficiaries 
getting support even though they are not shock affected. At all levels there were concerns about 
‘double-dipping’, that is the disproportionate allocation of support to households with more than 
one individual recipient of SP. Based on the HRVS data, about 17 percent of households that receive 
SP get more than one transfer/allowance, with the majority of multiple-beneficiary households 
being more than one person receiving the old age allowance—usually a husband and wife. 
The implications are that, in terms of public, political, and bureaucratic support, programs are more 
likely to be acceptable if they  
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(a) Make only temporary increases in payment rates over a limited number of months, or as 
extraordinary payments;  
(b) Do not limit shock response only to existing SP beneficiaries; and 
(c) Include a mechanism that recognizes which households receive more than one SP transfer to 
stop them from receiving a disproportionate share.  
This will require an effective mechanism for communicating about increases to beneficiaries and 
local communities, in particular, and more coordination with humanitarian responses in the future.  
6.4.2 Expand coverage 
Given that Nepal’s SP programs are fledgling but expanding, and the lesson from international 
experience that high levels of coverage are required for SP programs to support disaster mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery, it is useful to consider how far expanded versions of Nepal’s 
existing programs might provide ASP. 
There are various options for doing so across the main SP programs. In   
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Table 12 we calculate coverage for expanded versions of Nepal’s existing programs. For example, we 
assume that the old and disability allowances have perfect coverage (everyone age 70 and over, 
even those without citizenship documents, and everyone with a red or blue card receives benefits). 
We estimate coverage for scenarios in which all households with children under five, not just those 
in Dalit or Karnali households, receive allowances. And we estimate the coverage in that program is 
extended to all households with children under ten. Finally, we extend the single women/widows 
allowance to all female-headed households, and the disability allowance to anyone reporting a 
disability (irrespective of which card they hold).  
At a national level, inclusion and exclusion errors remain high in the estimates. We suggest further 
work running this analysis on a district-by-district basis to provide more accurate estimates. This 
could provide, in the future, a useful decision-making tool for policy makers, given that it is highly 
unlikely that a shock will ever affect every single district in Nepal. Overall, the lesson is that, by itself, 
having a high level of coverage of SP programs is not enough to maximize the role of SP in disaster 
response. Because of the relationship between exposure to shocks and poverty, having an element 
of poverty-targeting seems to be critical. 
6.4.3 Refocusing and revising programs for effective response 
In their respective frameworks OPM (2017) describe ‘refocusing’ as the tightening of targeting or 
concentration of support among a smaller group or number of households. Bastagli (2014) focus on 
changing or relaxing program requirements and design to better support households facing shocks. 
To this we add ‘re-envisioning’ programs—essentially a different kind of refocusing process but one 
that widens rather than narrows the vision of programs and the ways in which they work. 
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Table 12: Coverage and exclusion and inclusion errors for shock response routed through expanded SP 
programs 
Program  Earthquake 
(%) 
Landslide 
(%) 
Flood 
(%) 
Drought 
(%) 
Fire 
(%) 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
w
it
h
 m
e
m
b
er
 
ag
e 
7
0
 o
r 
ab
o
ve
* 
Shock-affected households included 
16.1 15.2 11.1 14.0 4.3 
Shock-affected households excluded 
83.9 84.8 88.9 86.0 95.7 
Share of households with member 
age 70+ that are not shock affected 8.5 97.2 97.5 80.8 99.9 
Fe
m
al
e 
h
ea
d
ed
 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
Shock-affected households included 
18.8 17.2 21.6 20.6 13.0 
Shock-affected households excluded 
81.2 82.8 78.4 79.4 87.0 
Share of female-headed households 
that are not shock affected 13.1 97.8 96.5 80.2 99.7 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 
w
it
h
 a
 c
h
ild
 
u
n
d
er
 5
 y
ea
rs
 Shock-affected households included 
26.0 41.7 36.8 39.3 26.1 
Shock-affected households excluded 
74.0 58.3 63.2 60.7 73.9 
Share of households with member 
age under 5 and not shock affected 13.2 96.9 96.5 77.8 99.7 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
w
it
h
 a
 c
h
ild
 
u
n
d
er
 1
0
 y
ea
rs
 Shock-affected households included 
46.0 58.3 64.2 63.1 60.9 
Shock-affected households excluded 
54.0 41.7 35.8 36.9 39.1 
Share of households with child 
under 10 that are not shock affected 13.1 97.5 96.5 79.5 99.6 
D
al
it
 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
Shock-affected households included 
15.3 9.3 12.6 15.0 26.1 
Shock-affected households excluded 
84.7 90.7 87.4 85.0 73.9 
Share of Dalit households that are 
not shock affected 9.5 98.6 97.6 82.7 99.4 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
w
it
h
 a
 
m
e
m
b
er
 w
it
h
 s
ev
er
e 
d
is
ab
ili
ty
 
Shock-affected households included 
1.4 4.0 3.7 1.3 4.3 
Shock-affected households excluded 
98.6 96.0 96.3 98.7 95.7 
Share of households with member 
with severe disability and not shock 
affected 15.4 92.9 91.8 82.4 98.8 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
w
it
h
 a
 m
e
m
b
er
 
w
it
h
 a
n
y 
d
is
ab
ili
ty
 
Shock-affected households included 
5.8 14.6 8.4 7.7 8.7 
Shock-affected households excluded 
94.2 85.4 91.6 92.3 91.3 
Share of households with disabled 
that are not shock affected 6.0 93.9 95.6 76.0 99.4 
Note: * Differences in figures for households with a member under 70 here and those for old age allowance in 
These estimates suggest large gaps in coverage and substantial exclusion and inclusion errors if shock-
responsive SP is targeted using the same lists as regular SP programs. However, the estimates are 
based on 50 districts in the HRVS and so, for more robust estimates we explore in more detail on a 
district-by-district, shock-by-shock, and program-by-program basis whether delivering shock 
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response through SP, as well as supporting disaster-affected people, might tackle the structural 
vulnerabilities that underpin poverty in an effective way. 
Table 11 reflect perfect coverage (while in reality not all age 70 or above receive old age allowance because 
they lack citizenship documents) and the fact that Karnali and Dalit households receive the allowance from 60. 
 
Refocusing by tightening targeting to support the most vulnerable in the face of shocks. Our fieldwork 
at the local level in Nepal suggests that certain groups—particularly single women and the 
disabled—were being routinely excluded through current shock-response targeting processes. There 
were numerous occasions where they found themselves left off lists of beneficiaries and watched 
neighbors—usually those with stronger social networks—work the system far more effectively. For 
governments where there are attempts to narrow, rather than widen, the share of beneficiaries, 
routing through households that are viewed by the government as particularly vulnerable would be 
appropriate. However, interviews among government officials and others suggest that, 
notwithstanding attempts to ensure that shock responses reach Dalit communities, there is no 
emphasis in shock response on tightening targeting on particular demographic groups. In fact, more 
than concentrating resources on a particular group of (excluded) people during a shock, the priority 
of the government appears to be to reach those who are most shock affected, irrespective of 
whether they are from a particularly vulnerable demographic or social category.  
Relaxing program implementation  
There are numerous ways in which programs might be relaxed. In public works, it may be 
appropriate to temporarily pay ‘wages’ without requiring work, especially if ‘works’ are difficult to 
organize. This might be because of the impacts of the disaster on the immediate physical 
environment, because works require technical support that is not available during a disaster, or 
because shortfalls of food and injuries due to the disaster may mean that people are not in an 
appropriate physical condition to work. Although relaxing program requirements can raise 
concerns—for example about creating dependency or people becoming lazy—it is important to 
stress that these concerns are inappropriate during disasters when saving lives and ensuring that 
people’s access to food, shelter, water, and health services must be the priority. It is also important 
to note that, in many other countries, works requirements have been relaxed during disasters 
without long-term negative implications. 
It may also be appropriate to shift activities in PWPs—perhaps away from road construction, to 
more rehabilitation-focused activities. ‘Tidy up’ activities vary in scale with some requiring 
equipment and skilled workers but others with few such requirements. Examples of small-scale 
activities include the clearance of blockages to roads, rivers, and water supply and mending small-
scale irrigation systems and terracing. 
6.5 What might work for disaster recovery through SP in Nepal? 
The opportunities for delivering disaster recovery through SP in Nepal are modest but noteworthy. 
On the whole they are linked to the options already outlined above. Messaging could be tailored to 
provide guidance on sources of information for agricultural rehabilitation or housing repair and 
reconstruction. Evidence from other countries shows that a regular poverty-targeted program would 
provide resources for households to invest in rebuilding livelihoods, encourage children back into 
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school more quickly, and allow access to lower interest loans for recovery of lost assets. Top ups to 
support housing reconstruction could be routed through the SSAs. Public works could be deployed 
(as in the Philippines, see Bowen [2015]) on a whole range of reconstruction and rehabilitation 
projects in infrastructure and environmental management, to restore key assets. 
In the aftermath of the 2015 earthquakes and the 2016-17 floods, the targeting of support for 
recovery has been very focused on individual households. Providing work through PWPs could also 
provide a cost-effective mechanism for the restoration of public infrastructure, buildings, and other 
public assets while simultaneously providing a wage to shock-affected households. Linking the new 
Prime Minister’s Employment Program to the NRA might be worth exploring as a mechanism for 
achieving reconstruction of public assets that supports the wellbeing of individual households 
simultaneously.  
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Chapter 7: Toward Adaptive Social 
Protection in Nepal - Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
The recommendations presented here draw on findings from our desk and consultation-based 
analysis of existing policies, systems, and programs (and the institutional capacity therein) for both 
SP and DRM. It also draws on the experiences of shocks and disasters among SP beneficiaries and 
others at the community level in Bardiya, Humla, Saptari, and Sindhupalchok districts. 
We have sought to be cognizant of the fact that this is a unique moment in Nepal’s history, one in 
which substantial changes are emerging in both policy discourses and agendas and in 
implementation practices, and one in which it is important not to increase the burden on a currently 
disrupted and dislocated suite of government institutions. As a result, we stress both the importance 
of building on existing processes and modalities, that is, the endeavors and undertakings that are 
already established or underway, but also attempt (after being inspired by people’s courage and 
forbearance at the local level) to be more aspirational and ambitious and explore options that will 
require a re-visioning of SP and DRM. 
The chapter begins by assessing what the implications of lessons from the previous chapters are for 
ASP in Nepal. It then makes some recommendations for the GoN—in most cases directed to specific 
actors in specific ministries—and its development partners to explore further for making SP more 
adaptive and for using SP to help disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. The 
recommendations are scaled—beginning with those that build on what is already in place and 
ending with longer-term approaches to ASP that could emerge over time. 
7.1 Implications and recommendations for ASP in Nepal 
Overall, the key implication for ASP in Nepal is that ‘one size’ will not fit all. There is no single SP 
program that offers a ‘best bet’ for ASP. Different programs have different useful features, for 
example, some are useful because they are targeted to the households that are most likely to 
experience shocks and have limited capacity to cope with the impact of shocks, while others are not 
targeted in such a way but reach many shock-affected households simply on account of their greater 
coverage. The distinctions between covariant and idiosyncratic shocks, the fact that some disasters 
are slower onset than others, the fact that Nepal’s existing SP programs have very differentiated 
coverage in different parts of the country and are targeted very differently, and the ways in which 
different shocks (earthquake versus fire, drought versus flood) are experienced mean that it will be 
necessary to consider options for a range of different situations. 
The recommendations here are underpinned by a number of principles. First, given that there are 
substantial financial and institutional constraints and Nepal’s current exposure to shocks will only 
increase under accepted climate change scenarios, it is critical to start with existing policies, 
programs, and systems as much as possible. Second, recommendations are based on an assessment 
of what is realistic and feasible given existing human, institutional, and financial capacity in Nepal—
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notably in the context of the transition to a three-tier federal political system and decentralized 
institutions for defining and delivering government programs.  
7.2 Overarching recommendations 
Continue existing efforts to strengthen SP systems, particularly systems for identification, 
payment, targeting, and management processes. SP programs that perform well in response to 
shocks in other parts of the world are those that are able to deliver transfers reliably, with high 
levels of coverage, and at an adequate level (Bastagli et al. 2014; Grosh et al. 2011; Ulrichs and Slater 
2017). So, there are strong arguments for continued investments—partly those being carried out in 
the Department of Civil Registration (DoCR)—in making the SP system itself work better in Nepal. 
Continuing the shift from annual to rolling enrolment for the SSAs is a core foundation of flexibility. 
Recipients of numerous programs such as the SSAs and PWPs reported that income from SP helped 
them to maintain consumption during both the floods and the 2015 earthquake—so ensuring that 
those payments are made reliably and perhaps tweaking payment times so that they take place just 
before seasonal shocks (such as floods and cold waves) are likely to hit, would be a useful way of 
building on existing systems strengthening efforts.  
Clarify and make provisions in guidelines and regulations for SP representation in DRM decision 
making and allow for the routing of some disaster response through the emergency top ups in the 
SSAs and other SP programs. International experience demonstrates the importance of a formal 
regulatory framework to allow institutional coordination between SP and DRM agencies. These 
processes require specific arrangements to be in place (for example the provision for representation 
of MoFAGA and MoHA, the two main agencies responsible for SP programs) on the national DRM 
committee is, alone, not sufficient to ensure that SP is mainstreamed through DRM processes. 
Ensuring alignment will require direct involvement in the committee and DMA of the Department of 
Civil Registration and those parts of MoFAGA responsible for delivering public works. We also 
recommend that in the immediate term the working group developing the DMA regulations 
incorporates a specific SP role into the DMA, and that those responsible for revising SSA guidelines 
include mechanisms for incorporating both the goals of resilience building (for disaster mitigation) 
and flexibility (for response and recovery).  
Make clear provisions in sector guidelines for the routing of some disaster response resources 
through SP programs. At present, it is not clear if and how resources and funds for disaster 
management might be routed through SP budgets and using SP bank accounts and payment 
systems. There is disagreement among stakeholders on the technical feasibility of routing funding 
through the SP systems. Clarification of these mechanisms as the DRM regulations and guidelines 
are developed is required rather urgently, not least because routing funding through SP systems 
does provide the transparency and accountability for the contributions made by international 
donors. Further clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the different levels of government in 
declaring a disaster or emergency and triggering a response is also required. 
Continue the switch to making payments through electronic means and mobile banking with the 
concomitant implication that more banking would need to be available locally—to allow a more 
rapid payment of emergency support through local systems. This is a ‘no regrets’ option because 
even if, during a shock, a decision is made not to target through the SP or there is no shock, ensuring 
there is banking in every municipality and rural municipality, and perhaps even every ward, will 
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provide substantial benefits such as the reduction of fiduciary risks in the SP sector and financial 
inclusion in the wider community. 
7.3 Recommendations for SP’s role in mitigation and preparedness 
Increase attention and resources for mitigation and preparedness. The focus on recovery, 
particularly the reconstruction process for buildings and homes, leaves little attention paid to 
mitigation and preparedness. It is important to ensure that more focus and clarity is created at the 
central level—notably in the Executive Committee and DMA—on disaster mitigation and 
preparedness. This needs to filter down to the local level to allow a clear understanding of roles and 
responsibilities, and funding streams, in these areas. Two direct ways of doing this are presented 
below.  
Beginning a dialogue on potential policy and program options for poverty-targeted SP  
In Nepal, there are few SP programs providing transfers that explicit target poverty, although there 
is progress toward a poverty identification process. PWPs target using HDI indicators and/or 
seasonal food gaps, but the remainder of programs target based on social and demographic 
categories and this limits the extent to which the poorest and most vulnerable can be supported to 
build more resilience to shocks. Poverty-targeted SP programs are key to ASP. Given substantial 
progress toward establishing SP in Nepal over the last decade, and the pressing need to tackle 
vulnerability and impoverishment amidst increasing threats from natural disasters, this is an 
appropriate moment to start discussing how a poverty-targeted SP program might work to improve 
the resilience of the poorest households in Nepal. The dialogue would be a broad one—between the 
implementers of SP and development partners in particular—but the practicalities of the process 
would require direct coordination between MoFAGA (for SSAs) and the Ministry of Land 
Management, Cooperatives and Poverty Alleviation (MOLMCPA) (for the poverty identification card 
system). 
Consider integrating PWPs more with existing climate change adaptation, DRM, and 
agriculture/rural development programs 
There is substantial opportunity to link public works initiatives to wider actions seeking to adapt and 
protect livelihoods, especially agricultural livelihoods in the context of threats from climate change, 
and to broader infrastructure investments. Linking PWPs directly and explicitly with the NAPA for 
Climate Change (GoN 2010) and with LAPAs and with emerging agricultural strategies would provide 
mechanisms for public works to contribute across the full cycle of DRM. Afforestation activities in 
public works would mitigate landslides, flood, and drought. Monitoring of river, dam, and snow pack 
levels could become a public works activity and be formalized and systematized at the community 
level. During recovery, workers might contribute to the rehabilitation of damaged roads, community 
buildings, or agricultural land. Clarifying the roles of the various central-level committees in respect 
of the four phases of DRM would be an important step toward achieving this. Specific ways of 
achieving this broader utilization of PWPs would be through the following:  
Incorporate disaster mitigation objectives and activities into the planning of the new Prime 
Minister’s Employment Program. International evidence is awash with examples of public works 
activities that have supported soil and water conversation, constructed small-scale irrigation and 
water management schemes, or delivered afforestation activities. These sorts of activities would 
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mitigate disasters associated with flood, drought, landslide, and fire. This would require a planning 
process for the new program with strong engagement of the line ministries associated with water, 
land, and forest management and with infrastructure and engineering to identify the most 
appropriate and effective activities across Nepal. 
Pre-positioning resources for shock response. This could be in terms of monetary resources or food 
stocks and would reduce delays in in-kind or cash transfers once beneficiary needs have been 
identified. A specific example of pre-positioning resources would be the Nepal Food Corporation and 
its PFDS. The MoCTS would need to work with MoHA and other agencies such as NeKSAP to ensure 
food stocks are in place in remote areas where shocks are anticipated. This was a key part of the 
government’s response to the 2015 earthquake. Food stocks can be sold (at varying rates of subsidy) 
during a shock, bought by the government and then distributed to shock-affected households. 
Maintaining food stocks where markets do not function properly is also critical to ensuring that 
other cash-based responses work: the first rule in emergency cash distribution is that local markets 
work. In the 2015 earthquake and in the following blockades, the PFDS was able to ensure the 
supply of food at reasonable prices in places where the private sector could not supply, except at 
very high prices. 
In terms of financing, international experience suggests that there are benefits to holding 
contingency budgets or pre-positioning financial resources not just at the central level, but at all tiers 
of government. While the roles of provincial governments are yet to be clarified, at the local level 
there is confusion over financial flows for different elements of DRM and how preparedness can be 
supported without building local contingency budgets that needs to be addressed. Furthermore, it 
may be useful to explore contingency mechanisms held beyond the national level, including through 
Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Options. 
Piggyback disaster preparedness messaging onto SP communications 
International experience, and Nepal’s limited experiences attaching messaging to the ETCTP, 
demonstrate the potential for incorporating disaster management into cash transfer 
communications. Examples could include seasonally timed reminders about the risk of fire or 
information about potential aftershocks following an earthquake. It is recommended that the DoCR 
assesses how far it could provide an appropriate vehicle for disaster risk communications as part of 
its own information—such as DRM messaging on payment slips and text messages when 
beneficiaries are alerted that payments have been made into their bank accounts or are ready for 
collection. In principal, the vehicle applies not only to preparedness but also to mitigation, response, 
and recovery. 
7.4 Recommendations for response and recovery 
Rethink the assessment criteria for targeting response and recovery. The review found that 
damage to housing was the primary criteria driving the targeting of response and recovery. Given 
that this focus was leading to some unintended outcomes at the local level—particularly households 
with no mechanism to meet their basic needs or maintain their livelihoods receiving no support—a 
review of the assessment criteria used at the local level by MoHA is suggested, with inputs from 
across all clusters. In particular, it is essential to focus the resources on those households who are 
not able to cope with the impacts of shocks, rather than on all households affected by a shock (but 
who might be able to mitigate its impacts), to ensure efficiency of public spending.  
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Consider temporarily expanding SP payments to existing beneficiaries 
Although there are legitimate concerns about inclusion and exclusion errors, there are a number of 
reasons to further explore the expansion of SP payments. First, the evidence suggests that cash and 
in-kind benefits provided following the 2015 earthquake appear to have resulted in shock-affected 
beneficiaries being significantly less food insecure than those households that were affected by the 
earthquake but were not receiving any SP. Second, for those programs whose targeting is linked to 
poverty and food insecurity (for example, PWPs) temporarily setting the PWPs wage rate closer to 
the local casual labor rate (instead of the usual 20 percent reduction on the local rate) would be 
appropriate and reflect the fact that during a disaster there may be few opportunities in the local 
labor market. Third, evidence from both this study and others (for example, Schjødt 2017) suggests 
that people understand the targeting of the SSAs, whereas they found the various targeting systems 
for the flood and earthquake response difficult to understand. Fourth, expanding payments to 
existing beneficiaries would provide a mechanism for reaching households that otherwise struggle to 
access support following disasters. Our fieldwork demonstrates the importance of social networks 
and patronage in accessing support and that many vulnerable groups (most notably those in receipt 
of the single women/widow’s allowance) do not make it onto lists at the community level. Providing 
payments through the SSAs would prevent the potential shortcoming of community-level 
targeting—that local networks, power relations, and discretion determine eligibility at the local level 
to the detriment of excluded groups. Having elected officials might make targeting decisions more 
accountable to residents in the long term (when they can choose not to reelect a mayor or 
chairperson whose resource allocation decisions they did not agree with) but this long-term 
incentive may help little in ensuring that the most needy people get the support that is desperately 
required in the immediate term. Fifth, when receiving SSAs during shocks, beneficiaries found that 
they were part of the solution to a household’s troubles, rather than being seen as a burden on the 
household. Respondents felt that this had a substantial impact on their position in the community 
and reduced social exclusion. 
A ‘sub-recommendation’ here is the importance of recognizing that increasing transfer levels could 
present a number of trade-offs and of being prepared to navigate these. Schjødt (2017, 42) notes 
that in selected districts affected by the earthquake “there were complaints about the earthquake 
support, which has less clear eligibility criteria, but none about the SP benefits.” As much as the 
targeting of the SSAs appears to be widely accepted—at all levels of government and within 
communities themselves—there is however a serious risk that targeting a shock response through 
the SSAs could create serious resentment and, potentially, endanger already vulnerable recipients. 
As Koehler and Mathers (2017, 350) note, for Nepal “there are indications that this kind of positive 
discrimination may—inadvertently—deepen divisions and social exclusion. In Nepal, some 
communities are not happy with the additional benefits accorded to their Dalit co-citizens.” 
Communication about a system routing funds through the SSAs would be critical. Tackling this will 
require far better communication than has been the case thus far. The trade-offs between 
acceptable targeting and speed of response are particularly acute in a post-conflict setting such as 
Nepal where grievances (in this case about access to emergency support) can endure for a long time 
and potentially undermine political stability (Slater and Mallett 2017). 
Use SP as one of a complementary set of mechanisms for emergency response and not as an 
alternative to emergency response  
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Overall, the recommendation is that routing benefits through SP should not be an alternative to a 
wider shock response but could work well alongside other complementary responses. Routing part 
of a shock response through existing SP would reduce the caseload of needs assessment and 
targeting that would be required at the local level during the response. Only households not in 
receipt of SP would require assessment with the potential to significantly speed up the assessment 
process. 
7.5 Conclusions 
The recommendations presented here are intended to support a dialogue about options for making 
SP more adaptive in Nepal and discussions about the roles that various stakeholders—government, 
donors, and NGOs—might play in that process. A number of options have been analyzed in Chapter 
6 and woven into these recommendations. The recommendations cover actions that are proposed 
focused on policies, institutions, and coordination, and on programs themselves. They encompass 
different levels of ambition, with varied potential outcomes. The more ambitious the option, the 
greater the potential for supporting DRM across all four pillars (Table 13). 
Finally, the four key messages from the review are as follows:  
First, the variation in shocks—from those that come with little or no warning to those that are 
seasonal and those that have a slow onset; from those that affect very few people in specific 
locations to those that are generalized across the population; from those that cause death and injury 
to those that damage housing and to those that undermine livelihoods—means that there is no 
single best option for using SP to tackle the major shocks that Nepal faces. Multiple pathways for SP 
will need to be bear in mind these differences and adopt a best-fit approach across a range of 
circumstances. 
Second, the tumultuous changes in Nepal’s political and administrative systems mean programs will 
have to be flexible, not just to the specificities of individual disasters, but also to the constant 
transition and upheaval in government institutions, particularly at the local level. Assessing 
capabilities to deliver each of the options will be critical. However, the new arrangements at the 
local government level may also offer opportunities—in particular to work in a more integrated way.  
Third, while delivering disaster management through SP in this rapidly changing context is difficult—
it also provides a unique window of opportunity to establish new ways of working that better link SP 
and responding to shocks, not just in terms of immediate disaster responses but also in relation to 
mitigation, preparedness, and recovery.  
Lastly, the recommendations proposed here purposely encompass some relatively easy to achieve 
ways of better linking SP and DRM and some rather more ambitious ones. They are meant as the 
starting point for a dialogue between the government and other development and humanitarian 
agencies that might, in turn, be reflected in the guidelines that underpin SP and DRM systems, 
procedures, and programs. 
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Table 13: Mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery outcomes from recommended actions 
Recommended Actions Outcomes 
 Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery 
Policy, institutional, and systemic 
Strengthen SP systems—particularly systems 
for identification, payment, targeting, and 
management processes. 
X x X x 
Make provision in guidelines for SP 
representation in DRM decision making and 
vice versa. 
X X x x 
Put in place a contingency and financing 
strategy for the financing of responses to 
shocks.  
  X  
Clarify the procedures for expanding SP—
especially early warning criteria for triggering 
expanded payments or other pre-determined 
responses to shocks.  
 X X  
Expand electronic and mobile banking 
services for SP payments. 
X X X x 
Put in place a national social registry for the 
identification of potential beneficiaries when 
shocks occur. 
    
Programmatic 
Attach DRM messages to SP payments. x x x x 
Ensure pre-positioning of food stocks using 
Nepal’s PFDS and manage food depot prices 
flexibly.  
X X X x 
Expand temporarily SSA benefit levels.  x  X x 
Expand (temporarily) coverage of cash 
transfers to shock-affected households. 
x  X X 
Expand public works payments and coverage. x  X x 
Establish a national poverty-targeted SP 
program to address chronic poverty and 
increase the resilience of the poor to shocks.  
X x x x 
Use public works as part of integrated climate 
change/rural development/disaster 
management response. 
X x X X 
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Annex 1: Statistical Analysis 
Annex Table 1: Exposure to shocks and gender of household head 
Type of shocks All households 
Female-headed 
households 
Male headed 
households 
Wilcoxon rank-
sum (Mann-
Whitney) test 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. P-value 
Any shock 54.8 49.8 54.3 49.8 54.9 49.8 0.677 
Earthquake1 89.9 30.2 86.9 33.9 90.6 29.2 0.139 
Flood 3.2 17.5 3.5 18.3 3.1 17.3 0.504 
Landslide 2.5 15.7 2.2 14.7 2.6 15.9 0.440 
Drought 18.9 39.2 19.8 39.9 18.7 39.0 0.371 
Fire 0.4 6.2 0.3 5.0 0.4 6.4 0.422 
Forced displacement 0.0 1.8 0.2 4.1 0.0 0.0 - 
Riots/blockages 20.7 40.5 18.5 38.8 21.2 40.9 0.037** 
Death of a family member 1.8 13.4 3.6 18.5 1.4 11.7 0.000*** 
Diseases or injury of family 
member 
12.9 33.5 13.9 34.6 12.6 33.2 0.235 
Breakup of family 0.2 4.1 0.3 5.0 0.1 3.8 0.412 
Fuel shortage  2.1 14.4 2.8 16.5 2.0 13.8 0.071* 
Unexpected higher prices 18.0 38.4 22.8 42.0 16.9 37.5 0.000*** 
Livestock loss 4.1 19.8 4.2 20.1 4.0 19.7 0.771 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
‘-’Too few households of this type are exposed to this shock. 
1 Earthquake is based only on earthquake-affected districts in sample (7 districts out of the 50 in the HRVS: Gorkha, 
Dhading, Nuwakot, Kavrepalanchok, Sindhupalchok, Dolakha, and Makwanpur). 
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Annex Table 2: Exposure to shocks for households with children under five years of age 
Type of shocks 
Households with 
children under 5 
Households without 
children under 5 
Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann-Whitney) test 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. P-value 
Any shock 53.8 49.9 55.3 49.7 0.245 
Earthquake 32.1 46.7 39.9 49.0 0.000*** 
Earthquake1 86.8 33.9 91.0 28.6 0.061* 
Flood 3.5 18.4 3.0 17.1 0.804 
Landslide 3.1 17.4 2.2 14.7 0.266 
Drought 22.2 41.6 17.2 37.8 0.283 
Fire 0.3 5.5 0.4 6.5 0.06* 
Riots/blockages 18.1 38.5 21.9 41.4 0.182 
Death of a family member 1.6 12.7 1.9 13.7 0.606 
Diseases or injury of family member 13.9 34.6 12.3 32.9 0.690 
Breakup of family 0.1 3.9 0.2 4.2 0.291 
Fuel shortage  2.1 14.3 2.1 14.4 0.902 
Unexpected higher prices 18.4 38.8 17.8 38.3 0.016** 
Livestock loss 3.8 19.2 4.2 20.1 0.899 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
‘-‘Too few households of this type exposed to this shock 
1 Earthquake is based on earthquake-affected districts in sample (7 districts out of the 50 in the HRVS: Gorkha, Dhading, 
Nuwakot, Kavrepalanchok, Sindhupalchok, Dolakha and Makwanpur).  
 
Annex Table 3: Exposure to shocks by age group of household head 
Type of shocks 
Household head age 
≤ median 
Household head age > 
median < 70 years 
Household head age 
70+ 
Kruskal-
Wallis test 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. P-value 
Any shock 53.2 49.9 56.4 49.6 56.6 49.6 0.103* 
Earthquake 35.4 47.8 39.1 48.8 39.7 49.0 0.040** 
Earthquake1 88.4 32.0 91.2 28.4 91.6 27.9 0.364 
Flood 3.1 17.4 3.5 18.3 1.7 13.0 0.836 
Landslide 2.3 15.0 2.7 16.1 3.0 17.1 0.953 
Drought 18.0 38.4 20.0 40.0 19.2 39.4 0.426 
Fire 0.5 7.2 0.3 5.3 0.0 0.0 - 
Riots/blockages 20.0 40.0 21.9 41.4 18.6 38.9 0.333 
Death of a family 
member 
1.5 12.2 2.1 14.3 2.4 15.2 0.190 
Diseases or injury of 
family member 
10.8 31.0 14.1 34.9 19.4 39.6 0.000*** 
Breakup of family 0.2 4.4 0.1 2.8 0.4 6.6 - 
Fuel shortage  1.8 13.2 2.1 14.3 4.5 20.8 0.000*** 
Unexpected higher 
prices 
17.9 38.3 17.7 38.2 20.7 40.6 0.286 
Livestock loss 3.9 19.4 4.6 21.0 2.2 14.6 0.038** 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
‘-‘Too few households of this type exposed to this shock. 
1 Earthquake is based on earthquake-affected districts in sample (7 districts out of the 50 in the HRVS: Gorkha, Dhading, 
Nuwakot, Kavrepalanchok, Sindhupalchok, Dolakha, and Makwanpur). 
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Annex 2: Case Study Figures 
Annex Figure 1 DRM and ASP service delivery in event of flood 
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Annex Figure 2 DRM and ASP service delivery in event of earthquake 
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Annex Figure 3 DRM and ASP service delivery in event of drought 
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Annex Figure 4 DRM and ASP service delivery in event of landslide 
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Annex Figure 5 DRM and ASP service delivery in event of fire 
 
